TheDaak review

VOLUME II ISSUE I

Introduction

India, that is Bharat has come a long way since its Independence from British colonial rule in 1947. India conducted its first general election in 1952-53 and will now be conducting its eighteenth in early 2024. From ballot papers designed on Bamboo shoots and election officials ferrying them across length and breadth of the state to questioning the EVM, Indian democracy has taken many winding turns. People of all hues and colours will participate in the great Indian election. Some will watch in great anticipation and others in resigned hope. Even the most cynical observer of Indian elections has defined it as a festival of democracy. An intriguing question arises, is the Indian electoral process a people’s process? Does it represent the people’s will? Who are the people? Why does India Vote?

The constitutional promise of ‘We the people of India’ in one sense can be seen as a promise of fair and equal representation to all the people of India. This representation is embodied in the institutional framework and structure adopted by the Indian constitutional polity. Based on the principle of universal adult suffrage, the Indian legislature and executive came into being. People’s representation puts power and authority into the structure to speak for and about the people of their concerned constituencies. Notional representation and values of identity representation have reverberated in the Indian legislature where a number of marginalized groups, including tribals, Dalits, other backward classes, minorities and women are mindful of their additional representation positions. Women across party lines coming together on the question of women’s reservation bill is an example in point. Despite this solidarity, women reservation in parliament had hardly ever become an election issue. Even now when it is passed, several questions have been raised with respect to whether or not it has remained truly representative of the women in India.

People while exercising their right to vote have voted based on many factors; predominantly among them were religion and caste. In several decades now, both muscle and money have remained dominant features of our representational story. The largest festival of democracy also spends the largest money on itself. Electoral finance has gained traction from both policy makers as well scholars but records of accountability on this count have remained poor. Indian political parties have remained firmly against complying with the right to information act. In the transforming nature of political representation and electoral process, successful electoral reforms have plugged many holes.

Indian judiciary imagined as a bulwark against the excesses of executive and legislative power has had a mixed performance too. But it has over the years helped bring a number of reforms including those related to criminalisation of politics, EVM systems and even election commission. Judiciary has also found itself at loggerheads with the executive and legislatures over matters of Public interest litigation, disqualifications of political leaders and in matters labelled as judicial overreach and judicial activism. These encounters have made the story of representation and Indian institutions a truly contested one. Judicial appointment has remained a subject of intense debate among scholars, academics as well as political leaders.

The role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law and safeguarding the constitution underscores the importance of judicial appointments. However, achieving a balance between judicial independence and ensuring diversity and representation within the judiciary remains a challenge. The evolution of the judicial appointment process continues to be a matter of critical concern and reform in the Indian legal landscape.

Ideas on representation however are not limited to the representational institutions, they go well beyond. In popular culture and the public sphere, people as a category have gone through multiple iterations. Is it the people of the pilgrimage, or that of the India versus Pakistan match, are they the people walking bare-foot back to their villages after covid lockdown. Indian people are represented, miss represented and under represented everyday, in social media, print media, memes, monuments and movies. State sponsored media since independence through censorship and patronage encouraged ideas of representation. Doordarshan and Prasar Bharti have taken projects of national integration and Mann ki baat to bring home the ideas that inform the nation.

India has also inherited ideas from its past. In that sense there has been some continuity in the history of ideas as opposed to political history which has seen disruptors as well as disruptions. These ideas have often remained in constant dialogue and sometimes in conflict with each other. There is a strong sense in which these ideas have answered the question of who belongs to India and who this ancient civilisation belongs to. The history of ideas therefore is one of plural contestations about this land, its people and future.

Encounters with western ideas of civilization and modernity made Indian people respond to some of the difficult questions on representations. Existing hierarchies of class, caste, language and gender made for a robust public debate on these questions. Reform movements of the early 19th century brought up issues of quality and liberty within the social-religious sphere. The Indian National movement was colored by opinions and ideology of all kinds. These ideas of and on the future of India, including Gandhian ideas of ‘Swaraj’ and ‘Ram Rajya’, Tagore’s ‘Cosmopolitanism’, Savarkar’s Hindutva, Nehruvian scientific socialism, Bhagat Singh’s Socialist Republicanism, Ambedkar’s Constitutional and Social Democracy, have held popular imaginations even now.

Throughout the life of the Indian Republic, several questions from the founding moment have resurfaced as different faces. Observers, commentators and even political leaders have questioned the efficacy of first past the post system in the electoral process. The chequered history of role of election commission, electoral bonds and independence of constitutional authorities has marked the landscape of representative democracy.

The Political history of the nation and the ideas prevalent about the people has gone through considerable change throughout the life of this subcontinent. Given the historical juncture of 75 years of Indian Independence, the question of Representation of people is worth examining. Representation seen both in terms of the institutional structure of the polity, in their performance and functioning and the representation of people (one, many and all) in the Idea(s) of India.

WHO SPEAKS FOR WHOM? THE STORIES OF CASTE, MEDIA AND REPRESENTATION FROM BEHIND THE CURTAINS

by Avichal Warke

Abstract

Caste biases and discrimination against Dalits in Indian society have been enduring social realities. Historically, Dalits have faced social exclusion based on caste, lacking a legitimate place in the Hindu social order and being relegated to a subordinate status within society. Mainstream media content reflects a strong so-called upper caste bias, especially when caste becomes a focal point in the news. The role of mass media is pivotal in large democracies, not only serving as a source of information and entertainment but also playing a central role in facilitating discussions and debates on crucial societal issues. The examination of diversity, or the lack thereof, in newsrooms is a relatively recent topic to pique academic interest, but the discussion around it is very important to understand the deep-rooted social realities, and plays a key role in shaping public opinion. Dalit women in Indian society are triply exploited on the basis of caste, class and gender. The often paired patriarchal undertones to the feminist narratives by the media makes it a tremendous task for women to voice their own challenges and put forth narrative through their voice. This task becomes mammoth and more complex when it infiltrates the caste hierarchy.

INTRODUCTION:

  Turn in any direction you like, caste is the monster that crosses your path. You cannot have political reform, you cannot have economic reform unless you kill this monster (Ambedkar, 1936). Caste biases and discrimination against Dalits in Indian society have been enduring social realities. Historically, Dalits have faced social exclusion based on caste, lacking a legitimate place in the Hindu social order and being relegated to a subordinate status within society. Even today, Dalits encounter various forms of humiliation, stigmatisation, and exclusion, particularly in rural areas of India. They continue to face barriers in accessing resources, education, and employment opportunities, coupled with discrimination in various aspects of their lives. Dalits face systemic exclusion in all walks of life. They still reside in segregated settlements, engage in occupations associated with defilement and stigma, and endure routine contempt, abuse, and ridicule. Physical atrocities against Dalits are unfortunately prevalent. NCRB’s ‘Crime in India’ reports that crimes against SCs went up 13% and against STs by 14.3% in 2022 (Pandit, 2023).  Although urban India is not free from social exclusion of Dalits, the nature and intensity of this exclusion differ, manifesting in more subtle and sophisticated ways.

  The historical roots of the caste system have led to social hierarchies and inequalities, with Dalits bearing the brunt of marginalization. Despite legal efforts to address these issues, like Article 15 (1) which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, caste, religion, sex or place of birth; Article 17 of the Fundamental Rights of the Indian constitution which abolishes untouchability; SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, and more, the lived experiences of Dalits often reveal ongoing challenges. They continue to face barriers in accessing resources, education, and employment opportunities, coupled with discrimination in various aspects of their lives. They face discrimination in workplaces, educational institutes, classrooms and also among their peer circles. There is a rise in student suicide cases which can also be termed as ‘Institutional Murders’ because of the kind of pressure that is built upon students and the lack of mechanisms that should be built around to help them (Pillai, 2023). The recent example of Dr. Ritu Singh, an assistant professor at Daulat Ram College who belongs to the Dalit community, peacefully protesting for more than 125 days in front of the Arts Faculty against the arbitrary termination of her contract in 2020 shows the apathy towards Dalit women in the present day.

  The latest studies done in the institution of mainstream media echo the same concerns and mark out the stark differences and dismal representation of Dalits in newsrooms. These studies bring forward how decision-making power still resides with the upper caste elites. The primary aim of this essay is to unveil the caste biases and lack of representation in media. It looks at the history and present status of recruitments in the newsroom along with analysing the prejudice that is built around the news of people from marginalised sections of the society. The primary objective is to examine the role of caste in media and diversity in the newsrooms. This may further lead to an examination of the discourses set around caste, diversity, gender, representation and narratives in media. This helps in locating our social realities and formation of public opinion through the media. Through various studies and analysis, this essay tries to critically examine the social locations of individuals working in media and the extent to which the institution of media is representative of them. The further examination is about the portrayal of issues of the people belonging to the marginalised communities, Dalits in particular, and the so-called upper caste bias in trying to erase the caste angle even in the cases related to caste-based atrocities. This essay also highlights the circumstances which led Dalit women to come forward to voice their opinions in this highly exclusionary space of media. Expanding further, the essay tries to substantiate the concerns through the case study of media portrayal of one of the tallest leaders of the country, Mayawati. 

Understanding Media:

  The role of mass media is pivotal in large democracies, not only serving as a source of information and entertainment but also playing a central role in facilitating discussions and debates on crucial societal issues.  According to the Habermasian concept (1989) of the public sphere, which is defined as the space where important matters are discussed and debated for citizens’ participation in public life, the media holds a significant position. In an ideal public sphere, all citizens have guaranteed access, and freedom of assembly, association, and expression to form something akin to public opinion. Habermas (1989) identifies newspapers, magazines, radio, and television as the media responsible for creating this public sphere. However, he notes that corporate media dominance undermines the proper functioning of the public sphere by creating media monopolies that prioritize corporate interests over diverse discussions. Gail Omvedt (2003) extends the idea of the public sphere to the Indian context, asserting that for an institution to be truly “public,” it must represent all sections of society. Drawing from Jotirao Phule’s perspective, she argues that institutions not allowing representation for all sections become a facade safeguarding private interests, even if they claim to be public.

  The examination of diversity, or the lack thereof, in newsrooms is a relatively recent topic to pique academic interest, but the discussion around it is very important to understand the deep-rooted social realities, and plays a key role in shaping public opinion. This issue gained prominence after racial riots in the United States in the 1960s, particularly in Detroit. The Kerner Commission, established in 1967 to study the causes of the violence, highlighted the lack of diversity in American newsrooms as a reason for biased coverage of issues related to the Black population, contributing to their alienation and resulting violence (Kerner et al., 1968). This scrutiny led to the American Society of News Editors (ASNE) setting a diversity goal in 1978, aiming to make newsrooms as diverse as American society. Despite ongoing efforts, US newspapers have yet to fully achieve this goal, but the number of journalists from minority communities has shown an upward trend. What remains extremely crucial here is the biases in reporting issues and the steps taken thereof to ensure how these biases can be mitigated. The simple and possible answer was to increase the diversity in newsrooms. The question that comes to the fore is why diversity is important? And what constituted bias in the reporting of the issues? The answers to both these questions are in tandem as the social elites did not want to keep the narrative of the underprivileged forward. The power to portray the news in a certain way benefits them to build a narrative which is completely devoid of any reality. This also helps to delegitimize certain claims and decriminalizes the offense as was seen in the coverage of racial riots in America. This is why diversity is important to bring into light those important narratives and stories which help underprivileged communities to grow and move forward.

In the Indian context, the problem of diversity in newsrooms, particularly the absence of journalists from SC/ST/OBC backgrounds¹, persists despite the emergence of so called lower castes in electoral politics. A thorough examination of not just the diversity of the newsroom but also the issues taken up by them and their portrayal, i.e. to say not just if they are getting represented but also how they are being represented is pertinent. The transition to a capitalist-liberalized phase in the Indian economy has not significantly altered the so-called upper caste domination in media. Mainstream media content reflects a strong upper caste bias, especially when caste becomes a focal point in the news, such as discussions on reservations², caste census³, or the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act⁴. Dalits having their own media platform is not a new idea, dating back to Dr. B.R. Ambedkar’s initiatives in the 1920s. He ran three Marathi periodicals named Mooknayak (Leader of the Voiceless) in 1920, Bahishkrut Bharat (Ostracised India) in 1927-29, and Janata in 1930, which was later renamed Prabuddha Bharat (Enlightened India) in 1956. His most successful student, and the founder of the Bahujan Samaj Party, Kanshi Ram also emphasized having a media house of the party and published a newspaper Bahujan Sanghatak. However, these efforts, including separate Dalit literature, have not integrated into the mainstream media in terms of circulation, reach, revenue, and impact. The fact that Bal Gangadhar Tilak even refused to print the advertisement of Mooknayak‘s first issue through his newspaper ‘Kesari‘ hints about the eagerness of the mainstream to accommodate the voices of the marginalised.   

  “The media serve and propagandize on behalf of the powerful societal interests that control and finance them. The representatives of these interests have important agendas and principles that they want to advance, and they are well-positioned to shape and constrain media policy. This is normally not accomplished by crude intervention, but by the selection of right-thinking personnel and by the editors’ and working journalists’ internalisation of priorities and definitions of newsworthiness that conform to the institution’s policy” (Chomsky & Herman, 1988: 11). A major challenge with legacy media, i.e., old media prior to the Information Age, particularly print, film & music studios, advertising agencies, radio and television, lies in its predominantly corporate ownership, making the industry undemocratic and discriminatory. Media monopoly and cross-media ownership, without regulatory frameworks, contribute to an industry driven by profit maximization rather than democratic principles. Advertisements, a primary revenue source for media corporations, lead to a bias in content that caters to the upper strata and excludes content related to the poor and rural masses which Chomsky and Herman defined as the ‘Propaganda Model’ (1988). The lack of diversity in media and its content thus encompasses both caste and class dimensions, shaping a media landscape that often prioritises the interests of the privileged while marginalising the voices and concerns of diverse sections of society.

Tracing the History of Underrepresentation:

  In the mid-1990s, Kenneth J Cooper, an African-American and then South Asian Correspondent of The Washington Post, raised a poignant observation about the dismal representation of so-called lower castes in Indian newspapers⁵. This critical insight into the demographic makeup of newsrooms necessitated B N Uniyal, a seasoned journalist based in Delhi associated with the Pioneer, to embark on a retrospective examination of his three-decade-long career. To his surprise, Uniyal realized that he had never encountered a fellow journalist from the Dalit community throughout his extensive tenure⁶. The purpose of the study was not an academic or detailed survey of the composition of different caste groups in the Indian newsrooms. The goal was to simply put the views of a Dalit journalist in one of Kenneth’s reports. This revelation became a pivotal moment, leading to broader implications for the diversity and inclusivity within India’s media landscape. It is interesting here to note that it required an African-American to ask such a groundbreaking question.

  The profound impact of these realizations manifested in the submission of a memorandum to the Press Council of India in late 1998 by a Dalit organization. This memorandum titled, “End Apartheid in Indian Media — Democratize Nation’s Opinion”, marked a significant call to action. It urged the establishment of a National Commission for Democracy in Indian media, aiming to rectify the stark underrepresentation of Dalits. The overarching goal was to align the caste composition within media organisations with the broader demographic distribution of the population by the year 2005 (Jeffrey, 2001).

  Jeffrey (2001), in his scholarly exploration of the dynamics within the Indian press, echoed the concerns raised by Cooper and Uniyal. He highlighted a disconcerting reality – the almost negligible presence of Dalits in roles critical to the journalistic process. This absence extended to reporters, subeditors, and even editors, with no Dalit-run dailies contributing to the media landscape. Jeffrey’s observations underscored not just a lack of representation but a systemic exclusion of Dalits from key decision-making positions in the media industry. Siddharth Varadarajan, writing in The Hindu in 2006, drew a direct link between the lack of diversity in newsrooms and the biased coverage witnessed during the anti-reservation agitation. His proposition was clear – a more diverse newsroom, inclusive of voices from historically marginalised communities, would not only bring forth untold stories but also contribute to a more nuanced and balanced portrayal of events.

  In the same year, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) conducted a comprehensive survey that illuminated the stark reality of caste dynamics within Indian media. It conducted a survey which found that “of the 315 key decision-makers surveyed from 37 Delhi-based (Hindi and English) publications and television channels, nearly 90% of decision-makers in English language print media and a substantial 79% in television belonged to the ‘upper caste_^‘7.” This statistical evidence starkly illustrated the lack of diversity in crucial positions within media organizations, further corroborating the qualitative observations made by Cooper, Uniyal, and Jeffrey.

  The latest study to find out the social composition of the newsrooms was conducted by Oxfam–NewsLaundry (2019). This report again shows the domination of upper castes in Indian newsrooms, including television, print, and digital media. Out of the 121 top positions analysed under the study, 106 were shown to be occupied by upper caste journalists. None of them belong to the SCs and STs. The report states that three out of every four anchors of flagship debates are upper caste. No one belongs to the SC (Dalit), the ST (Tribal or Adivasi), or the OBC. For over 70% of their flagship debate shows, news channels draw the majority of the panellists from the upper castes. Not more than 5% of all articles in English newspapers are written by Dalits and Tribal. Hindi newspapers fare slightly better at around 10%. Over half of those writings on issues related to caste in Hindi and English newspapers are upper caste. Around 72% of by-lined articles on news websites are written by people from the upper castes. The situation is quite serious, if not alarming as, according to the Census of 2011, the SCs are 16.6% of India’s population and the STs constitute 8.6%. According to the estimate of the Second Backward Class Commission, popularly known as the Mandal Commission, the OBC population is 52%. The Oxfam–NewsLaundry report shows that these three social groups are almost non-existent in leading positions in Indian media. These reports showed that there is a visible lack of social and caste diversity in Indian media and it has been largely an upper caste domain.

  While explicit evidence of conscious discrimination in recruitment processes remains elusive due to the opaque nature of media hiring, informal factors such as journalists’ networks have come under scrutiny. In the intricate tapestry of Indian society, human networks often operate within the deeply ingrained formula of caste. This raises questions about the influence of such networks on the hiring process and the perpetuation of existing caste-based imbalances.

Portrayal of Dalit issues and the problem of representation:

  Over the last two decades, there has been an increased focus on Dalit issues in mainstream Indian media compared to earlier times. This change can be attributed to various factors, including the heightened visibility of Dalit movements in several states following the Ambedkar centenary in 1990. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like the Dalit Foundation and human rights activists like Kiruba Munuswamy have also played a crucial role in exposing atrocities against Dalits across India. In Tamil Nadu, English print media outlets like Outlook, Frontline, The Hindu, and The Indian Express have dedicated more coverage to Dalit issues than Tamil newspapers and periodicals.

  It is crucial to note that this enhanced coverage does not necessarily correspond to greater representation of Dalits in the editorial departments of English media. English media organizations, operating at a national level, often project themselves as progressive on a larger scale. While they may highlight instances of violence against Dalits, they may not necessarily scrutinise the broader system of caste and state policies affecting Dalits. In contrast, vernacular media, functioning within a more localized and caste-centric framework, may not feel the same obligation to present themselves as progressive. However, the issue goes beyond the mere inclusion or exclusion of news on Dalit issues; it also involves how the media portrays these matters. The media’s historical representation of violent incidents against Dalits often lacked an examination of untouchability or human rights violations. For instance, the Keelavenmani incident in which 42 Dalit individuals were burned alive in 1968 was initially reported as “Clashes between Farmers”, framing it as a class issue rather than addressing caste oppression.

 Even in the post-1990s era, certain Dalit issues have been portrayed negatively by the media. The media’s handling of events such as the Tirunelveli massacre in 1999, where 17 Dalits were brutally killed in a police attack, involved efforts to convince people that the victims died by drowning in the river rather than due to the police attack. Similarly, the Khairlanji massacre showed a negative facet of the media towards Dalit issues. It is important to note here that the DNA was the first newspaper to report the issue after eight days of the atrocity. It was done only after massive protests were organised throughout Maharashtra. When the media initially covered the Khairlanji incident, it conspicuously omitted any mention of caste, attributing murders to what they called ‘moral reasons’⁸. What should have been identified as a glaring symptom of caste hatred was instead mischaracterised as personal vendetta or ‘moral disputes’ (Mhaske, 2023). Anand Teltumbde (2008) writes that “such reporting masked caste realities and ensured that readers had no sympathy for the victim”.  The same pattern was repeated in the Hathras case too, which played on the expected line of denying the existence of caste angle to the criminal act of rape and murder.  Mainstream television news reported that “it is only when the political parties politicise a women’s issue for their interests, the caste comes into the picture in such rape cases” ⁹

In a recent article written by Tavleen Singh in The Indian Express, she stated that  affirmative action or reservations are ineffective and only the politicians benefit from it. She also propounded the popular myth that at the time this affirmative action was introduced, Dr. Ambedkar suggested that it should last for only ten years. This is a blatant misappropriation as Dr. B.R. Ambedkar suggested no such restrictions on reservation in education or government jobs. The initial time limit of 10 years was imposed only on SCs/STs being elected to state and central legislatures through debates in the Constituent Assembly. However, Ambedkar was not in favour of any time limit even on political reservations. In his constitutional assembly speech that he delivered on August 25, 1949, he stated:

“I personally was prepared to press for a larger time, because I do feel that so far as the Scheduled Castes are concerned, they are not treated on the same footing as the other minorities…it would have been quite proper I think, and generous on the part of this House to have given the Scheduled Castes a longer term with regard to these reservations…For the Scheduled tribes I am prepared to give far longer time.….

“But all those who have spoken about the reservations to the Scheduled Castes or to the Scheduled tribes have been so meticulous that the thing should end by 10 years. All I want to say to them in the words of Edmund Burke, is ‘Large empires and small minds go ill together’.”¹⁰

 This brings into question the editorial scrutiny of the print media. Aren’t the facts cross-checked while publishing an article? Or are these facts deliberately hidden or misrepresented to spread misinformation which continues to harm the underprivileged of society? This paper strongly argues that the exclusion and misrepresentation of Dalit issues in the mainstream media is a direct result of the social exclusion of Dalits in the Indian media. Social exclusion refers to the denial of equal opportunities imposed by certain societal groups, leading to individuals’ inability to participate fully in the political, economic, and social functions of society.

  Drawing parallels with the United States, achieving a balanced staff in newsrooms that reflects the community’s makeup is considered socially responsible. The American Society of News Editors (ASNE) set a “Year 2000 goal” in 1978 to ensure proportionate representation of blacks and other social minorities in all American newspapers. The success of this initiative demonstrated that major publishers recruited from ethnic minorities to maintain news diversity. The U.S. experience underscores the importance of social responsibility and diversity in sustaining the media industry. Private media companies, despite being privately owned, cannot insulate themselves from reservation policies, as emphasized by the chairman of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes. To address the under-representation of Dalits, media organizations should offer special scholarships to train Dalit candidates in journalism and organize job fairs to recruit them, similar to the model adopted by the Asian College of Journalism in Chennai, Tamil Nadu.

