TheDaak review

by Sakshi Wadhwa

The rich corpus of studies on Ambedkar’s invaluable contribution in striving against the injustices faced by the ‘Untouchables’ in India, and drafting the Indian Constitution which has stood the test of time, often presents his political thought as confined to his refutation of caste-based atrocities, and in juxtaposition with Gandhian thoughts on the same. Ambedkar’s ideas on nationalism are usually portrayed by the reactionary right-wing as contradictory to Gandhi or other leaders like Nehru, specifically with respect to the partition of British India. This commentary seeks to explore Ambedkar’s thoughts on nation and nationalism, particularly in the context of the creation of Pakistan, and to point out the rationale for his dissent from other leaders, along with understanding the idea of community from his political thought. Further, the commentary also deals with the intra-community dimension as viewed by Ambedkar. For Ambedkar, it is the feeling of oneness and fellowship within, and among, communities that forms the basis of a nation.

Concepts of Nation and State

For Sudipta Kaviraj, the distinction between the state and the nation lies in the fact that the former has “some elements of material, institutional fixity” while the nation “is just an idea – one of the most indefinable, intangible and yet emotionally forceful concepts affecting political action in the modern world” (Kaviraj, 2019, p.13). Further, he viewed nationalism as “an unprecedented connection of intimacy and ownership between political subjects and their state” (Kaviraj, 2019, p.14). According to Kaviraj, the simplistic story of nationalism views nationalism along with capitalist economic strength that facilitated the Western countries to establish dominance across the world. The fascination with this power derived from nationalism led other countries to adopt it. Since it was not a herculean task for Asian countries to equip themselves with the military techniques of Western countries, the reason for the latter’s dominance and emergence as colonisers lay in their power as nation-states, something which was the Western invention. The invention of the nation-state involved “a peculiar organization of emotion behind their state apparatus, and the chemistry of an affect that produced an unprecedented figuration of collective intentionality and collective action” (Kaviraj, 2019, p. 14). The strength of this force called nation-state and the Western version of nationalism appeared attractive to the elites in India, who were eager to emulate it despite the fact that neither ‘nation’ nor ‘state’ in the Western connotation of the terms, existed in India. A crucial aspect of the nation-state is the concept of sovereignty, or in simple terms, the nation is to be ruled by those belonging to the nation and not a foreign power. However, it was not sovereignty that was the root cause of worry for thinkers like Gandhi and Tagore; sovereignty was the most important component as a collective, but it was the state as a locus of all political activities and concentration that appeared problematic… The denial of sovereignty to the natives is what charged the nationalists to demand it intensively. In other words, it is state-centrism as nationalists’ aspiration that posed the major issue for Gandhi and Tagore. For Gandhi and Tagore, the nationalists’ acceptance of the all-encompassing structure of the modern state—which absorbed the freedoms once enjoyed at the societal level and erased the distinction between the political and the social—was a cause for concern. Both of them were weary of the “logic of the modern state, and techniques of modern power,” which involves a dominant political sphere with its focus on homogeneity even when it is ruled by the natives (Kaviraj, 2019, p. 20). As pointed out by Kaviraj, “Tagore argued passionately that India had never known a concept like the nation whose feeling of community was based on peoples’ common link to the political power of the modern state. And, as becomes apparent through the narrative developments of his novel, Gora, his major concern was about the homogeneity demanded and celebrated by the ideal of the European nation-state” (Kaviraj, 2019, p. 20)  

Prior to colonial rule, the political and social spaces were distinct from each other, thereby ensuring that the social regulates itself and remains largely unaffected by the changes in the political one. Partha Chatterjee has also elaborated on the different socio-political set-ups in precolonial India. For Chatterjee, the political independence from British rule revealed just one aspect of anti-colonial nationalism in India; another crucial aspect that did not garner much interest was the social realm, which was fairly insulated from direct British influence. He argued that although India was a British colony politically, people experienced autonomy and independence at the societal level. In other words, British influence was limited to matters like statecraft, economy and even science and technology, categorized as “outside” domain, and people were free to follow their culture and traditions in what is categorized as the “inner” or “spiritual” domain (Chatterjee, 1993). Initially, the Indian reformers keen on reforming the traditional institutions and customs asked the colonial authority to intervene in the inner domain. In the latter phase, a reversal of this could be witnessed as although reform was still desired, there was resistance to the Western colonial intervention for the same. This latter phase that kept Western influence out of the “national culture,” for Chatterjee, is already the phase of nationalism. However, the inner domain changed where a non-Western “modern” national culture was crafted. Therefore, it was in this inner realm that the nation was imagined, already sovereign and autonomous, although politically, the colonial rule continued (Chatterjee, 1993). In short, the imagination of community in postcolonial India was dominated by the history of the postcolonial state, where the communities have a subordinated position and are overpowered by the state. 