Dalit Women and Media 

  Dalit women in Indian society are triply exploited on the basis of caste, class and gender (Kumar, 2009). Dalit women are subjected to discrimination from upper caste men and women and also men from their own community. The Indian media, over the years, has left little or no space for Dalit journalists and Dalit women were never shown the light of mainstream media. The often paired patriarchal undertones to the feminist narratives by the media makes it a tremendous task for women to voice their own challenges and put forth the narratives through their voice. This task becomes mammoth and more complex when it infiltrates the caste hierarchy. The demand for Dalit women to run news portals like Khabar Lahariya and Meena Kotwal’s Mooknayak brings to the fore the argument that the voices and Dalit narratives are lacking in the mainstream media. This exclusion from media led by upper caste men side-lining Dalits prompted the rise of the new era in 2002 when a group of Dalit women came together to create “Khabar Lahariya’ (News Waves), which started off as a newspaper and now has branched out into the digital platform. Kavita Devi and Meera Jatav are the founders of Khabar Lahariya. Khabar Lahariya takes the edge of hyper-local journalism to retaliate against discrimination. These women journalists are redefining the boundaries of politics in an institution that has been dominated by men since its inception. Their story inspired the production of a documentary called Writings with Fire. The documentary showcases the indomitable grassroots-level work of a group of women as they determinedly tell their stories against all odds. Winning many international accolades Writing with Fire was also nominated for the best documentary (feature) at the 94th Academy Awards in 2021. Khaber Lahariya focused on the overlooked parts of rural India through which it showed reports and stories to the country’s national media. Kavita Devi is the first Dalit woman to be a member of the Editors Guild of India. Her challenge and vision is to discard the label of ‘timid and emotional’ which are often attached to women journalists by mainstream media to separate them from newsrooms.As the CEO of ‘Chambal’, Kavita brings forward women into the so-termed ‘challenging‘ field. Kavita envisions bringing more and more women from the marginalised community to a collective space of not only journalism but also as filmmakers and producers. These women have resisted a caste-ridden patriarchal society through their writings.  By doing so, they are breaking many rigid stereotypes of women and Dalit women that previously existed in the media. 

Media’s Silence on Mayawati’s Achievements: Unveiling Caste Bias 

   Mayawati, the former Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and President of the Bahujan Samaj Party, has undeniably emerged as a significant Dalit icon, marking a new era in the Dalit movement. Historically dominated by Dalit males, the movement witnessed a paradigm shift which Mayawati led not only as a symbolic figure but also as a head of government. Mayawati was inspired by Dr. Ambedkar’s life and mission from her early childhood and also mentioned her desire to her father when she was in Class 8, “If I work like Babasaheb Dr. Ambedkar then will people celebrate my anniversary after my death as they celebrate Babasaheb Dr. Ambedkar’s anniversary?”. Growing up in a Delhi slum, born to an illiterate homemaker and a low-level government clerk, she managed to dream and pursue civil services, leaving her dream to join Kanshiram’s movement. She later left her house as her father was against her decision to join politics and after a lot of hardships and struggles, she managed to reach the pinnacle of success when she became the youngest and first Dalit Woman to be the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. Despite her substantial achievements, especially recognized by international media such as Newsweek – a US weekly magazine, that declared Mayawati to be one of the eight most powerful women in the world – the Indian media has maintained a surprising silence on her accomplishments.

  A notable contrast can also be seen in her attire and mannerisms compared to the so-called upper caste woman in Indian politics. We can observe that most upper caste women in Indian politics who have some stature, carry a typical image of an Indian woman wearing a sari. Indira Gandhi, Vijeraje Sindhia, Sonia Gandhi, Jayalalita, Vasundhara Raje Sindhia, Sushma Swaraj, Brinda Karat, Pratibha Patil to name just a few (Kumar,2009). Barring a few, most cover their head with pallu, an act of being polite in the Hindu culture to the elders. Mayawati never wore a sari but a salwar-kurtawith dupatta challenging the notion of patriarchy in Indian politics. However, the Indian media’s silence, especially considering their often critical portrayal of Mayawati, raises questions about their biases and priorities.

  The media’s historical hostility towards Mayawati is evident in instances where her statements were distorted, her character was assassinated, and derogatory news was published against her. Despite her significant achievements, such as being the Chief Minister of India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, the media tends to focus on negative narratives, perpetuating an image of her as a politician with unaccounted wealth. The media’s reluctance to celebrate Mayawati’s achievements, including global recognition, raises concerns about its role and priorities.

 Unveiling Prejudice: Casteist Remarks against Mayawati and the Conspicuous Silence of Indian Media

  The incident in Uttar Pradesh, involving the use of derogatory language by Mahendra Singh Tikait, a prominent leader of the dominant Jat caste, against Mayawati, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and the President of the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), sheds light on the enduring caste bias against Dalit women. While the offensive remarks may be hastily dismissed as vulgar and unparliamentary, a more in-depth exploration reveals the deep-seated historical and sociological underpinnings within the intricate caste structure of Indian society.

  The Jats proudly proclaim their position as “number two Hindus” (Kumar, 2009: 78) after Brahmins and Baniyas, showcasing a staunch belief in their invincibility and asserting their autonomy in an agricultural occupation. While Jats may not overtly practice Untouchability, their disdain for Dalits manifests in subtle yet impactful ways. In villages, Dalits are addressed with derogatory terms, reflecting the prevalent societal contempt. Jats, despite the evolving socio-political landscape and the rise of movements like the Bahujan Samaj Party, continue to exert dominance economically, as seen in their control over wage payments to other castes, particularly Dalits. This economic subjugation, combined with the influence of Jats in local structures, keeps Dalits subdued, despite their potential for revolt.

  Tikait’s hurling of abuse at Mayawati, a Dalit woman holding the significant position of Chief Minister, serves as a stark testimony to the persistent mindset prevailing in these regions. The incident prompted a substantial response, involving the deployment of ten thousand policemen, administrative interventions, and local Dalit engagement, underscoring the severity of the situation. Surprisingly, amidst this controversy, the Indian media chose to remain conspicuously silent. The media’s attempt to portray Mayawati as misusing state machinery, coupled with the absence of condemnation from women’s organizations, adds layers to the discourse, prompting a deeper reflection on whether caste bias or other underlying factors contribute to this silence. 

Conclusions:

  The absence of Dalits in significant roles within Indian media, as highlighted by these seminal observations and research findings, is indicative of more than just an oversight. It is an alarming reflection of media managements’ inattention to the social diversity of their editorial desks, leading to the perpetuation of social prejudice in media content for over seven decades. The urgent call remains to address these deep-rooted disparities and foster a more inclusive, representative, and equitable media landscape in India. While this may spark debates about quality and availability, media owners must recognize their social responsibility to diversify their newsrooms. The collective silence of the Indian media on Mayawati’s achievements highlights not only their limitations but also raises crucial questions about inherent biases, priorities, and the need for a more inclusive and intersectional approach to women’s issues.

Notes:

1. Oxfam-NewsLaundry. 2019. “Who Tells Our Stories Matters: Representation of Marginalised Caste Groups in Indian Newsrooms,” New Delhi.
2. IIaiah, Kancha. 2006. “Merit of Reservations” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol. 41, Issue No. 24. https://www.epw.in/journal/2006/24/reservations-higher-education-special-issues-specials/merit-reservations.
3. https://thewire.in/media/backstory-media-obc-caste-census-farmers-protest
4. https://thewire.in/media/backstory-the-dalit-public-and-the-media
5. Cooper, J Kenneth. 1996. “India’s Majority Lower Castes Are Minor Voice in Newspapers; Few Journalists, Periodicals Advocate Interests of the Underclass”. In The Washington Post,https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1996/09/05/indias-majority-lower-castes-are-minor-voice-in-newspapers/4acb79e3-13d6-4084-b1d9-b09c6ed4f963.
6. Uniyal, B N. 1996. “In Search of a Dalit Journalist.” Pioneer, 16 November.https://www.anveshi.org.in/broadsheet-on-contemporary-politics/archives/broadsheet-on-contemporary-politics-vol-2-no-1011/in-search-of-a-dalit-journalist.
7. https://www.forwardpress.in/2019/09/social-profile-of-the-key-decision-makers-in-the-national-media-in-2006. 
8. Pillai, Geetha. 2023. “17 years after Khairlanji Massacre: Reflecting on a Dark Chapter in Dalit History.” In The Mooknayak. https://en.themooknayak.com/dalit-news/17-years-after-khairlanji-massacre-reflecting-on-a-dark-chapter-in-dalit-history#:~:text=in%20Dalit%20History-,17%20Years%20After%20Khairlanji%20Massacre%3A%20Reflecting%20on%20a%20Dark%20Chapter,and%2021%20too%20were%20murdered.
9. Sulochana, Akash. 2020. “No case for Dalit woman victim? Politics of rhetoric in response in responses to Hathras gang rape and murder” In Countercurrent.org. https://countercurrents.org/2020/10/no-caste-for-dalit-woman-victim-politics-of-rhetoric-in-responses-to-hathras-gang-rape-and-murder.
10. Chavda, Rajesh. 2023. “Abolish reservation after 10 years: The illusion of merit and what BR Ambedkar never said.” In Scroll.in.https://scroll.in/article/1061196/abolish-reservations-after-10-years-the-illusion-of-merit-and-what-br-ambedkar-never-said

References:

Ambedkar, Bhimrao. 2014. Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches (Vol 1), V Moon (ed),New Delhi: Dr Ambedkar Foundation.  

Anand, Atul. 2015. “Representation and Hindi Language Newspapers: A Study in Bihar and                      Jharkhand,” thesis, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.

Aswanu, Tarushi. 2023. “Two Dalits Students’ Suicides in Two Months Highlight ‘Institutionalised Discrimination’ at IITs”. In The Wire.

Balasubramaniam, J. 2011. “Dalits and a Lack of Diversity in the Newsroom.” In Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 46, no. 11: 21–23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41151964.

Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge: Polity Press. — (1990): Moral Consciousness  And Communicative Action, Cambridge: MIT Press.

Chavda, Rajesh. 2023. “Abolish reservation after 10 years: The illusion of merit and what BR Ambedkar never said.” In Scroll.in.

Chomsky Noam and Edward Herman. 1994. “Manufacturing Consent: The Political   Economy of the Mass Media.” London: Vintage Publications.

Cooper, J Kenneth. 1996. “India’s Majority Lower Castes Are Minor Voice in Newspapers; Few Journalists, Periodicals Advocate Interests of the Underclass”. In The Washington Post, 

Habermas, Jurgen. 1989. “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a      

IIaiah, Kancha. 2006. “Merit of Reservations” in Economic & Political Weekly Vol. 41, Issue No. 24.

Issac, Elizabeth. 2023. “Dalit Women Journalists’ Resistance Against The Caste Bias & Discrimination” in Feminism in India

Jeffrey, Robin. 2001. “[Not] Being There: Dalits and India’s Newspapers,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Vol 24, No 2, pp 225–38. — (2005): “There Is Still No Dalit Newsreader on Any TV Channel.” Outlook, 17 October. 

Kahn, Jeremy. 2009. “Mayawati: The Rise of India’s Caste Warrior.”  New York: Newsweek. 

Kerner, O et al. 1968. “Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,”U Government Printing Office Washington, DC.

Kumar, Vivek. 2009. “Locating Dalit women in the Indian caste system, media and women’s Movement.” Social Change Vol. 39, No. 1: 64-84. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258185392_Locating_Dalit_women_in_the_Indian_caste_system_media_and_women’s_movement

Mandal, Dilip. 2020. “upper caste Domination in India’s Mainstream Media and Its Extension in  Digital Media.” In Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 55, Issue No. 46. 
https://www.epw.in/journal/2020/46/perspectives/upper caste-domination-indias-mainstream-Media-and.html.

Mayawati, Kumari. 2006. “Mere Sangharshmai Jivan, Evam Bahujan Movement Ka Sugarmama- Part I (Hindi).” Bahujan Samaj Party. New Delhi.

Mhaske, Dilip. 2023. “17 years of Khairlanji massacre, Modi govt has a Dalit opportunity.” In The Print.

Omvedt, Gail. 2003. “The Struggle for Social Justice and the Expansion of the Public Sphere in the Public and the Private”. In Issues of Democratic Citizenship, Gurpreet Mahajan (ed),New Delhi: Sage Publications.    

Oxfam-NewsLaundry. 2019. “Who Tells Our Stories Matters: Representation of Marginalised Caste Groups in Indian Newsrooms,” New Delhi.

Pandit, Ambika. 2023. “Crimes Against SCs Went up by 13% And Against STs by 14.3% I 2022: NCRB” In The Times of India. 

Pillai, Akshaya. 2023. “Rise in Institutional Murders: The Pressure of Caste, Class And Gender” In Feminism In India. 

Pillai, Geetha. 2023. “17 years after Khairlanji Massacre: Reflecting on a Dark Chapter in Dalit History.” In The Mooknayak.  

Ranjan, Pramod. 2009. Media men Hissedari: Social Profile of Journalists in Patna, Patna: Pragya Shodh Sansthan.

Singh, Tavleen. 2023. “Time to end reservations” In The Indian Express.

Sulochana, Akash. 2020. “No case for Dalit woman victim? Politics of rhetoric in response in responses to Hathras gang rape and murder” In Countercurrent.org. 

Uniyal, B N. 1996. “In Search of a Dalit Journalist.” Pioneer, 16 November.

LOCATING TRANSLATION AS RESISTANCE IN MALYALAM AND ODIA

by Akankshya Mishra

Translation as Resistance: The Role of Translation in Shaping Malayalam Literary Tradition by E. V. Ramakrishnan is part of the collection titled Decentering Translation Studies: India and Beyond, published by Benjamins Translation Library in 2009. In this paper, E.V. Ramakrishnan explores how translation serves as a means to diverge from the dominant Sanskritic and Tamil traditions while simultaneously subverting them. Additionally, translation is crucial in defining Kerala’s unique cultural identity. The topic of resisting linguistic hegemony is crucial in the current political situation. This collection of papers originated from workshops held between 2004 and 2005, that explored indigenous and Asian traditions in translation. 

The author, E.V. Ramakrishnan, is a renowned bilingual writer from Kerala, focusing on literary criticism, comparative Indian literature, Translation Studies, Postcolonial Studies and South Asian  Studies. 

Introduction to the Article  

The author delves into a series of theoretical considerations in exploring translation’s critical role in shaping the Malayalam literary tradition. These encompass the transformative power intrinsic to translation, the dialogic nature of cultural exchanges, translation’s capacity to counteract hegemonic influences, and its ability to engender entirely new literary genres. The essay maintains an academic and analytical tone, catering to a scholarly readership and draws upon terminologies derived from diverse fields such as translation studies, cultural studies, literary criticism and Malayalam and Kannada literature. The author introduces Malayalam terminologies, providing prior definitions or subsequent explanations in English, enhancing reader comprehension. The inclusion of footnotes, clarifying the various older literary forms of Kerala,  is a commendable feature of the essay as it facilitates easy reading for readers unfamiliar with Russian formalism and Classical Malayalam literature. 

Nonetheless, it demands a prerequisite understanding of Bakhtin’s concepts like dialogism,  polyphony and the “carnivalesque”. The term “carnivalesque” originates from the root word carnival, evoking vibrant celebrations marked by a lively atmosphere. It conjures images of exuberant crowds, vivid colours, extravagant costumes and Rabelaisian humour. This carnivalesque tone and setting inherently possesses a deeply subversive nature, intentionally suspending prevailing seriousness, hierarchical structures and societal norms. Polyphony, or the existence of multiple consciousnesses, doesn’t necessarily imply more than one character; it could involve multiple consciousnesses within the author’s voice. Dialogism, conversely, refers to the process of meaning-making through the interaction between two entities, often between the reader/listener and the text.

 The author extensively employs Bakhtin’s notion of dialogism as a critical lens to analyse how the Malayalam literary tradition uses resistance through translation. This examination is substantiated with references to seminal works by scholars such as Macura(1990), Freeman (2003), and Bakhtin(1984), as well as primary and secondary texts on Malayalam  literary traditions, including contributions by Chandrasekharan(2001) and Paniker(1999). This essay will be of particular interest to those exploring Kerala’s cultural and literary  history, the subversion of caste dynamics within the region, and the transformative potential of  translation in reshaping the socio-cultural power dynamics within the state of Kerala.

Summary 

The paper’s central argument revolves around the transformative power of translation in  shaping a distinct regional identity for Malayalam and Kerala. This transformation is achieved by  assimilating foreign cultures and texts, and recontextualising them to resonate with the local  context. In this context, translation is not merely a linguistic exercise but a means of bringing  Aryan-Dravidian languages and cultures into a dialogic relationship, challenging the entrenched  caste and class hierarchies through narrative storytelling while asserting a new local identity.  

The author’s argument is reinforced by their reference to Vladimir Macura’s essay titled Culture as  Translation which posits that translation possesses “an expropriative function”, leading to the  emergence of “cultural phenomena through analogy”(Ramakrishnan). This foundational idea lays the groundwork for the author’s exploration of three primary texts: 

Firstly,  Krishnagatha by Cherusseri, a fifteenth-century Malayalam classic that serves as a  translation of the Bhagavatha Purana; secondly, Ezuthachan’s interpretation of the Adhyatma Ramayana and, finally,  Kunchan Nambiar’s innovative creation, the Tullal genre, exemplified by works like Sabhapravesam and Synamanthakam. 

Cherusseri employs the melodious metrical pattern known as Manjari, which has its roots in  folk songs. He skillfully integrates Sanskritic elements into the Malayalam language. In contrast,  Ezuthachan utilises the Manipravalamm mode, a hybrid literary language that blends Sanskrit and  Tamil, creating a standardised medium for classical-age poetry. Furthermore, Ezuthachan’s  innovation is evident in his introduction of kilippattu, a poetic style featuring an interlocutor as a  parrot(Ramakrishnan 2009: 36). This unique approach bridges the gap between the poet and the reader.  This poetic innovation demonstrates Ezuthachan’s willingness to make classical discourse more  accessible and engaging to the specific audience of the ordinary folks of Kerala. Furthermore,  incorporating a parrot as an interlocutor bears cultural significance, given the historical context where parrots were utilised in divination and fortune-telling practices. 

Kunchan Nambiar employs satire, ridicule and carnivalized language in his performative  poetry, rendering Manipravalamm accessible and inclusive to a broader audience, especially  ordinary people. His Manipravalamm, characterised by the interplay of Sanskrit and Malayalam, as noted by Ramakrishnan (2009: 38), results in a mutually illuminating linguistic fusion. This  transformative attempt culminates in Manipravalamm becoming a vivacious and invigorating  medium, speaking directly to a diverse speech community, including those marginalised within  the Sanskritic tradition due to their varying social classes and castes. This transformation locates  their lived experiences at the epicentre of the translated epics. It establishes a new power dynamic  by facilitating a dialogue between two distinct worldviews, cultures, languages and the caste  divisions of Brahmans and Avarnas. Additionally, Nambiar introduces a new genre, Tullal, to  disrupt temples’ traditional centrality and insularity in disseminating Sanskrit discourse. 

In his analysis of these texts, Ramakrishnan uncovers many techniques employed by translators to fulfil their transformative goals. These strategies encompass a broad range of semiotic and  linguistic adjustments. One particularly significant approach is the practice of localisation, which  seamlessly incorporates non-canonical elements into the text. This localisation process involves  linguistic adjustments through Manipravalam, and cultural adaptations that situate characters and  settings within the context of Kerala. This process legitimises peripheral lives and realms, and significantly expands the realm of representation. 

Moreover, translators engage in cultural adaptation, and infuse languages, worlds, and cultures  with a dialogic function. This dynamic interplay between diverse linguistic and cultural elements plays a pivotal role in recontextualising the translated works, aligning them more closely with the local context. This dialogic function is achieved through various means, including retellings,  adaptations, use of humour,  incorporation of folk rhythmic meters in narrative poetry,  creation of innovative genres, and the subversion of the Sanskrit language by utilising the  Manipravalamm mode, which is predominantly Dravidian in its lexicon. 

Together, these various strategies demonstrate the inventiveness of the translators, and emphasise  the greater relevance of translation as a vehicle for both cultural preservation and social transformation. 

Assimilation as Resistance: Blending Cultural Threads in Translation 

A fundamental aspect of translation as a form of resistance is the process of assimilation.  In this context, assimilation involves integrating local elements into the exclusive domain of Sanskritic discourse, traditions and literary forms. These local elements may include folk  traditions, dances or meters significant in the Avarna or non-Brahman communities. As articulated  by Ramakrishnan in two sections of his article, this assimilation serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it  seeks to incorporate non-canonical worldviews and non-elitist philosophies as an act  of resistance. Secondly, it endeavours to merge two distinct worlds, Tamil and Sanskrit, into the literary framework of Manipravalam. 

In Cherusseri’s Krishnagatha, one observes the interweaving of local and folk experience  forms into the narrative through Manjari. This act of resistance brings the ‘high’ Sanskritic discourse into dialogue with the poetic traditions of the folk. Ramakrishnan argues that legitimising  non-canonical lives, worlds and worldviews is achieved by centralising them within the text. To illustrate this point, he cites an example from Krishnagatha where humour expresses the snake’s  astonishment upon hearing the flautist Krishna using the word “ushan.” This humour is an act of  resistance, as it intentionally disrupts the seriousness typically associated with Sanskritic discourse in its retelling of mythology. 

Thus, the assimilation of Sanskritic discourse and folk meters, along with the assimilation of  languages and the worldviews embedded in them, are pivotal manifestations of the transformative  power of translation as a mode of resistance and cultural synthesis. 

Retellings and Contextualization: The Transformative Power of Translation 

Ramakrishnan contends that even in cases where translation draws upon Sanskritic discourse, such as in the case of Krishnagatha, it manages to recontextualise characters and settings by  embracing the folk tradition of Manjari characterised by its distinctive melodic metre.  Additionally, the essay examines Nambiar’s Sabhapravesam, a work that references Kathakali  dancers and embeds them within a narrative set in Krishna’s era. This intricate blend illustrates how translation functions as a conduit for the infusion of contemporary elements, thereby  underscoring its capacity to assert a unique cultural identity. 

This skilful blending gives classic stories fresh life, and highlights their function for fostering a  particular cultural identity. 

Another example of this contextualisation through translation is in Paniker’s translation of  the Krishnagatha, where Cherusseri skilfully incorporates instances from the lives of oppressed  people, such as those without quilts during severe rains(Ramakrishnan 33). This work reflects 

Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony or the existence of multiple consciousnesses. This inclusion is crucial since it strengthens the portrayal of perspectives and consciousness outside Krishna’s life.  

Dialogic Function and Polyglossia in Translation 

The concept of dialogism, as articulated by Bakhtin, takes centre stage in Ramakrishnan’s  analysis across three distinct contexts: 

1. It manifests in the dialogic relationship between the folk poetic tradition, utilising ‘Manjari,‘  and the pre-existing Sanskritic discourse. 

2. This dialogic interplay emerges in the interaction between Sanskrit and Tamil, ultimately  creating Manipravalamm, a dialogue fostering an Aryan-Dravidian synthesis. Here,  translation functions as the bridge uniting these divergent linguistic worlds. 

3. Ramakrishnan extensively explores this concept in examining Kunchan Nambiar’s Ottan  Tullal, particularly in Nambiar’s translation of the Syamanthakam episode from Lord  Krishna’s life. 

As interpreted by Ramakrishnan, Nambiar’s translation transcends the confines of a mere  presentation of wedding decor or arrangements. Instead, it unfolds as a multi-layered narrative,  delving into various facets such as the involvement of diverse Brahmanical sections and the  intricate accommodations required to meet their demands. Nambiar’s commentary on the necessity  of boxes for Kathakali dancers, adds another layer of complexity (Ramakrishnan, 2009: 39). 

Within Nambiar’s translation, a complex web of perspectives and considerations emerges,  infusing the narrative with a profound dialogic function. This extends beyond mere linguistic  transformation; it breathes life into foreign words and distinct consciousnesses, including those of  Kathakali dancers and contemporary critics of Namputris, contributing significantly to the intricate  process of signification and meaning-making within the text, transcending the original author’s  intent. 

Ramakrishnan compellingly illustrates how a text can be read and interpreted dialogically through  acts of translation and adaptation. This perspective allows readers and interpreters to venture beyond the boundaries set by the original author, unearthing nuanced and multifaceted meanings  concealed within the text. Nambiar’s work is a prime example of how this dialogic approach to translation enriches the reading experience, unveiling the intricate mosaic of voices and  perspectives concealed within. 

While Ramakrishnan refrains from explicitly employing the term “polyglossia” in his  analysis of Manipravalamm, his examination effectively encapsulates the essence of this concept.  This intentional omission of jargon embraces a more inclusive approach to cater to a broader  readership. In Manipravalamm compositions, the coexistence of multiple languages, particularly Sanskrit and Malayalam, reveals a dynamic and living interaction. This linguistic interplay, predominantly observed in the Manipravalamm mode, underscores this literary tradition’s unique  and vibrant nature. 

In Manipravalam compositions, Malayalam does not exist in isolation but is deeply  informed by the spectral influence of Sanskrit. This influence permeates the language, resulting in  a linguistic landscape where Sanskrit and Malayalam harmoniously coexist. This phenomenon attests to the ‘polyglossic’ nature of Manipravalam, where multiple linguistic elements converge and intermingle, giving rise to a distinctive and vibrant literary tradition. 

Ramakrishnan argues that Kunchan Nambiar’s use of a “carnivalesque” language allows  for the subversion of social norms and hierarchies. The term “carnivalesque”, derived from the word carnival, evokes images of a vibrant celebration marked by exuberant crowds, vivid colours,  extravagant costumes and Rabelaisian humour. Naturally, this “carnivalesque” tone and setting  possess a deeply subversive nature, as they intentionally suspend the prevailing seriousness,  hierarchical structures, and societal norms typically rigorously enforced. Ramakrishnan’s assertion  holds true within this context. 

In the realm of literary works, such as Nambiar’s adaptations, this “carnivalesque” spirit  serves as a platform for satire and criticism. Notably, ecclesiastical figures like Indra in  Ahalyamoksham and Arjuna in Santhanagopalam become subjects of ridicule and biting satire  (Śarmmā 49). For instance, the traditional narrative from the Ramayana, where Indra interferes with Sage Gautam’s penance, is transformed in Nambiar’s “Ahalyamoksham Tullal.” Indra’s lust is overtly emphasised in this rendition, deviating significantly from the original account  (Śarmmā 49). While in the conventional Ramayana, Indra loses his testicles and they are replaced  by those of a goat, in Nambiar’s Tullal version, a striking transformation occurs: “one thousand  phalli appear on Indra’s body” (Śarmmā 40).

This creative adaptation serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it accentuates the vices of  sexual immorality humorously and exaggeratedly, creating a visually ridiculous spectacle that  captures the audience’s attention. On the other hand, it deliberately incites a riotous response  among the audience, embodying the “carnivalesque” spirit. 

Legitimisation through Translation 

In Foucault’s Discourse on Language, those whose speech deviated from the established  familiar discourse of society were typically labelled as ‘mad’ (Foucault 1972: 217). Their words were often  dismissed as meaningless and void of truth, yet paradoxically, they were also imbued with a  perceived power to reveal hidden truths inaccessible to the ‘wise’. This duality in the perception of madness, where the mad person’s speech was simultaneously discredited and seen as potentially  revelatory, lays the foundation for understanding the transformative power of translation employed  by Kunchan Nambiar. 

With its capacity to carnivalise language and subvert conventional norms, translation gave  Nambiar a platform to disseminate profound truths about power dynamics, hierarchy and the  deeply rooted caste and class conflicts in Kerala. In Foucault’s analysis, it is essential to note that  the madman assumed a role akin to that of a masked truth-teller within a theatrical context. His  words were considered mere noise outside this performative space, but within the theatre, he  played the role of the “masked truth.” 

Drawing a parallel to Nambiar’s art form, in Ottan Tullal, one observes a similar  theatricality. Ottan Tullal is a vibrant, colourful and performative mode of storytelling, replete  with vivid costumes, gestures, poses, music and instruments. This theatricality carnivalizes the  Sanskrit text, transforming it into a lively spectacle that engages the audience’s senses. Within this  performative space, Nambiar, like the madman in Foucault’s theatre, has the opportunity to convey profound truths about society. 

Fundamentally, Ottan Tullal becomes the medium through which Nambiar is “credited”  for his words, just as the madman was acknowledged within the theatre(Foucault 1972, 217). Within this  “carnivalesque” and performative space, Nambiar dispels the truth about societal dynamics by using  translation to transcend conventional language barriers and communicate essential messages to the  audience. Thus, the transformative power of translation and the theatricality of Ottan  Tullal converge to create a space where Nambiar’s truths can be both revealed and acknowledged,  much like the role of the madman in the “theatre of madness” described by Foucault. 

The “Carnivalesque” Tradition of Pala Performance: A Comparative Analysis with Tullal 

Like the Tullal tradition, the Pala performance genre embodies a “carnivalesque” presentation of devotional poetry, converging various artistic elements such as poetry, oratory,  dance, drama, music and comical contemporization. Typically staged during the nocturnal  hours, Pala, like Tullal, embraces a raucous form of buffoonery. Analogous to Tullal, Pala represents a fusion of Aryan-Dravidian cultural synthesis, drawing upon literary sources from  Sanskrit, Odia, Hindi, Telugu, and Bangla. Additionally, the spirit of mirth, reminiscent of Tullal,  permeates the essence of Pala. 

The Pala performance typically involves two primary characters: the Gayaka and the Vidushaka. The Gayaka assumes the role of both the troupe leader and explicator of slokas from  Sanskritic literature. In contrast, the Vidushaka embodies the archetype of the class clown, posing  inane queries, misconstruing verses, and satirising individuals and customs. The role of the  Vidushaka, however, assumes a pivotal significance, as his absurd questions and antics compel the  Gayaka to extemporaneously elucidate intricate themes akin to explaining them to a layperson. 

An illustrative example lies in the Gayaka‘s enactment of Harischandra, inquiring about  his wife’s desired parting gift, with the Vidushaka assuming the role of the wife and facetiously  requesting a plate of “dahivada” (Patra 46). This transposition of the audience into the contemporary milieu, anchoring the text within the present time and space, intertwines “carnivalesque” Rabelaisian humour with the elevated characters and slokas. This phenomenon  equally applies to Tullal, which endeavours to contemporise epics by infusing satirical elements. 

Conclusion 

Ramakrishnan’s scholarship illuminates the pivotal role of translation in shaping distinct  regional identities and fostering intercultural dialogue. The essay delves into the works of  Cherusseri, Ezuthachan, and Nambiar, exploring themes like assimilation, innovative genres, and  humour’s disruptive power in established discourse. The essay also emphasises translation’s  dialogic nature, a space where diverse voices converge to enhance the reading experience. The “emergence  of the new poetic language” Manipravalam, and the creation of the unique literary form known as  Ottan Thullal, can be related to the concept of “translated literature actively shaping the literary polysystem” of the Malayalam language(Zohar 193). 

Furthermore, the “carnivalesque” tradition in Pala performance, akin to Tullal, showcases  how translation transports audiences to contemporary settings, bridging past and present. This  fusion of Rabelaisian humour with sacred texts enlivens these traditions. 

         The various roles that translation plays are highlighted by investigating it as a means of resistance, cultural preservation and social transformation. The essay skillfully navigates multiple facets of this dynamic process, as evidenced by the various sections like “Locating Translation as Resistance in Malayalam and Odia,” “Assimilation as Resistance: Blending Cultural Threads in Translation,” “Retellings and Contextualization: The Transformative Power of Translation,” “Dialogic Function and Polyglossia in Translation” and “Legitimization through Translation.” In addition, Tullal’s comparative study of Pala Performance’s “carnivalesque” tradition offers a nuanced viewpoint that deepens our comprehension of the varied and multifaceted nature of translation in the studied literary and cultural contexts.

References  

Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. 1984. 

Bandlamudi, Lakshmi, and E. V. Ramakrishnan. “Introduction : Intellectual Traditions of Indiain  Dialogue With Mikhail Bakhtin: Pluralism, Dogma and Dialogue Through History.”  Bakhtinian Explorations of Indian Culture, Springer, 2018, pp. 1–19.  doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6313-8. 

Deblasia. Bakhtin, Mikhail – Filosofia: An Encyclopedia of Russian Thought. 29 Mar. 2019,  filosofia.dickinson.edu/encyclopedia/bakhtin-mikhail. 

Even-Zohar, Itamar. “The Position Of Translated Literature Within The Literary Polysystem.”  The Translation Studies Reader, edited by Lawrence Venuti, Routledge eBooks, 2021,  pp. 192–97. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429280641.

Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language. Translated  by Sheridan Smith, Vintage, 1972. 

“In Theory Bakhtin: Dialogism, Polyphony and Heteroglossia.” Ceasefire Magazine, 11 Jan.  2012, ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-bakhtin-1. 

Malayalam Resource Centre. “Thullal.” Malayalam Resource Centre,  

http://www.malayalamresourcecentre.org/Mrc/culture/artforms/thullal/thullal.html. Accessed 8  Oct. 2023. 

Patra, Umesh. “Tracing the History and Evolution of Pala.” Lokaratna, edited by Folklore  Foundation, vol. X, 2347–6427, 2017,  http://www.academia.edu/50011872/Tracing_the_History_and_Evolution_of_Pala. 

Ramakrishnan. “Translation as Resistance : The Role of Translation in the Making of Malayalam  Literary Tradition.” Decentering Translation Studies: India and Beyond, edited by Judy  Wakabayashi and Rita Kothari, John Benjamins Publishing, 2009. 

Śarmmā, Vi. Es. Kunchan Nampyar. Sahitya Akademi, 2000.

Evolution of the representative nature of Indian democracy:   Institutional-building and Decay in India’s Parliamentary Representation

by Sanchaly Bhattacharya

Introduction

Over the last seven decades, the representative democracy of India has been credited with holding the country’s length and width together. The post-independence Indian constitution grants its federal units significant power over several aspects of governance. India has an indirect democracy, where the people elect their representatives for policy-making and executions. Constitutionally, India has a parliamentary representative nature of governance, where the separation of powers is the basic feature of Indian democracy. However, representation in Indian democracy is often considered among the most complex models in the world, combined with factors of religion, race, caste, language, ethnicity, and others. Since independence, the nature of representative democracy in India has been evolving. The dynamism in representative democracy keeps Indian democratic federalism alive. India has been ruled by several parties, sometimes with the absolute majority in Parliament and sometimes with the coalition consensus. Having strong institutions with defined purposes has accompanied the journey of Indian democracy, but the connotation of deinstitutionalization is often attached to the later years. Irrespective of the political parties, the important role of the institutions started to get either neglected or eroded, which, in turn, hampered the representative nature of Indian democracy. From the Nehruvian era till the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the absolute majority in 2014, the political turmoil in Indian democracy while creating scope for improvement, also raised some questions on the nature of India’s representative democracy. In this context, the paper examines the evolution of Indian representative democracy with a thorough analysis of the era of institutionalization. It also delves deep into the question of whether there is any erosion in the functionality of the institutions in the Indian democratic system. 

Era of One-party dominance and institutionalization

Before independence, the Congress party emerged as a major platform to bridge the gap between British authority and the Indians. The sociological base of Congress in the pre-independence era has often been referred to as the “rainbow”, a large body representing India’s diversity which eventually helped to establish the democratic set-up in the post-independence era (Kothari, 1964). A one-party dominant system and the institutional-building mechanism in India marked the Nehruvian era. Interestingly, this one-party dominant Indian experience was different from what is recognised as a one-party dominant political system. Congress used to be a more consensual platform than merely a political party. In the pre-independence era, it was acknowledged as a common voice for the Indians. In that phase, it was the movement against British exploitation, which helped to mobilize the people for the freedom movement (Candland, 1997). However, after independence, the scenario did not change a lot, but under PM Nehru’s leadership, the Congress as a political party got mass support in the first-ever general election of 1951.  

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru himself ‘envisioned’ a socialist form of state, with equal opportunities for every Indian, in terms of political, economic, and social. The credibility of the institutional building is one of the greatest achievements in India’s democracy for the initial years. Rajni Kothari in his book Politics in India, highlighted that the congress system developed under Nehru signified ‘the simultaneous movement of a political centrality with the dissent from the peripheries or oppositions’ (Kothari, 1970). Critics argue that the Nehruvian regime was entirely based on the continuation of the authoritative state apparatus of British India. However, this is not the whole truth. The vision of  PM Nehru with his intellectual furor was a blend of the institutional-building process to make the Indian democracy more representative. The Indian constitution has already given the framework for some institutions which are supposed to hold the essence of democracy. The Election Commission of India (ECI) was one of them, which was constitutionally allotted the task of conducting free and fair elections timely. The Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) and other state PSCs were also provided the role of conducting the entrance examination for the civil services to recruit the bureaucrats based on merits.  

PM Nehru valued democratic pluralism, where people take part in the nation-building process. Having an open competition to enter the bureaucracy made the policy more contemporary. The wave of institutionalization started in every key sector of India. In education, when PM Nehru thought about the IITs featuring subsidized but quality education, he also focused on basic education by setting up a network of Kendriya Vidyalayas. For the promotion of small and cottage industries and their export, the Khadi and Village Industries Commission was established. Regarding the heavy industries, PM Nehru not only thought about establishing Bhilai, Durgapur, and Rourkela iron and steel plants but also realized the need for good connectivity for smoothening the supply chain of industries. The planning commission was set to plan government expenses every five years. The institutions help to maintain accountability in the governance system (Adetiba, 2018). In a democracy, political governance is seemingly more aligned towards corruption and the process of institutionalization has the potential to increase the level of accountability. 

The phase of deinstitutionalization 

In the first three elections, Congress Party got an absolute majority in the Parliament and almost in all the states against a scattered and disunited opposition. However, from 1967 onwards, the consolidation of opposition parties especially in the assembly elections increasingly led to the bi-polarization of state-level party politics. The strengthening of the opposition parties was the key driver in dismantling the Congress’s dominance in national politics. In the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, and Delhi from 1967 the Congress versus BJP and in West Bengal, Tripura, and Kerala the Congress versus Left party made the first pathway to break the Congress dominant party system in India. Congress continued to win in the general election only in two exceptional circumstances due to the vote share pluralities. Congress could not manage its majority in the Lok Sabha Election during the post-emergency of 1977 when for the first time, the Janata party government led by PM Morarji Desai was formed. However, the change in leadership within the Congress party made a remarkably different era in Indian democracy. 

The diminishing role of institutions started from the time of Indira Gandhi. In the review written by Ashok K. Pankaj (2016), on the book Autumn of the Matriarch: Indira Gandhi’s Final Term in Office authored by Diego Maiorano (2015), he mentions the author not accounting the devastating impact of Indira Gandhi’s rule through the larger spectrum in Indian representative democracy. He particularly highlighted that during the tenure of Mrs. Gandhi as the prime minister,  institutional decay started. The use of institutions for the partisan interest and entry of some politicians can be hardly distinguished from an act of criminal. While Maiorano (2015) in his book has thoroughly discussed the oblivious role of Ms. Gandhi in terms of expanding the social base through appealing to the poor with the slogan ‘Garibi Hatao’, the review article remarks about PM Gandhi’s unpredictable decisions having long-term impacts on Indian broader party politics. The process of institutional decay accelerated during Indira Gandhi’s period (Manor, 1986). The highly centralized pattern of rule not only hampered the autonomy of the formal institutions such as bureaucracy, judiciary, or legislature, but it also damaged the many heterogeneous institutions. The nationalization of 14 banks overnight established the fact that the Congress under Indira Gandhi’s leadership did not want to have a diversified financial sector, but centralization of authority needed to be established. 

After the assassination of PM Indira Gandhi and thereafter PM Rajiv Gandhi, Indian democracy had undergone some structural changes. This was the same year when scholars remarked on the end of Congress-dominance in Indian national politics. The rising tide of minority parties and their aspiration to end the upper-caste Congress party with the name of ‘rural majority’ and the ‘downtrodden approach’  created a vacuum for new leadership. For the first time, in the 80s, India saw the coalition formation of government in New Delhi, which was not at all a common scenario in Indian democracy. The victory of the National Front Government in the February 1990 Parliamentary election, a minority party, with the support of several other parties, made a remarkable year in the history of Indian democracy. These years strengthened the true essence of democracy by having the proper functioning of federal units. This victory was indicative of a gradual but continuous revolution that brought the lower castes   and peasantry to the highest political positions in Indian democracy (Frankel, 1990). The decade of the 90s was full of turmoil, politically due to the first-time experience of a coalition government, the rise of the secessionist movement in Kashmir, the emergence of Khalistani ideology in Punjab, and on the economic front because of liberalisation. Hence, the decade of the 90’s is often marked as one of the most challenging times for the world’s largest democracy, and with the internal turbulence and external instability, which thoroughly tested the resilience of Indian democracy from both the inside and outside. 

The coming back of the Congress Party as the leading party forming the coalition at the Centre, led by Dr. Manmohan Singh successively for two terms has embedded much bold decision-making, notably the Civil Nuclear Deal with the US, which opened a new strategic chapter of the India-US relationship. However, the decade of NDA is also memorable for several government scams. Once again, the Congress party failed to establish its credibility in the welfare system of India. The year 2014 was a watershed moment in Indian democracy. After some decades, the BJP came into power with an absolute and path-breaking record of poll votes, under Mr. Narendra Modi. While PM Modi’s first term and the current term are not free of  controversy, there is no doubt that the level of resilience of Indian democracy is time-tested and fully dynamic. While the one-party dominance shows institutional decay, whenever the coalition government with a multi-party system has reserved its victory, the institutions have rejuvenated due to the heterogenous coalition set-up. 

Conclusion 

Indian democracy is one of the success stories in the world. While many other democracies failed to continue, Indian democracy showed resilience in  times of extreme political instabilities in the country, be it the emergencies or be it the breakdown of the government within a short period. The perseverance of the political parties for the long-term interest of making India an economic hub in the world has helped the multi-party democratic system to align its objectives as a whole. With a population of 140 billion people and the huge diversity in the country, Indian democracy has been preserved by the Indian constitutional principles and institutional-building. The erosion of institutions is a real concern to have a representative democracy. While institutionalization and its proper functioning are closely connected with the accountability of the government, the consistent erosion of institutionalization may alter the democratic governance in an autocratic rule-based country. Representative democracy can only work with mature institutions with clear purposes and defined responsibilities. The current phase of deinstitutionalization is the long-term fruit of the 1970s when the process started and needs to be erected to demonstrate the true potential of Indian democracy with having strengthened institutions. 

Endnotes

Adetiba, T. C. (2018). Institutionalizing democracy. Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. Springer MRW: [AU:0, IDX:0] (researchgate.net)

Aiyar, S. A. (2016, July 21). 25 years of reforms: Nehru built many strong institutions, almost all have eroded, says Swaminathan Aiyar. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/25-years-of-reforms-nehru-built-many-strong-institutions-almost-all-have-eroded-says-swaminathan-aiyar/articleshow/53310256.cms

Candland, C. (1997). Congress Decline and Party Pluralism in India. Journal of International Affairs, 51(1), 19–35. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357463 

Das, S. (2001). The Nehru Years in Indian Politics. Edinburgh Papers in South Asian Studies Number, 16. https://www.csas.ed.ac.uk/sites/csas/files/assets/pdf/WP16_Suranjan_Das.pdf WP16_Suranjan_Das.pdf (ed.ac.uk)

Frankel, F. R. (1990). India’s Democracy in Transition. World Policy Journal, 7(3), 521–555. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209159 

Khan, M. G. (2003). Coalition Government and Federal System in India. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 167-190. COALITION GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL SYSTEM IN INDIA (jstor.org)

Kothari, R. (1964). The Congress’ System’in India. Asian survey, 1161-1173. The Congress ‘System’ in India (jstor.org) 

Kothari, R. (1970). Politics in india. Orient Blackswan. Politics in India – Rajni Kothari – Google Books 

Manor, J. (1986). India: Awakening and Decay. Current History, 85(509), 101-137. India: Awakening and Decay (jstor.org)

Pankaj, A. K. (2016). [Review of Autumn of The Matriarch: Indira Gandhi’s Final Term in Office, by D. Maiorano]. Social Scientist, 44(7/8), 99–103. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24890322 

The Decline of the Congress Party in Indian Politics | Economic and Political Weekly (epw.in)

Price, G. (2022, April 7). Democracy in India. Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank; Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/democracy-india 

Sirnivasrao, M. (2011). PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA. The Indian Journal of Political Science, 961-970. PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND COALITION GOVERNMENTS IN INDIA (jstor.org) 

Sridharan, E. (2022, August 14). 75 years of Independence | A new phase of one-party dominance. The Hindu. https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/new-phase-of-one-party-dominance/article65768396.ece 

CINEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF POLITICAL PROCESSES, ELECTIONS AND THE PEOPLE

By Sakshi Wadhwa

Abstract:

With no dearth of literature on elections in India, scholarly works on popular media and elections are also gaining traction. However, going beyond the relatively simplistic attempt at measuring the influence of popular media, especially cinema, on the elections, this paper explores the representation of the dynamics between political processes, elections, and the people and how in the processes of electoral politics, the people and their ideal leader get formed. While it is true that democracy is not limited to elections (also called electoral democracy), the objective is to take elections as the key variable and unearth the construction of the people and leader through cinematic expressions. In order to explore the same, two Bollywood movies, ‘Nayak: The Real Hero’ and ‘Bhoothnath Returns’, are selected. While the former is selected as a movie reflective of the direct political category where the movie primarily and directly addresses political issues which are coupled with songs to make it commercially viable, the latter is selected as reflective of the indirect political category where the movie subtly, in light humour, points towards a political issue. The basic theme of the movies concerning the dynamics of leadership, political processes, and the people appear to have some convergences that allowed for their selection in the same paper; however, there exist several differences, the time gap and tropes portrayed being a few. The purpose is not to lay out mere comparisons between the two but to show how the political matrix plays out in them, in their different storylines- the common themes of political processes, elections, and the people.