Similar to Chatterjee’s argument, Kaviraj points to the critique by Gandhi and Tagore, which is centred on the modern Western conception whereby the state takes centre stage for both political and social spaces, becoming the locus of every political and social activity. Kaviraj points out that “Tagore called this evil ‘the nation’ and an attachment to it the sentiment of nationalism” (Kaviraj, 2019, p. 27).

The resistance to supporting the idea of state centrism can rightfully lead Nandy to not view Gandhi and Tagore as nationalists; however, through this claim, Kaviraj lays out two interpretations of nationalism, which were different from the frequently cited civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. The first interpretation of nationalism deals with the anti-colonial sentiment whereby the “rule of one people by another” is considered inappropriate. It is this anti-colonial nationalism that focused on driving the British rulers out of India. The second kind of nationalism implies “a sense of cohesion among a group of members of a state that they are its ‘nation’, the people to whom the state belongs, who ‘own’ the state; which immediately produces the implication that those who cannot crowd into that definition are its internal others, marooned inside its borders but outside its collective self-definition” (Kaviraj, 2019, p. 27). While Kaviraj placed Tagore in the first category and probed into the question of whether the nation-state is the only form of political organisation for governance in the modern world, it is worthy to discuss these two forms of nationalism, which implies internal exclusion on which Ambedkar’s thoughts hold value and relevance.  

Before delving into Ambedkar’s views on the two forms of nationalism, it is helpful to first note that Ambedkar faced backlash on account of his views on nation and nationalism. Most nationalists criticised Ambedkar as a ‘desh drohi’ (Guru, 2016). Ambedkar deals with the cause of anxiety of the nationalists, particularly the Hindu nationalists, to establish that India has been a ‘nation’ with Muslims as a part of it. He follows a three-step explanation to quash such claims by the Hindu nationalists, which are seen and criticised as being supportive of the creation of Pakistan.

First, he debunks the similar characteristics logic for claiming the oneness of Hindus and Muslims. For Ambedkar, while it is unrefutable that Hindus and Muslims have commonalities, such as belonging to the same race, speaking the same language, and some common traditions, believing that such commonalities indicate the same ‘nation’ was a flaw. The rationale provided by him for finding flaws in such a belief is as follows:

“But the question is : can all this support the conclusion that the Hindus and the Mahomedans on account of them constitute one nation or these things have fostered in them a feeling that they long to belong to each other. There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first place, what are pointed out as common features are not the result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other’s ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On the other hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical causes. They are partly due to incomplete conversions…. Partly it is to be explained as the effect of common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims have been subjected for centuries….Partly are these common features to be explained as the remnants of a period of religious amalgamation between the Hindus and the Muslims inaugurated by the Emperor Akbar, the result of a dead past which has no present and no future….There is, therefore, little wonder if great sections of the Muslim community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their religious and social life” (p. 33).

Second, he shows that the claim of being a ‘nation’ encompassing both Hindus and Muslims and, therefore, fit for self-government is faulty by putting forth the qualification of a shared, common past for being a ‘nation,’ which is inspired by Ernest Renan’s thoughts on the nation. Ambedkar points out:

“Firstly, the Hindu felt ashamed to admit that India was not a nation. In a world where nationality and nationalism were deemed to be special virtues in a people, it was quite natural for the Hindus to feel, to use the language of Mr. H.G. Wells, that it would be as improper for India to be without a nationality as it would be for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly. Secondly, he had realized that nationality had a most intimate connection with the claim for self-government. He knew that by the end of the 19th century, it had become an accepted principle that the people, who constituted a nation, were entitled on that account to self government and that any patriot, who asked for self-government for his people, had to prove that they were a nation” (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 28-29).

Therefore, aligning with Tagore’s ideas, Ambedkar viewed sovereignty or self-government as a major goal for which nationalists were striving to achieve the same, and the claim of being a ‘nation’ was highlighted. Referring to Ernest Renan’s views, and agreeing with the same, Ambedkar believed in the need for common, shared glories of the past as a vital criterion to be called a ‘nation.’ Ambedkar then applies this qualification in the Muslim and Hindu communities. For Ambedkar, Hindus and Muslims have a contentious past.

“Their past is a past of mutual destruction—a past of mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand points out in his pamphlet called “the Hindu National Movement”,— “In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj, Partap, Shivaji and, Beragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while the Mahomedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad Bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their national heroes.” In the religious field, the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayan, the Mahabharat and the Geeta. The Musalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and the Hadis. Thus, the things that divide are far more vital than the things which unite” (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 36)

Another recourse offered by Renan and accepted by Ambedkar is the willingness to forget the past and the emphasis on co-existing together that can still ensure the national configuration. 

However, Ambedkar points out, “The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain” (Ambedkar, 2014, p.37). 