Introductory Note on Elections in India:

The significance of elections in democratic politics rarely needs an introduction. The exercise of voting, where people come out of their houses to the designated polling station to vote for the party or the candidate they are supporting, forms what is called a “communitas” (Banerjee, 2011). Collins Dictionary defines the word “communitas” as “the sense of sharing and intimacy that develops among persons who experience liminality as a group” (Communitas, Collins English Dictionary, 2024). In Mukulika Banerjee’s noteworthy work published in 2011 that dealt with ‘elections as communitas,’ she emphasised the activity of voting, in tandem with the expressive part of voting called the “theater of politics” where people vote as responsible citizens rather than merely to vote for making a party or candidate the winner (Tuck, 2008, p.2). Banerjee pointed out the creation of communitas begins from the weeks of campaigning and culminates on election day. (Bannerjee, 2011). The surfacing of democratic values during elections which are absent in mundane life, is what makes elections extraordinary to the people, and the celebration of those values with the hope that they might spill over into everyday life appears, according to Banerjee, to be a key reason for elections being sacrosanct in India. She, therefore, moves beyond the common logic of elections where people are driven to vote to make their favourite candidate or party the winner. The festive-like character of elections in India arises from the glimmer of hope that they provide for democracy, for the general populace to hold the reins of power through their vote and for that period, to oppose the depravity of political class (Banerjee, 2011). It can be argued that elections act as external stimuli to create communitas of the people disrupting the differences, inequalities, and lack of democratic ideals that mark their everyday lives. This does not imply that elections are devoid of social conflicts and symbolise everything well. Beyond the act of voting, elections in India are mired in the circumstances of diverse representation and the practice of electoral banks, which usually play on the differences based on caste, class, and religion. Questions of agency and electoral malpractices also characterise the act of voting itself. 

Finally, it can be argued that in democracies, elections and electoral politics play a significant role in showing the interaction between the people and their representatives in the most direct way. The movies analysed in the sections below reaffirm the cinematic expression of this dialogue between people and the leaders in electoral politics, prior to that, the next section will offer a brief overview of Indian cinema and its importance.

Overview of Indian Cinema and its Relevance:

In the words of Elizabeth Haas, Terry Christenton, and Peter J. Haas, “Movies are more than mere entertainment” (Haas et al., 2015, p. 53). Movies can impact people’s understanding of politics and even influence one’s political views. In cases where movies are simply dismissed as mere entertainment, it can also indicate ignorance of the movies’ influence on oneself which might be unknown to oneself. Some movies can be very persuasive and directly political, while others raise political issues in a more indirect way. Some can be assertive about their political positions, while others show their political positions more subtly. In both cases, political socialisation occurs when the audience is exposed to the politics portrayed in the movies. (Haas et al., 2015). 

The two movies this paper seeks to analyse fall into one of the two above-mentioned sides. While the first one falls into the second category by showing who a true leader is and how he should act, the second one belongs to the first category, where the movie watchers are introduced to the know-how of elections and are persuaded to vote.

The Indian film industry is one of the largest film industries in the world, rivaling Hollywood in terms of the number of films being made each year and in terms of the audience. Thus, the film industry in India cannot be considered trivial. The significance of cinema in understanding Indian society was taken note of by academics on a larger scale in the 1990s, with scholars like Ashis Nandy and Madhava Prasad writing on cinema, its influence, and socio-political life. Rachel Dwyer, first professor of Hindi Cinema at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), points out that “Hindi cinema deserves our attention, not just as a form in itself but also as the best and most reliable guide to modern India” (Dwyer, 2010, p. 381). 

Analysis of the selected movies:

Moving on to the other prominent discussions around cinema, the study of dominant themes such as nationalism and masculinity in cinema has been studied (Murty, 2009). Such studies focus on unearthing broader themes like nationalism in a film’s storyline and character portrayals. However, here too, the process of elections and the construction of people and leaders around it remains unexplored. This brief paper attempts to do just that, exploring the dynamics between electoral politics, leaders, and people amidst the electoral and political events. Rick Iedema pointed out two important features around which analysis of fiction films should be undertaken. First, the prominent conflict or problem waiting to be resolved and the resolution that the film puts forth. The problem-resolution dynamic poses the need for diverse ideas and imaginaries that allow the representation of various value systems in the film. Second, the characters and their actions (Idema, 2001). As Fiske (1987) has also put, analysis of characters is integral since it is through them that the social and personal discourses become apparent. 

Madhavi Murty has followed Fiske and Iedema’s approach to study the portrayal of nation, religion, and masculinity whereby both Hindu and Muslim characters along with the problem and its resolution being presented in the films, are analysed (Murty, 2009). This paper attempts to look at the characters and problem-resolution matrix in the differing contexts of the political process and around elections.

For Elizabeth Hass, Terry Christensen, and Peter J. Haas, “the most important and overarching aspect of the study of politics and film is the political messages that movies may transmit” (Haas et al., 2015, p. vii). Further, they also “stress the importance of recognizing the varying degrees of political messaging intrinsic to most popular films.” (Haas et al., 2015, p. vii). 

Each step in the filmmaking process is imbued with communicating the political message to the audience. The featuring of political messages can be either intentional, ie, the motive of the filmmaker, or a side effect of social realities the film is showing or both. The paper’s scope is, however, limited to films where a political message is intentional. Instead of unpacking each step in the filmmaking process, the key ones are focussed here, which are supplemented with Iedema and Fiske’s approach of emphasizing characters and the gist of problem-solution dynamics. 

The two movies taken for the study are ‘Nayak: The Real Hero’ (2001) and ‘Bhoothnath Returns’ (2014).

The rationale for selecting these movies also includes their political messaging. While the latter primarily deals with the electoral process in India in a more humorous way combined with some melodrama, the former caters to the ideal leader who emerges among the common people and solves their problems while fighting against corruption and corrupt politicians. In both the films, ‘the people’ are projected in useful ways. In ‘Nayak’, the people acted as a force behind the common man, convincing him to become a leader. At the same time, in ‘Bhoothnath Returns,’ the electoral process is highlighted with its provisions regarding who can contest elections and how party politics work. ‘The people’ feature here also, whose suffering pushes the ghost Bhoothnath to contest elections. More details on these movies will follow in succeeding paragraphs.

The two aspects of filmmaking adopted for analysis include: Production and the Plot conveyed through the screenplay. 

Screenplay and the story: An Analysis

Screenplay is the most prominent means through which the political message finds its way into films. Screenplay involves the critical elements of the film: the plot, characters, and the implicit message.

As mentioned above, political movies are no recent phenomenon in India. Unlike the case in American movies, where the convention is to not muddle into the political subject matter, in India many movies have been released with explicit political messages. In recent times, many popular movies revolving around the themes of nationalism combined with politically charged messages have been released, be it Uri, The Kashmir Files, or The Kerala Story. Even in the past, in tandem with the political atmosphere, movies like Peepli Live and Range De Basanti were released to highlight political evils. In American films, since political movies do not take centre stage, they are made interesting by supplementing them with other dominant genres like romance. In the Indian case, political movies with explicit political messages involve emotions and a tinge of melodrama, comedy or action in some form. Both movies selected here start with a lighter note and gradually move toward a gush of emotions. 

Coming now to the analysis of the movies, ‘Nayak: The Real Hero’ was released on 7th September 2001. Directed by Shankar and produced by A.M. Rathnam, the three hours long movie featuring famous Bollywood actors, Anil Kapoor, Rani Mukerjee, Amrish Puri, and Paresh Rawal in lead roles showed a common man becoming the Chief Minister for a day and exhibiting qualities of an ideal leader by leading people out of misery. The movie is worth noting since although it did not show elections in particular, it panned the camera on people and how their problems are resolved by one day CM, a common man, one among them who initially didn’t want to join politics. In the first half of the movie, the protagonist, Shivaji Rao Gaekwad, played by Anil Kapoor, a young media person, interviews the Chief Minister, played by Amrish Puri, and questions him regarding his involvement in the riots which he and his team member had recorded in their camera. Flustered by the tough questions, the CM challenges Shivaji to get a feel of the difficulty of his job and offers him to become the CM for one day. This sets the stage for the story to unfold in which Shivaji does an exceedingly great job as one day’s CM by resolving people’s day-to-day problems, such as affordable housing and employment-related issues, and arresting inefficient and corrupt government officials, even arresting the CM himself. The movie then shows Shivaji’s struggles as he becomes the corrupt CM’s target, his advent to power, and the climax presents Shivaji as a genuine leader working for people’s welfare. The movie’s central theme is a committed and honest common man’s ascendancy to power by coincidence and his dedication to reforming the corrupt political system. The movie has songs and Shivaji’s romantic relationship with his love interest, an honest and upright village girl, Manjari, to mellow down the serious storyline. 

Crucial frames worthy to note in the film, apart from the coincidence that gave power to the common man, include how a devastated Shivaji Rao bounces back from the attacks by the CM, people’s love and support that led him to represent them and become the ‘Nayak,’ i.e. their leader. The scene after Shivaji’s victory when the empty complaint box symbolises his earnestness in resolving people’s problems. Even on the romantic trope, the protagonist, Shivaji, faces a challenge when his love interest, Manjari’s father, disapproves of him due to his coming into the profession of politics since it puts him at risk, though ultimately, the story has a happy ending with the father agreeing the two to be together. Finally, the political message of the film shows the greatness of a common man who has all the qualities of being a ‘Nayak.’ The movie also indirectly touched upon elections where the experiment of one day CM became successful and showed the failure of an elected CM who was corrupted by power. The success of one day’s CM led people to support the newly emerged promising leader who is then convinced to become a selfless politician, to go beyond his selfish interests and work for the people who are standing in his support. Regarding the character, Shivaji Rao Gaekwad is presented as a young and dedicated media person who had dreams of clearing competitive exams and securing a good future for himself and his family. His life took a turn after the interview with the CM and his great performance as one day’s CM. He ultimately chose the greater good of serving the people. A mixture of wisdom and courage can be seen in the character in the way he fought the assassins and did not step back once he decided to enter politics. The CM was shown as a shrewd and cunning old man, a power-hungry politician trapped in his own game who finally met a sad fate. The movie, however, emphasised the fight of an honest and young common man who wanted to work for the betterment of people against corrupt leaders.

As a cult classic film that completed its two decades in 2021, ‘Nayak’ was received well in its TV premieres to the extent that it secured its place among the most-watched films on the small screen. The movie registered many firsts, including being the first to have a South Indian style choreography, the first to use CGI (Computer-Generated Imagery), and 36 cameras working simultaneously for a single scene (Shekhar, 2021). With high technology incorporation and 3D action scenes, the movie fits nicely into the commercial movie framework. Apart from being a remake of its director Shankar’s Tamil directorial movie, Mudhalvan (1999), the protagonist of ‘Nayak’ was named Shivaji Rao, which was inspired by Rajnikanth’s real name, Shivaji Rao Gaekwad. The film’s director was very fond of the superstar and kept the name in the Hindi remake also (Shekhar, 2021). 

The relevance of ‘Nayak’ in the present day is not only due to its political message but also due to its invocation, now and then, by political leaders and journalists. For instance, when former Uttarakhand Chief Minister, Harish Rawat was subjected to criticism by the opposition for his hurried introduction of several government schemes, he said to the voters in his vote appeal, “Inspired by the role of Anil Kapoor in the film “Nayak,” I inaugurated more than 1800 schemes on a single day but this action was not to influence voters but a well thought exercise for the development of Uttarakhand as financial arrangements for more than 1600 schemes out of them have already been made” (Press Trust of India & Business Standard, 2014a) Further, in 2020, in the swearing-in ceremony of Delhi’s Chief Minister, Arvind Kejriwal, there was a banner at Ramlila Maidan that showed Anil Kapoor as Nayak on one end and Arvind Kejriwal as Nayak 2 on the other end with Nayak 2 is back again written in the centre (Hindustan Times, 2020). 

In 2022, then Chief Minister Shivraj Chauhan was equated with Shivaji Rao of ‘Nayak’ by a news report when Chauhan suspended a government official (telephonically) in no time for his inefficiency regarding Ujjawala scheme cards. In the movie, the protagonist also took immediate actions of suspension of inefficient and corrupt government officials (The Economic Times, 2022). 

In 2023, another media report equated West Bengal’s Governor CV Anand Bose with the protagonist of ‘Nayak’ when he took prompt action of talking to the Election Commissioner and informing him of a man being attacked by miscreants in 24 South Paragana. His actions, such as visiting violence-hit areas, launching peace and rapid cation rooms, and sending complaints to the State Election Commission, were viewed to resemble that of Nayak’s protagonist, who was swift and action-oriented (Misra et al., 2023).

Moving on to the second film, ‘Bhoothnath Returns,’ released on 11th April 2014, the film was directed by Nitesh Tiwari and produced under the banner of T-Series and B.R. Films. In the second edition of the Bhoothnath franchise, the film follows a similar thread of bonding between an old man’s ghost and a young child, but the differentiating factor is the political message in the second part that revolves specifically around elections. 

Steered by veteran star cast of Amitabh Bachchan as Bhoothnath, Boman Irani as Bhau, and child actor, Parth Bhalerao as Akhrot, the film showed the ghost, Bhoothnath as the protagonist who goes back to earth to reinstate his fear as a ghost which is tarnished, in the first edition where he appears as a friendly and comical ghost to a child, Banku. As he returns to earth, he meets another kid, Akhrot who could see him and is unafraid of him. Getting to know him and his struggles as a kid residing in a slum, helping his widowed mother make ends meet, Bhootnath is taken aback by the corruption in the country and ultimately decides to contest elections. His struggle to contest elections by overcoming various obstacles becomes the core of the film’s second half.

Bhoothnath’s realisation of the people’s suffering is worth pointing out since he was no foreigner and had indeed stayed in the country. However, it is interesting that he comes to the realisation only after meeting Akhrot. This indicates the typical middle-class ignorance of the grassroot issues of poverty, malnutrition, and injustice that pervade the social and economically weaker classes. When he was alive, Bhoothnath also belonged to the middle classes. It required Bhoothnath to move away from the silo of his social position (even as a ghost he died as a member of the middle class) and closely witness the suffering of the people to understand their condition truly. This shows the superficial awareness of the economically better classes to the everyday painful struggle of those at the bottom of the economic ladder. 

The movie then traces the struggles of a ghost in contesting elections through which the audience is made aware of the eligibility criteria for contesting elections in the country, the positive points, and the loopholes. For instance, the Indian law’s requirement for the candidate to be a voter became a problem since Bhoothnath was dead. However, the non-issuance of Bhoothnath’s death certificate since his son refused to bribe the official and a vote being cast using his name in previous elections showed how the corruption helped Bhoothnath stay in the game of politics and contest elections. Through Bhoothnath’s dialogues and speeches, the audience is instructed to be vigilant voters who get their voter ID cards made and turn up to vote. The movie upholds a fairly instructive style, almost schooling the audience about the know-how of elections and the importance of voting. The ending takes a more emotional turn when the serious issue of candidates being murdered by other ‘powerful’ candidates is portrayed. Since as a ghost, Bhoothnath could not be killed, Akhrot was attacked by Bhau. The comic scenes between Bhau and Bhoothnath are praiseworthy and the movie’s pace from comedy to emotionally charged with the message being conveyed appears subtle and smooth. 

Regarding the characters in the film, Bhoothnath is presented as a friendly and honest ghost who has stage fright but is committed to working for the betterment of the people. Akhrot is portrayed as a witty child who is wiser than his age due to his difficult circumstances and supports Bhoothnath throughout even while risking his own life. Bhau, the villain and a dishonest politician is shown to be involved in dirty politics who, similar to the conventional understanding of politicians, is interested only in gaining power and can go to any extent for the same, even fighting against a ghost. Another important character in the film is that of the people, the ones who come to hear his speech and those who are convinced by Bhoothnath to get their voter IDs made through the new form of non-cooperation by asking people to turn dead ears to those who do not have their voter ID cards.

Owing to the similar thread of an invisible man (largely invisible ghost, to be precise) trying to help people, Nandini Ramnath finds ‘Bhoothnath Returns’ a sort of a sequel to Shekhar Kapur’s ‘Mr. India,’ showcasing a similarly well-intentioned and helpful man with the power of invisibility (Ramnath, 2014). For Ramnath, the focus of the movie is on the suffering of the underprivileged, and a call to respect their rights instead of keeping or shifting the focus to the middle class, which helps the movie stand out (Ramnath, 2014). It is worth highlighting that viewed from the eyes of Bhoothnath, the core character in the film, the underprivileged who constitute a huge section of the country’s population (in reality as well) became visible only when Bhoothnath encounters Akhrot (a street-smart kid who is a slum dweller) and sets foot in his part of the world. Another idea that subtly but confidently came across in the film, indicated by Ramnath, was the shift from Amitabh Bachchan’s portrayal as an Angry Young Man standing up for justice in yesteryear’s movies to a mature statesman who yet again shoulders the responsibility of leading the social change but in a different way  (Ramnath, 2014). The earlier image of Angry Young Man, who wanted to disrupt and overhaul the entire political system along with toppling away the establishment, gave way to a mature statesman who did not want to disfigure the political system but rather present his candidacy in compliance with the norms and legally challenge the corrupt veteran politicians. Capitalising on the mood of the country heading towards elections at that time, whereby people, in general, were frustrated with corruption, the movie did a fair job of building a story around the importance of voting against corruption and corrupt practices. The movie’s political message included a direct call for revolution through elections, i.e., change through a vote which was combined with the advocacy for a revolutionary leadership against the big-shot politicians already in the game. For Ramnath, the aspect of revolutionary leadership in the film hints towards the new and rising Aam Admi Party, which also claimed to be emerging from the common people, working for their advancement and fighting against the established politicians of the times who were embroiled in corruption  (Ramnath, 2014). 

For other reviewers like renowned film critic Anupama Chopra, while the movie is based on the great idea of a ghost contesting elections, it lacks the required narration (Chopra, 2014). Akhrot’s dialogue in the film, where he voices the advantage of Bhoothnath being a ghost and hence could not be killed, underlines the uniqueness of the film’s core theme along with hinting towards the normalisation of candidates being killed in the power struggle. For Chopra, the movie’s climax of a new dawn in India gives a suitable ending to the story by knitting together the hanging threads but does not save the movie from being simplistic yet loaded with preaching (Chopra, 2014). 

Another significant feature of the film that was left largely unnoticed was Bhoothnath’s pillar of strength, Akhrot-the kid who appeared mature much before his age- who took the responsibility of encouraging Bhoothnath to join politics and work for the welfare of the people. Akhrot’s role as a child taking responsibility for the betterment of the people indicates how children, though much neglected, become agents of change and wield enough will to persuade apathetic elders to wake up and take charge as active citizens. Akhrot’s witty dialogues where he first asks Bhoothnath not to overact but then approves of overacting since it has many takers in India are central to the film and indicate the observant nature of children who are observing those around them in much greater detail than the elders would expect. The strong presence of a witty kid, light humour, and the social message coming across more strongly in the second half is common in both films of the Bhoothnath franchise, however, the sequel can be seen tilting more towards a socio-political message with leadership, corrupt practices, the plight of the underprivileged and elections being the recurring aspects. The film was a slow starter and performed well at the box office later, the reasons for which include other political releases around the same time.

The two movies have some similarities, such as a reluctant leader, an ordinary young man in the case of Nayak, and a ghost in the case of Bhoothnath Returns. Their reluctance was converted into a passion to enter politics through the not-so-evident but crucial force of the people. In Nayak’s case, the people’s support convinced him, while in Bhoothnath, it was the people’s suffering that pushed him. In both cases, the supporting actors’s words of wisdom also encouraged the protagonists to take the bull by its horns. 

In terms of problem-solution dynamics, the problem of people’s corruption and misery was shown to be solved by a strong leader who was passionate about working for the people, away from the dirty politics that had been the norm. While a more happy ending is shown in Nayak, in the case of Bhoothnath it was kept a little low. Both are political movies that are commercial but have a social-political message, which is more instructive in the case of Bhoothnath and less so in Nayak. Both movies had an element of uniqueness, in Nayak, it was the one-day CM event, and in Bhoothnath Returns, a ghost contesting elections. Regarding characters, while Nayak showed a young hero and a pinch of a romantic relationship, Bhoothnath portrayed an old ghost bonding with a young kid with no romantic angle. The villains in both movies were shown to be the conventional politicians embroiled in dirty politics and lust for power.

Conclusion:

The paper traced the importance of elections and cinema and, further, elections in cinema to understand the relationship between political processes, elections, and the creation of the people. The two selected movies, with a gap of a good number of years between them, continued to show politics as a profession that is marked by cruelty and corruption.

In both movies, ordinariness is highlighted and appreciated, thereby indicating the purity of the commoners who are not conventional politicians. However, apart from the ordinariness, a difference can be seen in the projection of the leader. While ‘Nayak’ can be seen tilting towards support for hero worship, ‘Bhoothnath Returns’ was more instructive, where the sequence followed a more informative cum educational approach. The much-neglected aspect of both movies was the presence of a collective of people who persuaded the leaders to take the lead and represent their interests. The force of the people, their misery who were let down by the politicians, and their support for the newly emerging leader are noteworthy. The implicit presence of the people gave the leader the strength to fight against evil and remain pious amidst dirty politics. The movies therefore showed the ideal leader and the ideal people who should not step back from supporting the promising leader. In ‘Bhoothnath Returns,’ the scenes where the people are being schooled by Bhoothnath to vote communicate the same message to the audience, whose nation was up for elections in the same year. Finally, the relationship between political processes, elections, and the people was simplified by both movies by evading the more complex questions of active citizenship and, in fact, the lack of such a  sincere, dedicated, and flawless leader as shown in the movies. In terms of the portrayal of political processes and elections in cinema, it can be argued that movies with political messages have been a constant feature of Bollywood, and the filmmakers come out with new and interesting ways of building on political themes. The explicit presence of strong leadership and the implicit presence of the people continue to be recurring aspects while the storyline keeps evolving. The depiction of political and electoral processes does contain an element of truth coupled with other unreal and dramatic aspects to have an emotive appeal. The political messaging of movies, as reflective in the paper as well, can be both direct and indirect; while the former is easy to categorise under the broad genre of political movies, the same cannot be said for the latter, which subtly puts across political issues in symbols and layers. In any case, the relevance of the movies depends on their interaction and engagement with the audience. To better understand that, more research is needed to understand audience perception of such movies going beyond the mere box office numbers to determine the movie’s success. 

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Intertwined Paradoxes: Electoral Campaigns, Social Media and Populism in Indian General Elections of 2014 and 2019 

By K.S. Sanjana

Abstract

The beginning of the decade of the 2010s accounts for a series of watershed moments that drastically changed the landscape of Indian politics. The urban-centred political movements like the India Against Corruption, the Nirbhaya Movement and the consequent anti-establishment sentiments were amplified with the use of social media. Politics was mediated by newer practices of social media that now connected millions of people through a single click. These politically significant events were translated into political-electoral shifts in favour of a majoritarian Hindu right-wing political party, the Bharatiya Janata Party. The BJP has been credited with accelerating the social media revolution in India. Interestingly, the rise of the party is closely intertwined with the emergence of social media in India and a simultaneous construction of the category of ‘people’ as opposed to the elites. Promoted and aided by the affordances of social media, the party and its Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi was able to connect with voters across sections, thereby engaging them in a ‘participatory logic’ rendered legible both by elections and social media. This raises the question on how significant is social media in changing the electoral game and facilitating populism? Does the use of social media in the electoral realm have deeper implications in the political landscape of a democracy?

This paper picks up these questions and tapers its scope to analyse the increasing use of social media by the BJP with respect to electoral mobilisation. The paper aims to address the shifts in Indian politics, particularly the ‘populist turn’ by tracing an overlap between electoral mobilisation and social media. The main argument of the paper is twofold- first, that social media has altered the way electoral campaigning marking a deep shift in the practice of Indian politics, second the tactical use of social media has resulted in accentuation of the category of ‘people’ that can result in a majoritarian consensus favouring the populist and his party. A symbolic collective representation of the ‘people’ has been constructed by establishing a direct communication between the leader and his voters that social media has made possible. The paper undertakes a case study of General Elections of 2014 and 2019 to demonstrate the impact of social media on electoral campaigns. It looks at the mediation of electoral strategies of the BJP and its leader Narendra Modi by social media to unknot the overlapping process of social media, populism and electoral mobilisation.              

Introduction

Election campaigns in India are no less than a carnival, a celebration of the world’s largest democracy. The First Indian Election in 1952 was an experiment in democracy that demonstrated the tenacity of the Indian electorate. The commitment to choose their representatives for the first time left a unique ‘postcolonial’ imprint on the colonial institutions of Parliament and modes of representation. The Indian experiment in electoral democracy has been a success without any aberration in over seven decades and seventeen General Elections with the exception of the National Emergency when the country’s democracy was suspended for nearly two years (1975-1977). Mukulika Banerjee’s Why India Votes captures the phenomenon that an election is in the country- it means more to people than simply a means to elect governments rather the very act of voting is seen as  meaningful and an end in itself expressing the virtues of citizenship, accountability and civility (2014:3). Elections are an insight into the mood of the country, whether they acknowledge the commitment to the promises made by the political parties before coming to power, they punish the government and/or support it by bringing them back to power. The General Elections of 2014 is a strong case in support of this observation of the Indian electorate, it surmised a death knell for the Congress Party and marked a right-ward shift in Indian politics.       

The two General elections during the decade of 2010s marked a momentous phase in Indian democracy when the country was at the cusp of a change in its political leanings and social imaginings. This requires retracing the context right before 2013-14 Elections before the BJP emerged as a desirable alternative to the dominant force of Congress since the beginning of post-independence politics. The Congress was accused of rampant corruption including 2G Scams, Commonwealth Games scam, coal scam among others which drained the public resources of the country and tarnished the reputation of the party. The rhetoric of corruption picked up magnitude when the India Against Corruption movement led by self-proclaimed Gandhian, Anna Hazare mobilised thousands of Indians largely constitutive of urban middle class on the streets. This ‘emerging’ middle class played a crucial role in the 2014 Elections (Kaur, 2014). The rhetoric of corruption was central to Narendra Modi’s campaign who articulated in a populist manner, projecting the Congress and its ‘dynastic politics’ as the elites who suffocated and misused the rightful claimants of political power- the Indian ‘people’ or the ‘aam admi’ (common man). However, the peculiar significance of this movement was its novel and strategic use of social media to mobilise the people (Panwar et al., 2019). The Anna Hazare movement disseminated information regarding protests across cities in India, images of protests and strategies of protests using social media. For instance, the movement’s facebook page announced ‘candle light support’ rallies in Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore. Within minutes, millions were mobilised across the country, SMS and Missed Calls Campaigns were ways to show solidarity with the movement. Through social media, people connected with the movement and a national consciousness against corruption and state inefficiency was evoked. Having witnessed the power of social media in political mobilisation, one of the first few political actors to tap into the potential powerhouse in constructing its own ‘mediatized appeal’ was the BJP. Unlike conventional methods of electoral campaigning including mass rallies, door-to-door campaigning and pamphlet distributions, the affordances of social media seemed convenient and cost-effective (Mukherji, 2015). Political leaders could connect with the people directly opening up an interactive medium of political communication changing the way electoral campaigns take place. This transcended the more rigid relationship shared between the citizens and their political leaders, furthering the idea that ‘people’ had greater accessibility to political power. This line of argument is important to establish the overlapping of social media and political shifts.

In a close observation, the current ‘seemingly’ inevitable invincibility of the BJP was a political phenomenon in the making with multiple factors such as strong anti-incumbency sentiment against the Congress, mass perception of the party as being corrupt and scamming the people, political movements including India against Corruption and the Nirbhaya Protests in the 2011-12, all of these among other factors contributed to the political landscape of the country over a decade. The ‘people’ though largely constitutive of urban middle class had learnt their power, successfully mobilising themselves against the state machinery (Chopra, 2014). Especially, with the help of social media the people were able to connect and form ‘networks’ that helped organise agitations and movements (Papacharissi, 2014). The wave of anti-incumbency against the state and the party in power, Congress was generated, sustained and amplified. The background of BJP’s win was condensed in this idea of ‘people’ taking charge of the political helm, calling out those perceived as ‘elites’ in power. It kindled a nation’s collective imagination- desperate hope for prosperity and betterment. This was embodied in Narendra Modi’s branding as the ‘56-inch chest saviour’ who could transform and bring about ‘ache din’. The populist turn in India was solidified by a political and electoral mandate in favour of Narendra Modi in the previous two General Elections of 2014 and 2019. Several scholarly studies (Gudavarthy, 2015; Jaffrelot, 2021) have made attempts to capture this populist impulse, this paper focuses on an important if not fundamental aspect of the BJP’s current invincibility- its constructive and almost compulsive use of social media for spreading its message. The BJP’s hegemonic power, according to Suhas Palshikar rests on two pillars- election and ideology (Vaishnav, 2019). The two pillars, I argue, are tethered together by the social media ‘lasso’. The brilliant use of social media in the two elections has enabled BJP to not only maintain electoral dominance but also construct a political field where its ideology of Hindutva is made legible. Though it must be noted that of the two elections, it was the 2019 elections that saw a more systematic and rigorous use of social media. The differences are also noted in the kind of narratives that dominated its electoral campaign; the 2019 social media-led campaign used nationalist and communal overtones making it a highly polarised campaign. The first part of the paper will look at the factors of BJP’s electoral success. Expanding its social base, BJP has come to represent sections across caste, gender and class. The sections in this part underscores the significance of representation in electoral politics, political narratives during election campaigns and the increasing identification of diverse sections of society with the BJP that was closely linked to the popularity of Narendra Modi. The second part of the paper extends the analysis to the increasing use of social media in exemplifying the representativeness of the electorate. While tracing the impact of social media on election campaigns, the section focuses on the case of General Elections of 2014 and 2019 to argue that populist style of communication deployed by Narendra Modi establishes a direct representation of the populist with the people. In doing so, the populist reaffirms himself as the representative of the ‘authentic people’ . The section notes that the participatory logic of social media coupled with a populist impulse has characterised the shift in the practice of Indian politics, particularly election campaigns in India.      

Part I: The Rise of the BJP

1. The Electoral Mandate

The ‘post-Congress’ polity in India (Palshikar, Kumar and Lodha, 2017) was inaugurated by the massive gains made by the Bharatiya Janata Party at the cost of a humiliating defeat of the Indian National Congress in the 16th Lok Sabha Election.  The latter lost as many as 162 seats over the 2009 election outcome. The mandate of the election was reflective of the success of the BJP in presenting itself as a capable alternative to the Congress. It secured 31.1% of the votes, winning a clear majority with 282 seats in the Lok Sabha. The BJP in the 2014 election added to its strength in the lower house with the aid of its allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). The Allies contributed to a total of 54 seats, taking the total tally of the NDA to 336 seats. While this seemed as a ‘one-off event’  and a ‘fragile mandate’ (Chakravarti, 2018; Chhibber & Ostermann, 2014), in the 2019 elections, the BJP gained more than its previous tally winning 303 seats on its own with a vote share of 37.4%. The numbers only consolidated the BJP government’s hold over the Indian electorate. What is significant about the 2014 election is the replacement of coalition politics with majority party rule (Wallace, 2015) With the upcoming 2023 elections, there is little to no doubt among the psephologists and political pundits that the BJP with Narendra Modi at the apex is set to return. “The general sense is that a BJP win is almost an inevitability at this stage,” said Neelanjan Sircar, a fellow at the Centre for Policy research. He added, “the question is more: what factors will shape the scale of the victory?” (The Guardian, 2023).  The election slogan for the upcoming 2024 General Elections ‘Teesri baar Modi Sarkar, abki bar 400 paar’ clearly proclaims the target the party has set for itself. The possibility of  a third term for the BJP with only increased majority provokes questions- How has the BJP managed to maintain its dominance? What are the mobilizational strategies it uses to come to power? How strong are certain factors in ensuring a continued electoral success for the BJP? Has the BJP continued to use the same ‘toolkit’ or repertoires of mobilisation since 2013. If there is a difference in the rhetorics being used by the BJP over the successive elections? What does it tell one about the voters and the changing landscape of Indian politics? Now, with a Hindu Nationalist party in the centre over the decade from 2014-2024, it is interesting to note the steady growth of the party on the Indian political scene.

2. Accommodating new social coalitions

The BJP came to power with promises and hope for a developed India that resonated with the country’s electorate. While in 2014, the political winds were fanning the BJP to new heights in its political journey, it was a first for the Indian political landscape to bring a majoritarian right-wing party to power with an emboldening mandate. Wallace (2015) notes three major factors that led to BJP’s victory in the 2014 elections- economy, corruption and the massive campaign that Modi led on his own. In his book The Modi Effect: Inside Narendra Modi’s Campaign to Transform India, Lance Prince systematically lays out the carefully and meticulously crafted campaign to project ‘NaMo’ as a strong Prime Ministerial candidate not only within his party but also nationally. He launched his campaign independently along with the party, contributing heavily to his personal popularity somewhat separate from the party. However, BJPs success in the elections is not solely attributed to Modi’s persona but to its own transformation. BJP’s social engineering bore fruits in the form of expanding social base and shedding its image as an upper caste party. Taking the OBC into its fold left unaccommodated and untouched by the Congress allowed BJP to brand itself as the party of the ‘people’ as opposed to that of the elite which later helped in furthering the oppositional binaries of people and the elite during the election campaign of 2014. In 2019, Modi’s BJP came to power adding 21 new seats to its pocket (BBC, 2019). 

The BJP’s victory in the 2019 elections has prompted Chhiber and Verma (2019) to have argued for the rise of a fourth party system in India. The BJP enjoys a dominance that Congress once enjoyed (Vaishnav, 2019), what Kothari called the ‘Congress system’ (Kothari, 1964). This points to their argument in their much acclaimed book Ideology and Identity (2018) that the BJP’s victory in 2019 was not merely an extension of the immediate context of the elections but the structural shifts taking place in Indian politics (Chhibber and Verma, 2019).  The expansion of BJP’s social base contributed to this. The party was seen as an upper caste party, but with the lower rungs of the party open to diverse social groups, it has therefore become “more reflective of a larger swathe of Hindu society” (Chhibber and Verma, 2019:138) (Rukmini S. in Vaishnav, 2019). Nalin (2022) notes that not only was BJP able to forgo its casteist image but also its urban image by penetrating into the rural heartlands. Oliver (2015) attributes the reasons for the BJP’s landslide victory to mobilising new voters. Traditionally the BJP has received votes from upper caste, middle class, educated and those exposed to media (Chhibber and Verma, 2019). New social coalition of the Voters of the party include the poor, those from the rural areas, women and the Other Backward Castes (OBCs) and Scheduled Castes (SC), the religious minorities are an exception here. It is interesting to note that since 1998, voter turnout had been on a decline but the trend reversed in 2014. In 2009, it stood at 58% which went up to 66.4% in 2014 and the highest ever in 2019 with 67.1%. Increasing voter turnout coupled with two simultaneous trends of exponential rise in women voters and increase in young and first-time voters has changed the electoral field for the parties. Data from the National Election Survey (NES) 2014 and 2019 shows that the number of voters under the age group of 18-22, 23-29 has grown from 4 to 12% respectively. The 2014 Election registered a high voter turnout among young, first-time voters. Studies demonstrate that the young voters make a difference in electoral outcomes and so the political parties tailor their campaign to attract this block of voters (Palshikar, Lodha and Kumar, 2017). 

(Source: NES 2019, Lokniti-CSDS)

With respect to women voters, 2019 was the first time that women voter turnout (66.68%) equaled the male voter turnout (66.79%) (BBC, 2019). The BJP was able to capture more women voters in 2019 than the previous elections and for the first time women voters voted for BJP over their conventional choice of Congress. Rahul Verma and Ankita Barthwal note that welfare policies, emphasis on safety and emotive connection with the women voters led the latter to vote for BJP (India Today, 2022). 

BJP’s success, writes Suhas Palshikar can be attributed to the party’s ability to spread its message of majoritarianism. The constant narrative of victimhood and dominance creates a craving for leadership. The BJP with the face of Narendra Modi has been able to meet this demand. Thus, the rise of BJP is a combination of several factors working simultaneously on the political scene of the country. The BJP’s electoral gains were also a result of massive and sustained campaigning. The Prime ministerial Candidate, Narendra Modi addressed 437 public rallies across 25 states covering 3 lakh kilometres besides 1,350 rallies through 3D technology from September 2013 to the end of campaigning period (The Times of India, 30 April 2014). The Lokniti-CSDS Survey has noted that an increasing number of voters are identifying with the BJP- 41% of the voters a stark congrats to 18% identification for the Congress. (Chhibber and Verma, 2019). 

       (c) The Modi magic 

As briefly mentioned in the last section, Narendra Modi’s charisma has sustained and transcended beyond the electoral realm. His journey from Gujarat’s Chief Minister to the country’s Prime Minister to becoming the most popular leader in the world is not a fluke (Business Today, 2022). Lance Prince (2015) in his book The Modi Effect gives a detailed account of how once a pariah who was refused entry into the United States as a religious extremist would become the most prominent international leader with his electoral triumphs.  He writes that, Modi tried to show his achievements in the state of Gujarat to that of the whole nation, jumping up his position from a chief Minister of the state to that of a Prime ministerial candidate. He also notes how Modi was in awe of Obama’s Presidential Campaign of 2008. The 2014 elections was an ‘Indian version of Obama’s ‘Yes We Can!’ amplified a hundred times over (Price, 2015). The novelty of 2014 Elections was the extensive use of social media. The Modi phenomenon is the work of social media, the evidence for it lies in the fact that mainstream mass media was not in favour of Modi given his communal image and role in the Godhara riots (Chopra, 2014; Wallace, 2015; Price, 2015). Jaffrelot notes that BJP’s 2014 campaign was Modi-centric and populist in nature (Jaffrelot, 2015) .  He carefully crafted his ‘chaiwala’ image in sharp contrast to the Congress corrupt elites in New Delhi. 

   (d) Ideological belongings and Political Narratives

Price (2015:23) notes that Modi’s fascinating image is due to his ability to ‘weave together and then articulate India’s many contradictions and make them appear consistent’. The 2014 election had three major narratives spun together around the three major factors for BJP’s success as noted in the first section- economy, corruption and Modi’s own campaign. Emphasis on policy paralysis, poor delivery and credibility crisis were some other issues that needed to be addressed. The language of reform and reinvention of the system was well received by the voters (Business Today, 2019). The 2014 election was driven by economic agendas set for the nation. The main electoral slogan for the 2014 election was ‘achhe din aane wale hain’ (good days are about to come) gave hope to the people for a better future that saw India rising from the grip of a stale economy bogged down by corruption to that of fast-paced economic development and prosperity. The BJP projected itself as the party with a difference with Narendra Modi at its helm who was able to present a cohesive ‘aspirational’ narrative for the growth story of India that was only achievable under the conditions that ensured him coming to power. He projected his ‘successful’ stint as the chief minister of  Gujarat and the ‘Gujarat model’ as the ideal path for India’s success story (Jaffrelot, 2015). ‘Development’ as the catchphrase helped BJP garner support from not only the upper and middle class but also the poor (Palshikar, et al., 2017). The youth, particularly, wanted to benefit from the promises of development and unencumbered growth. The pro-market and pro-industrial image of Modi captured the growing neo-liberal impulse that was partially being stifled by the Nehruvian past, the capitalists of the country who were eagerly awaiting the penetration and expansion in the market and also the corporate-driven media that gave coverage to Modi that facilitated his popularity. Moreover, the rhetoric of Hindutva which Modi and the BJP has been tied to was dormant in the 2014 Election, what Jaffrelot has called the ‘banalisation of Hindu nationalism’ rather than its absence. The BJP government had to balance its Hindutva agenda with the promises of economic growth. This careful balancing act was the foundation of BJP’s success post-2014 elections.   

The BJP has accused the Congress of appeasing the minorities, specifically the muslim minorities for its own gains. This narrative has come to be attached with discussions on India’s secularism which is presumed then to have been ‘favourable’ to the minorities and an unequal treatment of the Hindu majority. The construction of public distrust for secularism as deeply flawed and solely western in its oeuvre, aided the BJP’s narrative of a Hindu majority victimhood furthering its own ideological premise of Hindutva. The BJP has had a list of cultural agenda for decades with Ram Mandir, abrogation of Article 370 and the implementation of Uniform Civil Code. These rhetorics came in handy during the 2019 elections. Despite many political pundits predicting a loss of votes and popularity for the BJP and Modi, the outcome of 2019 elections proved all the predictions wrong. Modi employed new communication strategies to ‘saturate’ the public sphere and reach voters directly (Tillin, 2015). 

The 2019 Lok Sabha Elections was high on the rhetoric of national security amplifying the ontological threat to the Hindu majority and the nation while casting out muslims especially Kashmiri muslims as threats. The information regarding Pulwama attack and the retaliatory surgical strike was played out on smartphone screens which seems to have impacted voting in favour of the incumbent party notes a Lokniti CSDS Survey (2019). Varshney (2019) notes that, unlike his 2014 campaign which was built around economic development, good governance, and an attack on his political rivals, Modi’s 2019 campaign was built around his personal charisma and incorruptibility along with grand narratives of national security (after the Pulwama attacks) and the Hindu nationalism to persuade voters. The 2019 elections also focussed on Modi’s achievements in the previous term and subsequent articulation of the slogan ‘Sabka Saath Sabka Vikas’. It reflected BJP’s position that it stands for the development of all, appeasement of none. The development narrative along with communally polarising narratives of the general elections were premised on bringing the nation under the ‘right leadership’. . 

According to Palshikar, this BJP-led system has been able to cement its newfound hegemony on two pillars: elections and ideology. This part of the paper accounted for the electoral appeals and accommodations the BJP undertakes. The BJP has emerged as a catch-all party that was once credited for Congress’s decades-long mass appeal. The BJP has weakened the coalition system and strengthened itself as a formidable opposition to Congress. This has been characterised by the rise of a charismatic leader who claims to be the representative of people from across sections of the society. With manifold increase in the number of voters and their participation in the electoral democracy through votes, the shifts in democracy have been consolidated as populist in nature. The quest for electoral and ideological hegemony is incomplete without an examination of the significance of social media in ensuring BJP’s political success. 

          Part II:  Social Media: A key player in Indian Elections ?

1. New medium of political communication

Mass Media has been used by political parties to mobilise voters and communicate their political agendas. Traditional electoral campaigns relied on distribution of pamphlets, organising rallies and roadshows and making personal appeals to the voters. Social media added an additional layer of medium for political communication (Diwakar, 2015) (Mukherji, 2015). Social media is different from traditional mass media, in the sense that people can create their own content, thereby creating an active participation. The novelty of participation and direct communication attributed to social media communication ensured greater connectivity, establishing a bottom-up route of political dialog. Social media has the potential to alter the relationships of individuals to society (Effing, et al., 2011). It functions on the paradox of allowing individuals to maintain their individuality by creating their own profiles, enabling them to craft an ‘online persona’ that might be different from their ‘real’ persona and; has also bound individuals together into a collective that can think and act in unison. This ‘participatory logic of social media’ gives the ontological comfort of connectivity with others and renders participation convenient. The use of social media as a tool for political mobilisation has been witnessed in the Arab Spring, Anna Hazare movement and Nirbhaya Movement among others. In the electoral realm, however, politicians use social media to interact with their voters and communicate their message directly to them. The voters can directly tweet or tag the leaders, engage in political discussions and conversations with others on similar issues using hashtags. Political campaigning has found a new communicative medium in social media (Safiullah et al, 2017). The question of how much of a significance social media plays in electoral campaigns is highly debated (Effing et al., 2011; Mukherji, 2015). The precedent for a tactical use of social media was set by Barack Obama for his Presidential Campaign in the American Elections of 2008. His “Yes, we can!” campaign gained traction and prominence among the American voters making him the First Afro-American President in a deeply racially divided country (Effing et al., 2011). This was picked up in various countries including India. 

2. BJP’s tactical use of social media in the General Elections of 2014 and 2019

The digital population in India has witnessed exponential growth. The Internet and Mobile Association of India states that India is the second country with the most internet users. In 2014, India had 814.59 million voters, out of which 23.16 million were in the age group of 18–19 years, comprising 2.8 per cent of the national electorate (Kanungo, 2015). NDTV (2014) reported that since the 2014 elections were announced till its end, twenty-nine million people in India have engaged in 227 million posts, comments, and discussions. This represents two third of all regular Facebook users engaged on Facebook, and around 13 million citizens have mentioned Modi in their posts on Facebook.  While only one in ten voters accessed Facebook in 2014, this figure jumped to 32% by 2019 (CSDS-Lokniti, 2019: 12). India’s 2014 General Election was proclaimed as ‘substantially mediatized’ elections  (Verma and Sardesai in Palshikar et al., 2017) where mainstream mass media and social media heavily determined the popularity of the Prime Ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi. The BJP worked hard to eliminate the narrow ethno-religious nationalism and violence that had stuck with the party by redefining its public messaging to that of development in the 2014 elections (Vaishnav, 2019). 