Therefore, since the two communities uphold religions which had conflicting pasts, in order to forget the past, the element of religion needs to be forgotten, which in itself is impossible.  Another aspect pertaining to the territory is mentioned later. Third, Ambedkar distinguishes between a community and a nation, and is of the view that the demand for a separate nation by Muslims who earlier characterised themselves as a community, cannot be a sufficient reason for refusing their claim. Therefore, the will for separate existence, as pointed out by Renan, remained absent among the Muslims since they articulated their desire to break away. In his words:

“To say that because the Muslims once called themselves a community, they are, therefore, now debarred from calling themselves a nation is to misunderstand the mysterious working of the psychology of national feeling. Such an argument presupposes that wherever there exist a people, who possess the elements that go to the making up of a nation, there must be manifested that sentiment of nationality which is their natural consequence and that if they fail to manifest it for sometime, then that failure is to be used as evidence showing the unreality of the claim of being a nation, if made afterwards. There is no historical support for such a contention” (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 37-38). 

He further stated:

“It is no use contending that there are cases where a sense of nationality exists but there is no desire for a separate national existence. Cases of the French in Canada and of the English in South Africa, may be cited as cases in point. It must be admitted that there do exist cases, where people are aware of their nationality, but this awareness does not produce in them that passion which is called nationalism. In other words, there may be nations conscious of themselves without being charged with nationalism. On the basis of this reasoning, it may be argued that the Musalmans may hold that they are a nation but they need not on that account demand a separate national existence; why can they not be content with the position which the French occupy in Canada and the English occupy in South Africa ? Such a position is quite a sound position. It must, however, be remembered that such a position can only be taken by way of pleading with the Muslims not to insist on partition. It is no argument against their claim for partition, if they insist upon it” (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 38).

In the aforementioned words, it is evident that Ambedkar did not discourage the attempts by Hindu nationalists to convince the Muslims to stay in unified India; however, he also highlights the validity of the wish and claim of the Muslims to break away and form a separate state. 

It is also worth noting that Ambedkar accepts the existence of a sense of nationality but no wish for a separate statist existence. Therefore, Ambedkar distinguishes between nationality or national feeling and nationalism. To quote him directly offers better clarity:

“First, there is a difference between nationality and nationalism. They are two different psychological states of the human mind. Nationality means “consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship.” Nationalism means “the desire for a separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship.” Secondly, it is true that there cannot be nationalism without the feeling of nationality being in existence. But, it is important to bear in mind that the converse is not always true. The feeling of nationality may be present and yet the feeling of nationalism may be quite absent. That is to say, nationality does not in all cases produce nationalism. For nationality to flame into nationalism two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the “will to live as a nation.” Nationalism is the dynamic expression of that desire. Secondly, there must be a territory which nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a cultural home of the nation. Without such a territory, nationalism, to use Lord Acton’s phrase, would be a “soul as it were wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again and dies out finding none.” The Muslims have developed a ‘will to live as a nation’. For them nature has found a territory which they can occupy and make it a state as well as a cultural home for the new-born Muslim nation” (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 38-39). 

However, this does not imply that geography or territorial or administrative congruity is the only criteria for a nation. By offering the example of administrative unity between India and Burma  (present-day Myanmar) till 1937, it is argued that the common sense of belonging, the feeling of nationality (kith-kin associational feeling) is what constitutes the most crucial aspect of nationalism.

According to Ambedkar, despite having the feeling of nationality, communities can co-exist within the same nation; however, the sense of nationality metamorphoses into nationalism when the desire for a separate existence of the community steps in. Nationality is, therefore, a crucial stepping stone in leading towards nationalism; however, it is not mandatory that the sense of nationality will always intensify and evolve into nationalism. In order to transform into nationalism, the desire for a separate national existence is needed, along with the existence of a specific territory which could be formed into a state for the proposed nation. Further, Ambedkar views nationality as “a social feeling” that binds individuals together with feelings of kith and kin. Calling it a “double edged sword,” Ambedkar points to the cohesion, oneness, and belonging for the community as part of the sense of nationality (irrespective of economic and social differences), as co-existing with the feeling of exclusion or “anti-fellowship” for those not considered a part of the nationality (Ambedkar, 2014, p. 31). 

It can, therefore, be argued that Ambedkar tilts towards the ethnic conception of nationalism while referring to nationality, while simultaneously accommodating the civic conception by pointing to the examples of Canada (French population) or South Africa (English population), that the different nationalities subsumed under the same ‘nation’ is also possible. His emphasis on the community as legitimate decision makers in this regard points to his liberal, non-state, and non-majority centric approach whereby coercion or cajoling of the community to not break away is opposed by him; the example of Muslims’ freedom to separate acts as a prime example for this. However, a pertinent question emerging from this discussion on Ambedkar’s views on nationality and nationalism is: what should be the exact procedure, process,  strategy or way of deciding whether it is the elites of the community who decide for nationalism, i.e., a separate national existence, or the community as a whole. Since Ambedkar emphasised the injustices within the Hindu community, it is reasonable to question the similar faultlines in other communities, too, thereby posing the question of ‘how’ a community decides on launching nationalism, i.e., separate existence. Further, it appears that despite attempts at avoiding it, Ambedkar falls into the Western concept of homogeneity of nations by allowing the congruity of ethnic communities with the territory while finding this geographical unity as secondary. 