BJP and Narendra Modi placed an unprecedented emphasis on social networking sites that allowed the party to relay its own narratives and ideas surpassing the mediation by the mainstream mass media. It also helped Narendra Modi to establish a direct channel with the electorate through social media. He created his Twitter profile in 2009. Much of the election took place online with the medium becoming a deliberate channel of electoral communication (Narasimhamurthy, 2014). The elections of 2014 and 2019 became a spectacle that transformed not only the way electoral campaigning played out in the world’s largest democracy and new communication but the way people saw their representative. I argue that social media was not only put to use to relay the political message of the party, however, the party’s compulsive reliance on social media has consequently impacted the latter’s ability to capture the political imagination of the ‘people’.  

Modi, notes Lance Price was aware of the success the American President Obama had in the elections and aimed to follow suit. The ‘Brand Modi’ relied heavily on social media. The politician had a website, his own youtube channel which gained 20 million subscribers becoming the first world leader with such massive followers. He was also one of the first politicians in India to target young voters by taking part in a Google+ Hangout discussion (Price, 2015). Speeches made by Modi were livestreamed and broadcasted to the larger public. He regularly posts on Twitter and even uses the micro-blogging site to engage with celebrities, like taking selfies with them and also performing community action (Pal, Chandra, and Vydiswaran 2016). Ronojoy (2019) examines that Twitter significantly creates political influence and promotes a politician’s brand and profile. AAP, BJP and Congress make attempts to lure voters with the aid of social media (Goyal, 2014). However, Narendra Modi and his party had a headstart when it came to using social media for electoral campaigns. India 272+ was launched with the intention to translate support for Modi’s ideas into votes during the election. The ‘272’ stands for the number of seats the BJP and its allies had to muster to win the majority in the Parliament. The portal asked volunteers to sign up and pass the message to others. It became like an online game subtly rebuilding Modi’s image and planting the seeds for the electoral haul. Further, a Stanford University study noted that during the 2014 elections BJP was ahead in the number of tweets, posts and reposts on the social media platform X (formerly known as Twitter) (Hindustan Times, 2017). An example of BJP’s social media electoral campaign post on 22nd April, 2014 read: “To end the institutionalisation of corruption, the only legacy of UPA govt., Vote for Modi, press the ‘Lotus’ symbol”.     

The BJP’s target since the beginning of the election campaigns has been the young voters of the country. It is a well calculated strategy that BJP’s reliance on social media to frame its political message of Hindutva and economic development are attractive to these young voters. The Indian youth are spending a considerable amount of time on social networking sites. One study showed that 65% of Indian social media users think that social media is a significant source of staying updated (Krishnan, 2019). Political movement on social media platforms was higher in the 2019 election than in 2014. One-third of first time voters were influenced by political messages on social media platforms (Sharma, 2022). The 2019 Elections saw a greater use of social media platforms in mobilising voters. For instance, in the 2019 General Elections, a “booth action plan” was prepared by the Party President, Amit Shah which had asked state units of the Party to compile the list of smart phone carrying voters in every polling station. The party’s war room in its old HQ located in Delhi’s Ashoka Road will get into the act of integrating it with the proposed programme. Cell-phone pramukhs will be identified by party leaders who will then create three WhatsApp groups for each polling station, each group consisting of 256 persons (the maximum allowed on the platform), according to the plan. They will be responsible for creating whatsapp groups to disseminate information related to development agenda, policies and programs of the BJP (Hindustan Times, 2019). They acted as promotional agents for the Prime Ministerial candidate. The extensive usage of WhatsApp during the 2019 Lok Sabha election was dubbed as ‘WhatsApp elections’ (Bengani, 2019). Political Parties now have War Rooms from where tech-savvy “social media warriors” launch political campaigns in the favour of their respective parties. They ensure the party’s online presence. The infamous BJP IT Cell set up by Prodyut Bora was created with three main aims: ‘to automate the party, to reach out to the voters, and advise the party on policy matters’. However, over the years BJP has orchestrated online campaigns through the cell to intimidate perceived government critics. Sadhavi Khosla, a BJP cyber-volunteer in the BJP IT Cell said that the organisation disseminated misogyny, Islamophobia and hatred. Bora quit the party and asserted that he laments the current form the  IT Cell has taken (Quint, 2018). This perverts the democratic underpinnings of social media by making it a tool for spreading disinformation and even a propagandistic machinery. What it also points out is the way the BJP has used social media not only for electoral purposes but to introduce ideas of Hindutva using the new media.  

Overlapping trends: Social Media, Elections and Populism 

The increased and extensive use of social media does not suggest a wholesale abandonment of conventional mass campaigns undertaken by the leaders and political parties. This paper does not argue for a diminished role of conventional mass media. It points to the complementary value of social media in establishing a new mode of communication that impacts political communication in an electoral democracy. It acknowledges that social media lends convenience that aids faster, efficient and direct political communication. Social media has individuated as well as expanded the networks of communication between persons as well as groups across the globe. For instance, through a hashtag individuals can engage in conversations about a topic they care about, post their opinions and even use emoticons to express that particular emotion they feel at that point. The medium of social media allows greater connectivity and accessibility to people. In the political realm, this seems novel as citizens can directly tag and tweet to their leaders over issues that concern them or even register their protests through a hashtag. Similarly, parties and political leaders can establish a channel of communication bypassing the more restricted flow of interaction on mainstream mass media including newspapers and radio.  

The BJP became the first party to expand social media’s potential to the electoral realm. Along with the process of penetration of social media, the political movements of the early 2010s signified the category of ‘people’ as the legitimate harbingers of power. As noted in the previous sections of the paper, the BJP under the leadership of Narendra Modi was able to sharpen the wedge between the ‘elites’ and the ‘people’ that marked a populist turn in Indian politics. The overlap of these two processes- growth of social media and the rise of a social media savvy populist,  resulted in transformation of the electoral space. The argument then follows that the use of social media since the 2010s revealed a new kind of political engagement which furthered citizen participation. The Internet has inherent democratic characteristics promoting direct, transparent, collaborative participation to all in the absence of physical boundaries. The political movements of the early 2010s – the India Against Corruption Movement and Nirbhaya Movement displayed the power of social media in mobilising citizens across cities. Though the movements were largely urban, it actualised the liberal-democratic ideal that people had the ultimate power to decide the fate of the politicians and their power¹. It was also a testimony to the larger discontentment and growing frustration with inefficient political governance at the time. The idea of ‘people’ raises a political will that can be appropriated by a populist. Narendra Modi was no less than a populist leader who used personal charisma and populist rhetoric to direct the anti-incumbency anger into electoral gains for the BJP (Gudavarthy, 2014).

By adopting the unconventional campaigning tool of social media, Modi bypassed the more conventional way of communicating with the voters. He used social media to reach out to a larger audience, thereby combining conventional electoral campaigns with newer forms of campaign medium. Modi’s speeches in multiple rallies were livestreamed and uploaded on his websites, twitter and facebook accounts. This allowed people across the country to consistently keep track of his speeches and contributed to the larger narrative that he built around himself. The aspirational story of becoming a ‘somebody-from-nobody’ was recounted in many speeches given in 2014. This emotive chord was struck with his voters adding to his popularity, social media amplified the process.

Modi’s brand was successful in translating social media buzz into votes. He is as of today the most popular political leader in the world and the elected representative of the world’s largest democracy, possibly for the third time. The success of Modi’s direct communication with the electorate by dismantling ‘old’ intermediaries and establishing to some extent, ‘new’ intermediaries like various online support groups of Modi and the BJP, and other political leaders and parties, actively promoted their leaders, parties and candidates (Sharma, 2022). Thus, Modi became a social media phenomenon even before he became the Prime Ministerial candidate since then he has used the medium to his advantage (Chopra, 2014). There are three ways in which Modi employs a populist style of communication- self promotion and branding, narrativizing people-elite distinction and constant engagement with citizens.    

Sharma (2022) empirically analyses that during the 2019 campaign a high proportion of tweets posted by Modi were self-promotional, to boost his own image and less about promises of development and good governance as was the case in 2014. Sharma and Sivakumar (2023) note the influence of social media in creating a communally polarised electoral campaign in 2019. The research study ‘Tweeting to win: Analysing social media use in India’s 2019 national elections’, concluded that nationalism was one of the main keywords that Modi used in his tweets. The Prime Minister posted the majority of his tweets concerning the BJP and tweets more than ten times in a day on an average which drives home the point that the leader has been effectively using social media for a decade now (Firstpost, 2021). Apart from using social media for self-promotion (Sharma, 2022), Modi has successfully turned every criticism against him into a powerful narrative that serves his image. After the election announcement in 2019, in response to Rahul Gandhi’s ‘Chowkidar Chor hai Campaign’, Modi launched the ‘Mai bhi Chowkidar’ campaign that yielded better results than the former (Lokniti CSDS, 2019) (Tribune, 2019).  He turned the jibe into a positive message and encouraged people to fight corruption and social evils.

                    Image: “Main bhi Chowkidar” Modi’s response.

This campaign is a testimony to two facts- first, social media has been used effectively by the leader to respond to a political criticism and second, the social media enabled the construction of electoral narratives connecting with the voters simultaneously. Modi embraced the ‘chowkidar chor hai’ jab and asked citizens of India to themselves become a ‘chowkidar’. BJP leaders including  Amit Shah added “chowkidar” as prefix to their names on their social media handles. Modi launched his NaMoApp on Twitter and made the following tweet on March 30, 2019: “The day we were most looking forward to is here! At 5 pm, lakhs of Chowkidars from different parts of India will interact in the historic #MainBhiChowkidar program. This is an interaction you must not miss. Watch it live on the NaMoApp or NaMo TV.” 

In the 2019 campaign, Modi also tweeted on April 5, 2019: “Beware of the Dynastic Hand! They are going to INCREASE TAXES. YOUR MONEY will FUND the LIFESTYLE OF CONGRESS LEADERS!” This statement though based on no substantial evidence is indicative of the rhetoric that Modi was amplifying. Drawing the Indian electorate’s attention to the Congress ‘elites’ who are corrupt. Another interesting tweet on March 19, 2019: “The biggest casualty of dynastic policies are institutions. From the press to parliament. From soldiers to free speech. From the constitution to the courts. Nothing is spared. Sharing some thoughts.”  Disdain of political institutions being under the control of the elites is another rhetoric from the “populist toolkit”. The electoral results of the 2019 elections reaffirmed the populist turn in the country. Populist communication on social media is characterised by emotional appeals over rational persuasions. In a last minute bid, Modi heightened and captured the nationalistic rumblings of the nation after the Pulwama attack into votes in his pocket (CSDS, 2019). This alludes with Maldonado’s (2019) assertion that digitalization promotes social media campaigns for the populists, and the populists then turn the campaign from a rational to an emotional campaign as was the case in the Indian General Elections of 2019².  It is important to highlight that while social media was used to project an aspirational narrative with development at its centre in the 2014 elections, the subsequent elections saw the use of the medium to promote a communally polarising atmosphere. In both these elections, the Hindu right appealed to emotions. As a populist Modi’s personal charisma, ability to weave narratives of hope and aspirations with Hindutva’s ideological commitments and his strategic use of social media, he has been able to connect directly with the voters, a characteristic of populist communication style (Sharma, 2022).  

Contemporary populism is often described as mediated populism where social media platforms play a major role in spreading populist leaders’ messages directly to their followers, often bypassing the mainstream media (Chadwick, 2014; Engesser et al., 2017).  Rodrigues (2019) meanwhile notes that Modi’s use of social media by bypassing the mainstream media has already augmented a structural shift in India as the agenda-setting power of the mainstream press has diluted. Pal et al. (2017) in their longitudinal analysis of Modi’s social media handles note that unlike other rightwing leaders, Modi crafts his messages strategically by ‘dodging potentially controversial topics, avoids direct offence to any community of Indians, and projects a unified voice of his party on these platforms’. Modi often retweets common citizen’s tweets acknowledging their contribution to the nation. For example, during the Main bhi chowkidar campaign he retweeted a picture that featured a young girl promoting his chowkidar campaign and appreciated the family for contributing to the development of the nation. Modi constantly engages with his voters through twitter. In his #Votekar campaign, he urged voters to come out and vote in the 2019 elections. He also tagged famous personalities and urged them to spread the message. India recorded its highest ever voter turnout that year. Modi forms a personal bond with his voters through social media. He portrays a relatable image of himself that strikes a chord with millions of Indians who have continued to hype up his popularity. By posing himself as anti-establishment and anti-elite he employed populist strategies of communication on social media (Sharma, 2022).

Social Media has opened up a new avenue for political discourse and dialog to take shape and shape in turn the landscape of politics. The use of social media for electoral campaigning and mobilisation has been acknowledged and adopted by all the actors concerned. However, the question worthy of attention is if presence on social media converts into votes. The role of social media in influencing voting preferences is not understated but it requires systematic study with well-thought methodological techniques to gauge how much of the social media buzz actually translates into votes (Verma and Sardesai, 2017).  Another study by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in 2019 revealed that social media was not a game changer during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections. It also revealed that social media exposure hardly impacts voters’ voting behaviour, but social media exposure increased political participation during the 2019 elections. Barclay et al. (2015) study found a positive correlation between a leader’s Facebook fan page and amount of votes secured by the party with 86.6% accuracy’. With the rise in internet users and government’s push towards digitalisation, social media is likely a key player in determining the terms of political inputs and outcomes. 

Social media has been a key Player in the dissemination of Hindu nationalist projects over the last decade. The Internet renders itself as an effective tool to seize political power and establish dominance and hegemony. Chopra (2019) traces the significance of social media in constructing what he calls ‘Virtual Hindu Rashtra’. He notes three areas by which the Hindu right-wing wing of which BJP is an integral part uses Social media: Modi’s ubiquitous and ‘peculiar stability to dynamics of politics’, particular functions that social media platforms like WhatsApp and Twitter serve Hindu Right and in creating alternative truths about the Hindu right that amounts to deliberate disinformation. The BJP has unleashed an army of trolls that intimidate the critics of the government (Chaturvedi, 2016). The BJP social media cell which provides directions to the online right wing trolls has been accused of orchestrating harassment campaigns.  Riots and lynchings have become normalised and platforms such as whatsapp have enabled rumor and fake news to translate into actual violence against Dalits and Muslims (Ali, 2020). Gerry Shih (2023) exposes the digital campaign that promotes inflammatory messages and instils fear among Hindu majority to consolidate their votebase. For instance, in one of the whatsapp messages that was forwarded multiple times during the Karnataka State Elections 2023 played on the narrative that warned of Hindu girls being groomed by Muslim men to join the Islamic State. Simultaneously the message made an urgent appeal to vote: “If the BJP is here, your children will be safe. Hindus will be safe.” Thus, the hegemony that BJP aspires to maintain over the nation hinges on strategic use of social media- electoral use of social media is closely linked to the ideological project of Hindutva.   

Conclusion 

The decade of 2010 has unravelled political complications and newer challenges for political enthusiasts. This paper attempts to capture the intertwinement of multiple moments in Indian politics that hold significance in the country’s history. The convergences between popular movements that highlight the democratic impulse and their taming by a populist impulse as seen in India are important to draw. Social media acted as an important dimension in archiving the changes in Indian politics. The power of social media was acknowledged by both the people and the party leaders. It brought about a permanent change in electoral mobilisation of the country. The argument here is not that social media has replaced the conventional forms of electoral campaigning, rather it has supplemented a more interactive interface for political communication where direct communication can be established between the leaders and the people.  The paper furthers this line of argument to inquire into the nature of this direct communication by accounting for a populist turn in Indian politics. The tactical use of social media by the BJP and its leader has accentuated and amplified the political processes of the country.   

The Indian electorate is known to reject tall leaders if they fail to satisfy the demands of the people. The Indian electorate rejected the Congress convinced by BJP’s grand narrative of ache din that spun the narrative of growth and development. The elections of 2014, however, marked the arrival of Modi, a populist leader. A post-Congress polity as Palshikar (2017) notes was founded on BJP’s hegemony- electorally and ideologically. This paper extends Palshikar’s observation to argue that social media acted as a common thread between the two and in doing so it pulls the two closer. This enmeshment of BJP’s dominance electorally and ideologically is evident in the change in political discourse and campaign narratives in the General Elections of 2019 from that of 2014. It is noteworthy that Modi’s rise as a populist leader converges with the rise of digital platforms in India (Sharma, 2022). Modi has been able to rebrand himself through Social media. He has altered the very terms by which party leaders, officials and other electoral communication takes place. However, social media revolution in India, particularly in electoral and political mobilisation has posed newer challenges for democracy. In conclusion, the paper has revealed an intertwined paradox of social media which enables participation of citizens in the political process of the country and affords a new medium for political representatives to connect with their voters. However, in the case of India since 2014 the use of social media by a populist has enabled him to sustain and further his own image as the sole representative of the ‘authentic people’. The use of social media by a right wing populist party such as the BJP has unleashed undemocratic forces that curtails participation on social media by bullying and abusing on social media. The benefit of easy access to information through social media also has been misused to spread rampant misinformation. The paper highlighted the paradoxes closely intertwined in the electoral campaigns, use of social media and populism that work together to change the terrain of Indian politics.      

Notes

1. The Anna Hazare movement has been lauded as a democratic uprising of the people, critics, however, have argued that it harboured a populist impulse, a ‘movement against politics’ (Chatterjee, 2012).
2. It is imperative to mention that Modi was not the only populist leader to emerge successfully in India. Indira Gandhi also invoked populist repertoire during her election campaign in 1972 after the Indo-Pakistan war in 1971. However, Modi’s populism in the contemporary neo-liberal and social media context begs a distinct analytical analysis. What is also distinct about the Modi brand of populism is its reliance on Hindutva rhetoric which has deeper implications for Indian society and polity tending to communally charged majoritarian sentiments. 

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BOOK REVIEW: Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of Freedom in Post-Independence West Bengal

Book: Decolonization in South Asia: Meanings of Freedom in Post-Independence West Bengal, 1947-52 by Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, New York: Routledge, 2009; pp. ix + 246, $140.00 (hardcover). 

By Rajarshi Dasgupta

Sekhar Bandyopadhyay’s Decolonization in South Asia is an excellent follow-up to his earlier work, From Plassey to Partition (2004), which had been a wide-ranging study on the entire duration of colonial rule in the subcontinent, particularly India. Having thus already traced the emergence of India as an independent nation previously, Bandyopadhyay, in this book, focuses on the immediate political situation post-1947, attempting to explore the complexities of India’s transitional experience from the colonial to the post-colonial era. Historiographically, as the author himself notes, his chosen period of review, i.e., the first five years of the nation’s independence – from 1947 till 1952 – has come to constitute “some kind of an academic no-man’s land” (p. 1). Very little has been written about it, with most scholars identifying Partition as the culminating point of modern Indian history. Therefore, it indeed appears to be this specific lacuna that has prompted Bandyopadhyay to undertake a detailed analysis of the dramatic years that ensued in the wake of independence. 

However, beyond the very fact that this book shows the courage to venture into a largely uncharted territory, what renders Bandyopadhyay’s work even more unique is the manner in which he problematizes the idea of ‘decolonisation’ itself. Pointing towards the conventional conceptualisation of ‘decolonisation’ as an essentially elitist process, he shows how, even in the case of India, it has come to be understood in terms of either a transfer of power or a contest for sovereignty – both of which reflect little more than statist visions. Mention may be made here of Ted Svensson’s monograph, Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan (2013), which while focusing on a similar timeline as Bandyopadhyay and providing a very novel argument, deals with decolonization from a fundamentally state-centric elitist perspective, in order to show how it signified and signalled a ‘restarting of time’.

Breaking out of this paradigm, Decolonization in South Asia offers a fresh approach to the study of independent India, albeit limiting its investigation to the political scenario of West Bengal – a newly created frontier province, borne out of the vicissitudes of Partition. The principal aim of this book therefore is to unravel how the common people perceived their transition from colonial subject-hood to post-colonial nationhood, accompanied as it was with all its immanent anxieties, tribulations, ruptures and hybridity. Accordingly, the book examines several facets of day-to-day political life including organised institutional politics, mass movements and isolated opinions in the press. By means of that, it basically intends to uncover how the meanings of freedom came to be hotly “contested by the new citizens of West Bengal, both in a discursive field as well as through popular protest actions outside the shaded corridors of Writers’ Building or the closed chambers of the Congress committee meetings” (p. 5).

In his endeavour to accomplish such a task, Bandyopadhyay probes into the popular cultural representations of freedom that had been doing rounds during the aforementioned period, exploring not only the mentalities that lay behind mass agitations but also analysing editorial letters published in the popular newspapers of the time. Specifically, thus, the book’s central theme revolves around the competing notions of ‘freedom’ that prevailed within a postcolonial context, wherein the cessation of foreign rule ensured that it could no longer serve as the stabilising opposition, by virtue of which the unity of the ‘freedom struggle’ had hitherto been maintained.   

Bandyopadhyay opens by outlining the passage from initial excitement right after independence to growing dissatisfaction as the promise of freedom appeared to remain elusive in an era of food scarcity, surging inflation, rampant corruption, outbreaks of diseases, mass immigration from the east, political and communal turmoil, and authoritarian government measures – like the expansion of the police force, curtailment of press freedom, passing of the repressive West Bengal Security Act (1948) and Preventive Detention Act (1950), etc. – which only seemed to carry forward the legacy of colonial oppression. Many had hoped that with the advent of independence, not only would British rule come to an end, but so would the injustices, destitution, brutality and exploitation that it represented. Such expectations naturally led to increasing political disenchantment, which Bandyopadhyay investigates by concentrating on peasant and labour agitations, communal violence and growing middle-class angst.  

In the process of evolving into an organised political party from an anti-colonial front,     the ruling Indian National Congress, too, grappled with its own internal ideological and factional differences. At times, it virtually seemed to risk all its claims to legitimacy in resorting to authoritarian tactics, even if only for the sake of quelling the political chaos that arose out of clashing political demands. In this situation, it became vital for the Congress to present itself as the sole representative of the nation – almost embodying the Indian state – entrusted with the responsibility of protecting India’s newly gained freedom. The leaders believed that this could be achieved by successfully subduing the Communist Party which, in responding to government repression, had itself initiated a fierce rural uprising. Moreover, Bandyopadhyay deftly shows how the other leftist parties also struggled to establish a clear ideological agenda that could truly set them apart from the Congress, opting ultimately to proclaim their moral superiority instead. 

Thus, while the left could not develop into a cohesive political alternative, the anti-Congress opposition on the right equally struggled with organisational weakness and division within its ranks, faced as it was with severe public criticism in the aftermath of the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. Therefore, when finally the inaugural elections of independent India took place in 1952, the Congress succeeded in comfortably attaining a majority so far as seats were concerned, even as it failed to secure a majority in terms of the votes cast. Effectively then, it was the 1952 election that, in this way, cemented Congress’s dominance over West Bengal for the next fifteen years.

Writing from a postcolonial perspective, nuanced in his approach, and distinctive in his choice of subject, Bandyopadhyay definitely brings something new to the table. Exploring the domains of perceptions and imaginings as articulated in the public sphere, he skillfully analyses the interactions between the factions, alliances and networks that jockeyed for influence and power in post-independence West Bengal. Seeking to explain how independent India’s political modernity was plagued by a sense of incompleteness, uncertainty, bitterness and distress, the book is organised into six chapters that carefully scrutinise the aspects of communal violence (1947-50), factional politics and communist insurgency (1948-50), and also the first national election of 1952. 

This study relies essentially on archival research for teasing out the mindset of the elite and middle classes; while for recovering mass perceptions, it uses the methodology of interpreting behaviour as text, i.e., reading popular minds through their protests and other non-protest everyday actions. Various official records – especially those available from the Intelligence Branch (IB) files of the West Bengal Police Department and the reports of the British Consulate Office at Calcutta – have been utilised only to reveal how, in the post-colonial period, even the IB officers continued to keep the opposition political leaders under constant surveillance. Besides, the work also draws upon contemporary popular and high literature, including feature films, posters, cartoons and important private documents.

Building on Joya Chatterji’s seminal text, The Spoils of Partition (2007), Bandyopadhyay thus crafts a wonderfully lucid account of the initial days of independence, deftly deploying sub-categories in order to give shape to his narrative. His writing, though empirical in nature, consists of perceptive interpretations that are entwined into the fabric of what otherwise appears to be a largely descriptive account substantiated heavily by quantitative data as well as a large number of examples.

However, compared to its length, the book is filled with too much information pertaining to several events and episodes that unfolded within this half a decade, thus somewhat straining the reader’s attention, and thereby making it a relatively difficult read for non-academicians interested in this period. Also, even as Decolonization in South Asia centres on the theme of multiple ideas/representations of freedom, Bandyopadhyay often appears to lapse into a deep examination of the intricate nature of the political struggles during this time, resulting in unnecessary deviations from the primary subject. Besides that, a little more elaboration on the structural, especially legal and constitutional changes that were being effected in the relationship between the nation and the region at this juncture, would have certainly allowed the reader to better situate the discussion on West Bengal in its proper context.

Nevertheless, Bandyopadhyay’s erudition, commitment and meticulous attention to sources are beyond dispute. The book’s strength lies especially in its rigorous investment in the archives, and in its ambitious attempt to unveil how different groups of people were “translating the modern concepts of freedom – encoded abstract political terms as ‘sovereignty’ or ‘citizenship’ – into their day-to-day language of entitlement, expectations, hunger and protests” (p. 5). In doing so, it indeed successfully retrieves some of the alternative visions of the post-colonial future that competed with the dominant Congress programme.

References:  

Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India. New Delhi: Orient Longman Pvt. Ltd., 2004. 

Chatterji, Joya. The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 

Svensson, Ted. Production of Postcolonial India and Pakistan: Meanings of Partition. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

BOOK REVIEW: Hailing The State: Indian Democracy Between Elections

Book: Hailing The State: Indian Democracy Between Elections by Lisa Mitchell, Duke University Press, Paperback, Published: 2023, 320 pages, ISBN:978-1-4780-1876-6,  INR 2,418

by Survesh Pratap Singh

There is a tendency in discussions around democracy, particularly Indian democracy, to be hooked to election practices and results. This gives the false impression that elections are the only lifeblood of a democracy. Hailing The State by Lisa Mitchell is a novel attempt to bring into the discussion how a democracy like India works and functions in between elections. This is probably a rare book as it takes collective assemblies and their interaction with the state seriously while also offering a different understanding of the purpose of these assemblies. The book, in my opinion, could also be taken as a supportive reading to books that primarily focus on Indian elections such as Why India Votes? (2014) to understand Indian democracy comprehensively by bridging the gap between election times and non-election times.

Lisa Mitchell has organised the book into two parts, part I titled “Seeking Audience” and part II “The Criminal and the Political” and contains a total of seven chapters along with the introduction and the conclusion. Each chapter aims to focus on a certain form of collective assembly such as Dharnas (sit-in demonstrations), general strikes, rail and road blockades all the while keeping issues like recognition, representation and democracy at the core of the discussion.

Among the major arguments that the book propels is that all actions and instances of collective assemblies cannot be seen as ‘protest’ against something or as the total rejection of the state and its apparatuses’ authority. Rather, certain forms of collective assemblies aim for recognition in the eyes of the state and seek inclusion into its ambit. The book argues for a new understanding of collective action- to be taken as efforts to seek recognition and inclusion, to gain a hearing and interest fulfillment which can mean different things for different groups, myriad ways in which people in India “seek to be seen, heard and recognised by the state” (p. 15, emphasis in the original). 

The book, in offering this argument, goes against the anarchist, the marxist and the rightist traditions all of which view the state through suspicion. It stands to challenge the Foucauldian understanding by arguing that the state has been seen as a provider and protector of the people, as an enabler, an agent of change and the medium through which people’s lives can be transformed for the good. People aim for recognition in the eyes of the state, particularly those at the margins. The book tries to offer an alternative view of looking at the state, which has been portrayed only as an oppressive institution in a vast gamut of literature. The author argues that if the state was solely oppressive in nature, its sustenance for a long period would be difficult. The view emerging from the book is that the state is an institution of inclusiveness, meaning that various groups and individuals want to be included in its mechanism and gain recognition. But a major question that was left unattended is why the state originally failed to give recognition to historically marginalised groups and left them no choice but to mobilise and form a collective to get heard and seen. How much can we really understand the state from an ahistorical, value-neutral and non-sociological position, as the book tries to do?

Efforts of collective assembly or mobilization, apart from being viewed with the rejection of state authority and attempts to gain inclusion binary, should also be read as a way of communication with the state. The various forms of collective assemblies that are discussed in the book are methods that the people adopt to communicate with the state and its extensions, to raise their voices and to hold the authorities accountable. In this context, questions like who needs to communicate with the state and for what reasons or why become inevitably important and the book does drive towards this direction. An interesting take in the book is that while the powerful and the resourceful can afford to speak as individuals as they expect to be seen and heard by the state, the poor, the powerless and the oppressed are compelled to come together and form a collective to seek an audience with the authorities. Thus, these sites of collective assemblies are filled with social categories that have been marginalised for a large part of history. But what is peculiar and could make us rethink this proposition is that in recent times in India, we have witnessed the collective assembly of dominant groups in different parts of the country to claim what was meant for the marginalised- affirmative action, particularly in the form of reservation in the public sector.

Amongst the argumentative edge that the book yields is a direct refutation of Western scholarship that suggests the origin of methods of general strike and more broadly the idea of civil society, exclusively in Europe. The author argues with evidence that collective assemblies in the form of general strikes by workers were a part of British India much before documented instances began to be reported from Europe and the West. These assemblies, contrary to the assumptions and portrayal of Western scholarship, were not unruly and violent. They were highly organised with clear motives and effective communication strategies. By digging up new evidence from the archives, the author establishes that what is known as civil society has functioned in the Indian context much before the gaining of independence. Thus, it would be incorrect to say that civil society as an idea and mechanism has originated from European soil and has been adopted by other regions of the world.

The book is conceptually very vibrant, so much so that there is a democracy framework ensuing throughout, dealing with the relationship between democracy and collective assemblies. It also dwells on the significance of these collective assemblies for a democracy in general and more centrally, for a democracy like India. In election times, promises are made but whether these promises are kept or abandoned is decided during the non-election times. Collective assemblies are ways to hold elected and administrative officials accountable for their duties and promises in case they fail to do so. Bringing in Rousseau, the author has tried to argue that forms of collective assembly can be read as examples of direct democracy in the larger frame of liberal democracy that pervades the world in current times. Through these collective assemblies, people directly participate in a democracy that has failed them till today and fight for rights and freedom. These collective assemblies, much like the practice of voting during elections keep a democracy fresh and alive.

The coming together of a large mass of people raises imperative questions about identity, recognition and belonging. The author argues that there are no prefixed and rigid identities, rather through the process of assembling collectively and mobilisation, identities get formed. Identities are outcomes of collective mobilisations and not a pre-existing foundation on which mobilisation happens. In the various forms that collective assembly has been discussed in the book, rail roko (blockade of trains) and road roko(blockade of public buses) have received considerable attention as a political practice, as sites for political messaging and communication. We have seen this in India as well with the recent farmers’ protest and the Agniveer protest. The claim that the book, however, would make that these assemblies were not necessarily a ‘protest’ in the sense of rejection of state authority in toto, but simply to seek a hearing and visibility.

The book intends to offer a fresh perspective and for that, Hailing The State deserves attention but also, understandably, has minor shortcomings. The book did not draw a conceptual differentiation between the forms of collective assembly that it brought up for discussion such as- garjanas (roar), strike, rally, bandh, yatras, blockades, dharna, hunger strike, chakka jam, gherao, human chain etc. Furthermore, the way the state has been conceptualised in the book often goes against the actual functioning of the state which fails to honour and acknowledge the marginalised. How the state sees the marginalised and how it responds to their assertion through collective mobilosation is an element missing from theoretical discussions. Additionally, the argument that access to public places for collective assembly has been consistently shrinking with the rapid onset of liberalization in India remained underexplored and underdeveloped. Moreover, while the book portrays the state as an agent of transformation it is not clear how much these collective assemblies have transformed the state itself. We do not have enough evidence to show that collective actions lead to change on the part of the state especially when the matter concerns the marginalized. Like, can we look at these assemblies as something other than an extension of the state in the realm of civil society?  

BOOK REVIEW: H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars

H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars by Kunal Purohit, HarperCollins India, Paperback, Published: 22 November 2023, 306 Pages, 14 x 2 x 22 cm, ISBN:9789356995826, Rs. 499.

By Kunal Nath Shahdeo

During my fieldwork in 2019, which centered on observing Ramnavmi processions in Ranchi, Jharkhand, a notable departure from traditional practices during this annual event caught my attention. Unlike previous years, the musical accompaniment took on a distinct Electronic Dance Music (EDM) genre featuring provocative lyrics against the Muslim community. This departure from the usual Hindu devotional or Bollywood songs heightened the energy and fervor of the crowds, contributing to palpable tension during the procession. The atmosphere became charged with emotion as slogans of Jai Shree Ram echoed, accompanied by spirited dancing and the wielding of sticks and swords. This musical shift, coupled with provocative lyrics, created a backdrop that fueled communal sentiments. The next day’s news reports detailed communal tensions in various locations of Jharkhand during the Ramnavmi celebrations, attributing the provocative songs as a primary catalyst for the ensuing communal conflagrations across the state.

This incident wasn’t an isolated occurrence. In 2019, on the outskirts of Gumla, Jharkhand, a mob lynching incident took place following a Ramnavmi procession. The incident served as a catalyst for journalist and researcher Kunal Purohit, known for his reportage on hate crimes throughout India, to undertake the authorship of ‘H-Pop: The Secretive World of Hindutva Pop Stars’ to delve into the phenomenon of Hindutva pop. Driven by a commitment to understanding the underlying factors of mob lynching and communal tensions, the author conducted extensive research over a period of five years. This effort resulted in a timely examination of the intricate connections between popular culture, propaganda, and the escalation of communal tensions. The author accomplishes this by delving deep into and unveiling the ‘secretive’ world of Hindutva popstars.

The strategic deployment of popular culture for propagandistic ends is an established historical practice, underscored by instances such as the instrumental role played by Radio Rwanda in the Tutsi genocide (McCoy, 2009), as well as the pervasive influence wielded by Joseph Goebbels, Minister of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, during the Nazi era (O’Shaughnessy, 2017). These extreme cases underscore the efficacy of popular culture as a potent medium for the dissemination of ideological narratives. In the Indian context, Akshaya Mukul’s scholarly work, ‘Geeta Press and the Making of Hindu India’, meticulously delineates the pivotal role of print media, particularly Geeta Press, in shaping and consolidating Hindu communal consciousness (Mukul, 2015).

The book’s contemporary investigation marks a departure from historical paradigms, delving into Hindutva popular culture within the internet and social media era. In this age of unprecedented information dissemination, coinciding with the ascendancy of Hindutva as the predominant political ideology, the book unravels the phenomenon of ‘banal Hindutva’(Harris, Jeffrey, and Corbridge, 2017). Here, propaganda seamlessly masquerades as popular culture, integrated into the daily lives of the common populace. The study navigates the nuanced manifestations of Hindutva within the contemporary socio-cultural milieu, addressing complexities shaped by ubiquitous internet-mediated communication channels.

In the exploration of H-Pop, the book captures the potency of each instance of its consumption, emphasizing how it reinforces Hindutva beliefs, provoking rage and fear against the perceived enemy. This scholarly work provides an in-depth narrative of Hindutva popular culture, particularly its impact on small towns in the Hindi heartland. The book elucidates the role played by Hindutva pop in propagating Hindutva ideology through the intertwined narratives of three central protagonists—a singer, a poet, and a writer/publisher—all engaged in what is termed a ‘cultural war’ aimed at establishing Hindutva hegemony (p.182).

The book strategically revolves around three emblematic figures, each representing a distinct yet ideologically related form that has significantly bolstered the Hindutva juggernaut. Profiles of Kavi Singh, a Hindutva pop musician, Kamal Agney, a firebrand Hindutva poet, and Sandeep Deo, a YouTuber and publisher of Hindutva literature, are meticulously examined. The book is thoughtfully structured into three parts, each devoted to one of these influential artists, highlighting their collective impact in amplifying the influence of Hindutva ideology within the linguistic confines of Hindi. This deliberate choice underscores their collective contribution to shaping and reinforcing the formidable presence of Hindutva within the cultural and linguistic landscape of the Hindi heartland.The author hints at the potential influence of Hindutva pop in other regions of the country, particularly in western India. However, the primary focus of the book remains on the Hindi belt due to factors such as accessibility and the substantial popularity of H-Pop in that area.

The first section of the book vividly recounts the compelling narrative of Kavi Singh. Her journey unfolds as a captivating odyssey marked by serendipity and ideological evolution. Born as Keshanta Singh in Rajasthan’s Alwar district, her life took a transformative turn when adopted by the renowned Haryanvi singer Ramkesh Jiwanpurwala. Ramkesh assumed multifaceted roles in Kavi’s life—father, manager, lyricist, director, confidant, and life coach. Their collaboration garnered attention with a song released in response to the Pulwama attack on February 14, 2019, one of the deadliest terrorist assaults in Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in the tragic martyrdom of 40 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. This response inadvertently fueled animosity, leading to assaults on Kashmiris across the nation.

At the age of 25, within a brief four-year singing career, Kavi has recorded over eighty songs, positioning herself in the realm of Hindutva pop music. Her compositions echo the core principles of Hindutva, highlighting notions of a Hindu nation, Hindu supremacy, and the vilification of others, particularly Muslims, exemplified by assertive lyrics like ‘Don’t dare touch the temple, Or else we will show you your place’ (p.7). Through her music and performances, Kavi consistently reinforces the imperative for her audience to embrace Hindutva nationalism.

Despite attempts to diversify her thematic repertoire, Kavi aligns her music with Hindutva ideology, gaining prominence and invitations to perform at Hindutva events. However, her ambitions for political prominence were hindered by struggles in her personal life, causing a decrease in her visibility both online and offline, thereby slowing her progression in the political arena.  Now in Alwar, Kavi envisions a significant role in the 2024 elections, planning video releases aligned with the Hindutva cause.

The second segment of the book unfolds the narrative of Kamal Agney, a young poet from Gosaiganj near Lucknow. His early exposure to poetry stemmed from his father’s avid participation in Kavi Sammelans (Poet’s gatherings), where expressions of Hindutva sentiments gained prominence. Aligning his poetic pursuits with this trend, Kamal rose to prominence in Hindutva Kavi Sammelans across the Hindi belt. His pivotal role in the electoral campaigns of Yogi Adityanath, running for the position of  Chief Minister of the northern Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, particularly during the 2017 and 2022 elections, became apparent.

At 28, Kamal emerges as a poet adept at utilizing poetry and digital platforms for political propaganda. His distinctive approach involves simplifying messages for enhanced accessibility, using vivid imagery to portray a purportedly glorious past and casting the contemporary era in a pejorative light. Exemplified by the provocative verse, ‘Had Godse not pumped that bullet into Gandhi, Every Hindu would have been praying at Mecca and Medina today,’ Kamal strategically reinterprets historical events to evoke a collective identity and provoke apprehension about an ostensibly bleak future (p.94). At its core, Kamal employs poetry as a medium to not only reshape historical narratives and sway public opinion but also to advocate for a distinct political agenda using emotionally charged and divisive language. This prompts an exploration of the multifaceted nature of poetry as an artistic expression—its potential to inspire revolutionary change alongside its susceptibility to being utilized as a tool for propaganda, contingent upon the circumstances surrounding its creation and reception (Lye and Nealon, 2022). Such contemplation initiates an investigation into the intricate dynamics of poetry, its power to shape perceptions, and the ideological messages embedded within its narratives.

In the concluding section of the book, Sandeep Deo emerges as a dynamic Hindutva entrepreneur, transitioning seamlessly from mainstream journalism to fervently advocate for Hindutva. Formerly with Dainik Jagran and Nai Dunia, Deo’s departure from traditional journalism is driven by a fervent desire to champion Hindutva principles. Undeterred by entrepreneurial setbacks, he becomes an author, collaborating with Bloomsbury.

The controversy around the book on Delhi riots of 2020 by Bloomsbury propels Deo to establish Kapot, a publishing house, and an e-commerce platform aligned with Hindutva ideologies (p.231). Beyond the digital realm, he envisions Shaurya Kendras—physical bookstores/libraries in small towns serving as knowledge hubs for Hindutva ideology and arms usage training.

Deo, a well-known YouTuber, views himself as a staunch advocate for Hindutva principles. Dissatisfied with what he perceives as the RSS and BJP’s moderate stance on Hindutva, he co-founded the Ekam Sanatan Bharat Dal with Ankur Sharma to pursue a more assertive political agenda reflecting Hindu majoritarianism. Despite reservations about figures like Narendra Modi and Mohan Bhagwat, he aspires to emulate a modern-day Tulsidas, disseminating Hindutva ideals through journalism, publishing, YouTube, and life coaching. In his cultural war against perceived adversaries, Deo stands as a formidable force, shaping the narrative of Hindutva in virtual and physical realms.

The book significantly contributes to the existing literature on the rise of the BJP and Hindutva politics by examining its grassroots operational dynamics and seamless assimilation into everyday life. Unlike many works focusing on the RSS and extremist violence, the book nuances the exploration of Hindutva as an integral facet of ordinary existence. Its work unveils the intricate interplay between economic considerations, aspirations for upward mobility, and the contemporary Hindutva ecosystem. Notably, the book addresses the alignment of economic aspirations of young artists and social media influencers with the Hindutva narrative, illustrating a contemporary phenomenon where economic success intersects with Hindutva ideology. Situating its work within the emerging scholarship on Hindutva, the book explores its diffusion across diverse vernacular contexts, idioms, and cultural expressions, characterized by some scholars as ‘Neo Hindutva’ (Anderson and Longkumer, 2020). The book’s strength lies in its exploration of the relationship between popular culture, the building of Hindutva consciousness among common people, and the politics of Hindu supremacy.

The book, characterized by meticulous research, delves deeply into the flourishing realm of Hindutva pop culture. Nevertheless, it exhibits shortcomings, notably a dearth of ethnographic narrative elucidating the tangible effects of Hindutva pop culture, as I witnessed during my fieldwork in Jharkhand. Furthermore, a notable deficiency lies in the absence of a comprehensive sociological analysis of Hindutva pop stars, particularly in terms of the expanding social base of Hindutva and its firm grip on youth. Despite these limitations, the book is well-crafted, offering an insightful analysis of the burgeoning domain of Hindutva pop culture and the pivotal role played by H-pop warriors at the forefront of the ideological struggle for Hindutva supremacy. It is recommended for individuals interested in the convergence of politics and popular culture.

References

Akshaya, M. (2015). Gita Press and the Making of Hindu India. HarperCollins India.

Anderson, E, and Longkumer, A. (eds) (2020). Neo-Hindutva: Evolving Forms, Spaces, and Expressions of Hindu Nationalism. Routledge.

Harriss, J., Jeffrey, C., and Corbridge, S. (2017). Is India becoming the ‘Hindu Rashtra’ sought by Hindu nationalists. Simons Papers in Security and Development 60.

Lye, C., and Nealon, C. (eds) (2022). After Marx: Literature, Theory, and Value in the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge University Press.

McCoy, J. (2009). Making violence ordinary: radio, music and the Rwandan genocide. African Music: Journal of the International Library of African Music, 8( 3), 85-96.

O’Shaughnessy, N. (2017). Marketing the Third Reich: Persuasion, packaging and propaganda. Routledge.

BOOK REVIEW: Siyasi Muslims A Story of Political Islams in India

Siyasi Muslims A Story of Political Islams in India, Hilal Ahmed, Penguin Books, 2019, pp-222, ISBN-978-0-670-09140-9, Rs 496

By Durdanah Masoodi

The book Siyasi Muslims is a thorough read on the emerging discourses about Muslims in India, the identity of whom continues to fuel a lively ongoing debate. The book has been named Siyasi because, as per the author, it connotes two meanings. One is that it assumes Muslims are a deeply political community. The other deems them as a community that is ‘informed, conscious, yet disloyal’. The subtitle of the book ‘a story of political Islams’’ is used by the author to differentiate between ‘Muslim politics’ and ‘political Islam’ where the former is an attempt to listen to dynamic muslim issues, and the latter is a plural usage to understand reshaped Islamic principles in postcolonial processes. 

The first part of the book helps readers to understand the colonial evolution of Muslim politics and its trajectories after partition. Ranging from issues of creation of a Muslim Monolith, to the question raised on the same, and impact of Islamic dawat by certain Sunni figures/movements to the ultimate trajectory of Hindutva animosity for Muslims. It can be argued that the political engagements of Indian parties driven by the impulse for power and the goal of winning have benefited from the ‘religious-based homogenous identity’ of Muslims. Calling it a religious-based homogenous identity is broadly due to the subscription of Muslims (Indian or worldwide) to some common beliefs as per the tenets of Islam, which are, Faith, Prayer, Alms, Fasting and Pilgrimage. Although the author has talked about various ways through which Islam is being practiced by Muslims in India, the argument holds substance only in the art and action part of such practices. In essence, it is the aforementioned homogeneity of Muslims that is targeted during electoral or nationalistic motives to spark the “other” side’s countermobilization. This familiarizes us with Wilkinson’s argument about how certain events are designed in a way to provoke a minority, which will force them to react and hence, lead to ethnic violence between the two groups (Wilkinson, 2004). However, while unpacking Siyasi Muslims, the author argues that Muslims should not be seen as a homogenous community, because of varying tastes in politics depending on their caste, class, and other factors. The interesting part is that these differences are advanced by parties to serve their purpose of showing themselves as accommodative about the “minority” which otherwise is thought of as “homogenous and threatening”.

However, as the author argues, even the concept of Muslim minority has two dominant narratives in India- that of accommodation and appeasement/separatism. The Constituent Assembly of India, as the author argues, formulated a fluid concept of the minority, thereby, not dealing well with Muslims as a minority in constitutional terms, rather reducing them to electoral competition. This viewpoint remained stronger because the assembly was dominated by lawyers, and the use of legal language led to a lot of unsolved puzzles. The author contributes here the argument that Muslims as a religious community and constitutional minority are different, as being a minority cannot be a permanent tag. This leaves readers with the question- does becoming populous without sovereignty (because unlike autonomy which covers partial independence, sovereignty caters to wider control of political power) and agency determine any strength?

Furthermore, the author speaks about Muslims as minorities in contemporary India who are searching for survival strategies, especially under the current order. But if Muslims only search for strategies to survive what the author calls the “Modi phenomenon”, those are then of no use because, as pointed out by Mamdani, as long as the source of the issue is not addressed, the problem will keep on lingering (Mamdani, 2020).  Despite contestations about whether this division is a pre-or post-colonial phenomenon, the author points to how colonial power through strategies of “categorization” and “fixation” added a “new language of politics” in India. This connotes that the colonial state normalized creation of such identities, and when the State institutionalized identities, as argued by Lieberman and Singh, it is seen as more of a natural phenomenon than something that is created (Lieberman & Singh, 2017).

The book further elaborates on the question ‘Why does Hindutva need Muslims?’  An interesting conclusion is drawn by the author in this analysis, which is that “the struggle to define Hindutva always revolves around Muslims” (p. 94). This is reinforced by Appadurai’s argument that not only does the majority need a minority for its existence, but the former also considers the latter as a threat to its idea of being a total ‘whole’ (Appadurai, 2020).  Hence, when Bhagwat argues that “Hindutva without Muslims is meaningless,” he puts forward rhetoric to connote that the “existence of the idea of Hindutva needs Muslims for its survival” (p. 88). Further, the author points out the idea of Indianizing Muslims is so deep that even if Muslims of India try to Indianize themselves in one field like politics, they will always be questioned about not doing so in other fields like dressing, eating, and so on. Essentially, the author argues that there is an inherent contradiction between Indian Muslims and various conceptions of Hindutva. This is just one profile of a case where Muslims are collectively taken as a threat since they are seen as foreigners. Hence, the concept of Muslim homogeneity as a threat could be assessed in this case. Restating Kymlika’s term “minoritized majority”, people who subscribe to the majority tend to act as a victimized minority living in fear of existential survival (Kymlika, 2007: 26).  In this case, subscribers to Hindutva and their associates. But while we turn the pages of the case, we see structural differences among Muslims that determine their politics, as put forward by the author.

The presence of differences based on caste, region, and class has created divisions among Muslims themselves. On this note, we find politics being played differently. The economically better-off section, termed Ashrafis, and the ones who are not, called Arzals, have their reasons for assessing the Muslim backwardness in India. The author takes the arguments of the Late Syed Shahabuddin and Iqbal Ansari under the “Muslim unity perspective” (p. 122) and those of Ali Anwar and Eijaz Ali under the “Muslim Pasmanda perspective” (p. 134). The former perspective views the under-representation of Muslims as the core problem and wants reservations for all Muslim communities. The latter considers caste as the main barrier and hence, vouches for the reservation of certain sections within the Muslims. This distinction between groups on various bases led to the emergence of an elite class. The author remarkably argues that “Muslim elites are not just a class of economically rich, but religiously dominant, politically influential, and culturally powerful” (p. 159). Such elites in their respective fields claim to represent the community in general. However, there is a profound difference between what the vast Muslim masses think and how they are claimed to be presented by elites, who, as argued by the author, mold themselves as per the context. By presenting for example, the issue of Triple talaq, Babri Masjid, and Hajj subsidy, the author presents the claim that the vast Muslim population thinks beyond these “Muslim issues” and do care about rest socio-economic affairs.

In the last portion of the book, the author discusses the politics that surrounded the Siyasi Muslims in three major domains. The first is the issue of the reduction of the Muslim community by the parties to the Muslim vote banks. However, if patterns of Muslim voting are analyzed, religious issues are not the only ones that bother them, but electoral gains have reduced their identity to religious issues. The second issue is that of the ‘Good Muslims vs. Bad Muslims’ division, done for electoral gains. Generally, the perception of a good Muslim in India is one who says yes to everything by compromising anything, while the bad ones would refuse to do so. Because here it is the broader or major identity that was used to determine the good and bad ones. The last issue deals with that of Muslim appeasement. As per the author, it speaks either of biased institutional practices or unfair political practices towards Muslims. The present regime usually speaks of it as against constitutional norms of religious equality. The Congress argues that the opposition is trying to shadow this community and exclude them as per their agenda. Surprisingly, the presence of few Muslim figures in these parties, as the author argues, is a symbolic presentation of the usage of the policy of appeasement. Quoting examples of educational institutions such as JMI and AMU, the author puts forward that how so-called ‘appeasement’ done on their bases has further complicated the definition of minority, and the idea of backwardness.

To conclude, it can be argued that the attempt made by the book to understand the ongoing debate about the Muslim community beyond what they have been restricted to deserves appreciation. However, that should not lead one to think of the unspoken issues as obsolete. The book majorly explores how Muslims have responded to contemporary issues surrounding them, but remains silent on their mobilization by parties such as AIMIM, and movements. This limits its exploration and analysis specific to legal matters and does not go beyond that. Yet, the book is vital in terms of understanding the internal dynamics of politics, constitutional explanation of their identity, and concepts of homogeneity and minority, speaking of segregation and accommodative tendencies respectively. 

References

Appadurai, A. (2020). Fear of small numbers: An essay on the geography of anger (D. P. Gaonkar, J. Kramer, B. Lee, & M. Warner, Eds.). Duke University Press. 

Kymlicka, W. (2007). The internationalization of minority rights. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 6(1), 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mom032 

Lieberman, E. S., & Singh, P. (2017). Census enumeration and group conflict: A global analysis of the consequences of counting. World Politics, 69(1), 1–53.https://doi.org/10.1017/s0043887116000198 

Mamdani, M. (2020). Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities. Belknap Press. 

Wilkinson, S. I. (2004). The electoral incentives for ethnic violence. In Votes and Violence (pp. 1–18). Cambridge University Press.

BOOK REVIEW:Performing Representation: Women Members in the Indian Parliament

Performing Representation: Women Members in the Indian Parliament by Shirin Rai, Carole Spary, Oxford University Press, 2019, 416 pages, 14.61 x 3.18 x 22.23 cm, ISBN-978-0199489053, Rs 995

By Sneha Roy

Shirin Rai and Carole Spary are well known scholars in the field of gender and politics, and they break new ground with their invaluable insights on women’s representation in their book Performing Representation: Women Members in the Indian Parliament. They do so while adorning the gendered lens, looking beyond the institutional approach in examining the workings of the Indian Parliament. The methodology they adopt instead tries to fill the gap in examining representative politics through institutional norms by performing a study that is both “historical and socially embedded” (p. 334). This book is theoretically nuanced and is a must-read for anyone trying to understand the everyday workings of the Indian Parliament as it provides a cultural (Taylor, 1995) analysis of the Parliament’s functioning, and is not limited to the investigation of constitutional debates (Austin, 1999). To break free from the “universalism that undermines the performance of ‘other’ representative modes” (p. 18), Rai and Spary adopt the performative approach in bringing about a gendered revolution, tipping the scale towards understanding the experiences of women MPs by reflecting on vignettes provided by elected representatives who identify as women in the Indian Parliament, the corporeality of  their speeches and debates as well as visuals in terms of their clothing. The ‘gendered revolution’ is made possible as they do not treat women MPs as a homogenous group but instead view parliaments as ‘diverse and conflictual spaces of work’ (p. 345).

Rai and Spary focus on Pitkin’s¹ (1967) third mode of representation–‘the symbolic’– while also engaging with her other two modes, i.e. descriptive and substantive representation. Being dialectical, the symbolic dimension includes visuals and the discursive aspects of representation because it reflects the interaction between the performer and the audience, which is in line with their empirically sound ‘performative approach’ which they represent in a tabulated figure (fig.1.2), making it easier for scholars to replicate. They suggest that such an approach “can be materialised through anthropological, ethnographic, and aesthetic approaches” (p. 18). The significance of adopting a very sophisticated blend of qualitative and quantitative methods by evaluating the performance of women MPs in the Parliament, is mammoth as it raises questions that were earlier overlooked by scholars studying representation in this context (p. 311- Struggles for Re-nomination: Stories Told and Untold). They do so by analysing numerical data and generating their own quantitative data— “social profiles of women in terms of class and education, how women MPs have voted, the hours that they have spent participating in debates and how much they have garnered votes” (p. 332). This is done in tandem with analysing their life stories, reflecting on how they present themselves to the authors, their constituents and their peers as well as “media representations of women MPs, press photographs that highlight and comment on their dress and deportment, and by listening to their speeches in Parliament, by reading through parliamentary debates and watching Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha TV” (p.332).

The authors reflect critically on the juxtaposition of the different positions adopted by women MPs and their representation. Some women MPs claim to ‘do politics differently’, while focusing on ‘womanly qualities’ (p.289). On the other hand, others did not want to be associated as ‘women’ MPs (p. 333) and strayed away from the gender specific representations. For instance, in the analysis of MP Sumitra Mahajan’s speeches, some phrases stand out—[women] being the ‘strongest voices of peace and non-violence’, ‘[women] tend to work in a less hierarchical and more participatory and collaborative manner’ (2016:21) ‘life giver-producer mother power’ (Mahajan, 2016a: 224, 227). According to Rai and Spary, such reflections can ‘displace the individualised and heroic approaches to leadership’ (p. 289) but at the same time they express their anxieties over such ‘domestication of politics’ (Ch 2 and Ch 8) which does not produce structural change as it does not challenge gendered norms but furthers the representation of women being docile actors in a gendered institution. On the other end of the spectrum, we have women MPs who either did not want to be associated with their gender but just as working members of the parliament (p.333) or who go completely against the prescribed feminine qualities and adopt notions of ‘dashing’ (Bedi, 2016) (p.289). For instance, Uma Bharti and Vijaya Raje Scindia, supporting their respective party’s agendas of anti-Muslim and anti-Babri Masjid sentiment (p. 289). Showcasing different ways in which women perform politics, Rai and Spary, throw light on the heterogeneity of the category of women as well as the ways of representation they adopt, thus going a step beyond Pitkin’s (1967) political triptych, descriptive representation (representing constituents), substantive representation (making laws), and symbolic representation (representing democratic politics) (p. 12). Such arguments compel the readers to think whether the ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips, 1995) always leads to substantive representation or not.

This volume also deals with the notion of intersectionality, portraying the complexity of Dalit representation in a space that ‘mirrors society and nation at large’ (Johnson and Rai, 2014). There are various measures in place to ensure positive discrimination (Art 330, 332, and 334) to promote ‘effective equality’ (Brass, 1994) and uplift the marginalised sections (Dalits [SCs] and tribal communities [STs]). One would think that MPs belonging to such communities would always be in favour of such measures, but this was not the case.  Velayudhan, the only Dalit woman to be elected to the constituent assembly in 1946, asserted that she was against affirmative action or ‘any kind of reservation’ (p. 9). In their concluding remarks, Rai and Spary also expressed their dilemma while interviewing Dalit women in Parliament who were reluctant to talk about ‘Dalit issues’ (p. 333). However, such practices do not discount the role of ‘critical actors’ (p. 23) like Meira Kumar (Armitage, Johnson, and Spary, 2014) and the more recently elected Draupadi Murmu who make a difference in the everyday functioning of the Parliament by ensuring a ‘politics of presence’ (Phillips, 1995). The authors also reflect on the accounts of former MP Brinda Karat and Asha Kotwal, the general secretary of the All India Dalit Women Rights Forum who expressed their anxieties over Dalit women being subjected to both caste and gender-based discrimination (p. 118). 

The authors do not limit their study to just the themes discussed in this review but also include the problems of authenticity of representation (p. 150) and frivolity of Bollywood-esque representation of women MPs who had earlier ties to the celebrity culture, portraying their rivalry as almost a daily soap (p. 117) among others. Women MPs are not free from the male gaze in terms of what they wear to the Parliament as well as their personal lives making them subject to constant scrutiny. This volume offers a nuanced understanding of the representation of women in the Indian Parliament, focusing on the finer details of performance on a case-by-case basis rather than imposing a universal explanation of practices adopted while performing representation. Although this book may come across as theoretically dense for some readers, it serves as a cache for literature on the performance of representation, making it a must-read for scholars, researchers, or anyone interested in reading about the everyday workings of the Indian Parliament from a gendered perspective. 

With the political and aesthetic onslaught on the Parliament building, Performing Representation remains extremely relevant in today’s context, enabling one to see the parliament as a ‘theatre of Indian democracy’ (p.2), ‘place of work’ (p. 329) and more importantly as a ‘gendered site of representation’ (p.29). Even after decades of gaining independence, just over 11% of MPs in the Lok Sabha are women when the world average is 23.6% (p. 9). Building on the ‘critical mass’² (p. 323) argument presented in the book, the recent passing of the Women’s Reservation Bill, 2023³ is a product of women’s solidarity in the parliament (p. 320). It will surely push a greater number of women onto the political stage which will change the culture of the Parliament, bringing focus on gendered policy agendas and improving gender-sensitive legislation (p. 324). It will also ensure a safer work environment for women in dealing with ‘objectionable characters’ (p. 187), sexism and misogyny, thus ensuring their sustained participation. 

Notes

1. Hanna Pitkin in her book ‘The Concept of Representation’, 1967 identifies three modes of representation, i.e. descriptive representation, substantive representation, and symbolic representation. The authors focus on the dialectical symbolic approach as it emerges through the interaction between the performer and the audience to build their ‘performative approach’. 
2. Beckwith (2007) argues that there is a linear relationship between numbers (critical mass) and outcomes (gender equal policies) (p. 291).  The authors argue that the small numbers of women in large institutions results in the lack of ‘critical mass’ which leaves women isolated and constrained in challenging gender bias (p. 290). The presumption is that a greater number of women will change the culture of the parliament improving gender-sensitive legislation(p.324). The authors mention that authors like Childs and Krook (2008) have challenged the theory of ‘critical mass’ and have instead focussed on ‘critical actors’ in political institutions.
3. Also known as the Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam, 128^th Constitutional Amendment Bill

References:

Armitage, F. R. E. Johnson, and C. Spary. 2014. “The Emergence and Impact of First Female Speakers in the UK, South Africa and India’. In Democracy in Practice: Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament edited by Shirin M. Rai and R. E. Johnson. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 

Austin, Granville. 1999. The Indian Constitution. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Beckwith, K. 2007. ‘Numbers and Newness: The Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Women’. Canadian Journal of Political Science 

Bedi, Tarini. 2016. The Dashing Ladies of Shiv Sena: Political Matronage in Urbanizing India. Albany: SUNY Press. 

Brass, P. R. (1994). The Politics of India since Independence (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Childs, Sarah and Mona Lena Krook. 2007. ‘Critical Mass Theory and Women’s Political Representation’. Political Studies: 2008 56: 725-36. 

Phillips, Anne. 1995. The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pitkin, H. F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 

Rai, Shirin. M. and R. E. Johnson (eds). 2014. Democracy in Practice: Ceremony and Ritual in Parliament. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

BOOK REVIEW: Politics of Representation: Historically Disadvantaged Groups in India’s Democracy

Politics of Representation: Historically Disadvantaged Groups in India’s Democracy. Edited by Sudha Pai & Sukhadeo Thorat, Palgrave Macmillan; 1^st edition, 2022 XIV + 288 pp. Hardcover ₹ 11,733.

By Mohammad Wali Akhtar

Recent trends in Indian politics have witnessed a renewed interest in the question of political representation. Partly, it emerges from theoretical works that significantly expand the concept of representation by introducing key theoretical propositions. In Politics of Representation: Historically Disadvantaged Groups in India’s Democracy,editors Sudha Pai and Sukhadeo Thorat bring together the contributors to explore the issue of representation in Indian democracy. The essays in this recently published book provide vivid historical and empirical examples of representation in parliament and state legislatures. This is a thought-provoking and analytically helpful collection that challenges established assumptions and suggests fruitful paths for further research. 

Since India’s independence, there has been an ongoing debate regarding representation in Indian democracy. The issue of representation for various groups has been debated in the constituent assembly since the foundational moments, which include the choice of electoral method to ensure proper representation. The need for representation of historically marginalized groups, such as the SCs and STs, Muslims, and women, has been one of the concerns of our day and has been consistently discussed and argued throughout this country’s democratic path. This edited work is an attempt to address the question of representation in contemporary Indian politics in a few carefully chosen chapters. It covers historically disadvantaged groups as well as groups that are left behind in the nation’s post-colonial politics.

The contributors to the volume further developed the question of representation and illustrated it by providing vivid historical and empirical examples. Through figures and tables, the authors illustrate how the representatives of marginalized communities raise questions and affect policy framing. These range from the percentage of elected members in the legislature from these marginalized groups to a role analysis of their MPs, etc. While arguing on Muslim representation, Prof. Zoya Hasan utilizes Christophe Jaffrelot’s statement that the importance of “‘your people’ representing your interests in elected bodies is that if they do not, there will be fewer people in defense of minorities” (p.154).

Among the above-mentioned groups, the author argues that the SCs and STs have comparatively improved because of their descriptive representation. It is a questionable fact whether descriptive representation provides them with real representation. It would not have been possible without the efforts of Ambedkar, who, in order to secure representation for his community, flipped the idea of a minority on its head and said, “Social discrimination is the real test of defining a group as a minority, not separation in religion, which constitutes the only test of a minority, as it is neither a good nor an efficient test” (p.82).

This volume is organized around three overarching themes: the SCs and STs, Muslims, and women. Through these themes, the central aspects of contemporary political marginalization such as representation in legislatures, group politics, and the empowerment of these groups are explored and discussed.

In the first part of the book, the authors explore representation in the electoral system by focusing on historically marginalized groups, i.e., the SCs and STs. The essays on the SCs reflected on the role played by electoral reservation, which the Schedule Castes were able to secure because of the constant effort of Ambedkar, the changes within society because of education, and the rise of the middle class, which led to the emergence of Dalit identity. On the other hand, the STs are unable to develop political consciousness, leadership, or influence in policymaking because of their reservations. The tribal parties have been sandwiched between the politics of the Congress and the BJP and remain limited to their region. It is still debatable whether the descriptive representation in the lawmaking body or other institutions provides them with real representation and a share in power and policymaking.

The second part of the book discusses the issue of Muslim representation, which has been one of the most troubled issues because of the horrors of partition and the lack of a leader who can put forth their demands. Political safeguards for religious minorities did not receive a principled defense from nationalist opinion, and constitution-makers did not attempt alternative legitimacy for their protection (Bajpai, 2000). Leaders like Nehru and Patel were against communal reservation. The author argues that the crisis of representation was first felt after the 1980s with the decline of Congress and the demolition of the Babri Masjid, and later reports of the Sachar Committee brought the issue of reservation to the center of Muslim politics. The ‘Ranganath Mishra Commission’ shifted India’s discourse on equal opportunity away from national integration towards justice and equality, recognizing religion as a category of social exclusion, ensuring proportionality, and monitoring social diversity (Kim, 2019). Eventually, with the coming back of the BJP in 2014, representation has fallen very sharply in state assemblies and in parliament, so unlike the SCs and STs, the author argues that the Muslim community has witnessed a decline in representation, which can also make them second-class citizens with little representation. 

Finally, the book’s last section tackles the issue of women from various perspectives. Shefali Jha first philosophically traces the gender question and representation in modern democracies, where large groups can experience exclusion even though they participate in the system. A prime example of what the author highlights is the issue of the Women’s Reservation Bill, which has still not passed. The author argues that women’s symbolic representation would perhaps turn into a form of substantive representation. However, the main thrust of Shirin Rai’s chapter is that the larger subject of empowerment cannot be addressed unless women’s groups in India truly address the issue of class and caste-based disparities. It is still unclear if representation always equals recognition, and since party ideology takes precedence over gender solidarity, it is critical that women’s representatives hold themselves accountable for advancing women’s issues. 

Although the ideas and arguments in the book have been explored before by scholars, they are perhaps more acute today with the rise of Hindu majoritarian politics than in the initial years of post-independence politics. The contribution of this volume is distinctive in that it brings these dispersed studies together and gives them a new shape by highlighting the distinctions and similarities of these underrepresented groups’ experiences. Prof. Vidhu Verma argues that “Though support for reservation for SCs, STs, and even OBCs is present for different kinds of reasons, the same kind of support is not widely accepted for religious minorities” (p. 51). This may, of course, change at some point in the future, but for the time being, contemporary politics reflects the ramifications of the path undertaken in the earlier decades, with minorities and women still struggling after many decades to obtain representation. 

This book draws our attention to the fact that ensuring proper representation for the above-mentioned groups in society today is still a major challenge. This representation challenge is further exacerbated by the advent of an authoritarian nationalist government that is unwilling to share power with marginalized communities. According to data presented throughout the book, Muslim representation has reached a record low since the BJP won an absolute majority in 2014, making them the most susceptible of the groups the book discusses. In the context of contemporary India, Mamdani’s words are becoming more and more relevant. In Neither Settler nor Native, he argues that in democracy, majorities and minorities are formed through political processes. However, in a nation-state, it can only be real for the national majority (Mamdani, 2020).

The book left a few questions unexplored, like the evolution of the idea of minority, thereby creating a path for further research. The collection of chapters in this volume is well organized around a certain theme, and it can significantly advance the research in this field. The many viewpoints of the writers, informed by their specialized fields, combine to provide an integrated impact that challenges the way the entire field thinks, inspiring researchers to consider their research and the field’s future in novel ways. Anybody interested in representation and politics, gender, reservations, communalism, or empowerment should read the Politics of Representation. 

References 

Bajpai, R. (2000). Constituent Assembly debates and minority rights. Economic and Political Weekly, 1837-1845.

Kim, H. (2019). The Struggle for Equality: India’s Muslims and Rethinking the UPA Experience. Cambridge University Press.

Mamdani, M. (2020). Neither Settler nor Native, Harvard University Press.

Tawa Lama-Rewal, S. (2016). Political representation in India: Enlarging the perspective. India Review, 15(2), 163-171.