Navigating Emotions in the Community

Since the feature of emotions in the context of nationality is quintessential in Ambedkar’s thoughts, it is worthy of understanding to some greater length by invoking Rajeev Bhargava’s views on the same and to grasp the ways in which emotions were used by Gandhi, Nehru, and more broadly the Congress party in calling for Hindu-Muslim unity in undivided India and the response to the same by the Muslim League. For Bhargava, “a failure to achieve the objective of living within a single, unified state (it is established fact that till 1940 political separation was not on the agenda of the Muslim League) is to be explained not just by economic or religious causes but by a lack of political imagination – shaped as it was, as much by distinct conceptions of nation and community, as by differing emotions” (Bhargava, 2000, p. 194). The emotional appeals are expressed by both Gandhi and Nehru, cited by Bhargava when the former said that wished for “not a patched up thing but a union of hearts based upon a definite recognition of the indubitable proposition that swaraj for India must be an impossible dream without the indissoluble union between the Hindus and Muslims of India” (Bhargava, 2000, p. 198). The latter also made an emotional appeal for a “conscious effort on the part of all of us for the emotional integration of all our people” (Bhargava, 2000, p. 198). However, the response of the Muslim League to emotional bonding was derived, according to Bhargava, from self-interest. While he believed that Hindu-Muslim relations went through a rough patch, emotional bonds based on mutual respect might have improved them, but the emotional appeal and interest-based dynamics acted as roadblocks.  

For Bhargava, a community is “a dense network of relations binding members into a thick unity of purpose. Fusion rather than the diffusion of identity is critical to this conception. Furthermore, these bonds of solidarity must be experienced emotionally, if they are to exist or else at best they exist very weakly” (Bhargava, 2000, p. 198). Therefore, the vital components of ‘community’ in general are a strong sense of purpose and emotional bonds of solidarity. It is the shift in the understanding of community whereby Hindus and Muslims were now viewed as two distinct emotionally associated communities with a common sense of purpose within themselves that the perception of each being a nation came to the fore. Therefore, what Ambedkar characterised as nationality is what Bhargava denoted as community. For Bhargava, the perception of being a distinct community with a thick sense of purpose and emotional bonding leads to a feeling of being a ‘nation’, and demand for a separate nation-state; Ambedkar placed emphasis not merely on the sense of being a distinct nationality but on the will to demand a separate nation-state that results in a separate national existence. On the one hand, owing to this rationale laid out by Bhargava, he found the terms ‘communal’ and ‘national’ becoming “antithetical to each other” during the nationalist struggle (Bhargava, 2000, p.199). On the other hand, the earlier mentioned reasons: shared past and will to live, led Ambedkar to view Hindus and Muslims as never a singular community or nationality even prior to the nationalist struggle. 

A question that emerges here is whether the wish by the Congress for a unified, undivided India with both Hindus and Muslims living together is also derived from self-interest and masquerading in emotional appeals, something that, as Bhargava notes, Muslims were already suspicious of. For Bhargava, the focus on emotional appeals by the Congress leadership appeared to be based on the passion for unification without attempting to understand the reality of growing estrangement between the two communities, while Muslims, threatened by the hegemonic rule by the majority Hindus, based their demands on self-interest. Therefore, “a sentimental conception of community affected the perception and evaluation of inter-community conduct” by both communities, thereby indicating the importance of emotions in community dynamics (Bhargava, 2000, p. 199).  Therefore, in line with Ambedkar, Bhargava also points to the growing emotional distance between the communities, which for Ambedkar, had always existed due to differing pasts, and any coercion in this regard should be avoided. 

Intra-Community Dimension

In the context of intra-community dynamics, it is important to understand Ambedkar’s views on the Hindu community along with his staunch opposition against the caste system, which forms another important aspect of Ambedkar’s ideas on belongingness within a religious community. 

As per Ambedkar, the caste system is premised on a mindset; a change in the state of mind is needed to do away with the caste system. The root cause for such a mindset is not an unfounded misconception but religious sanctions. He argued that “To ask people to give up caste is to ask them to go contrary to their fundamental religious notions” (Thorat & Kumar, 2008, p. 291). Therefore, he emphasised two kinds of religious basis, one based on rules or principles, which he found important regarding reforms. “Religion of Principles” alone can be considered  “a true religion” instead of one based on ‘rules.’ Principles are different from rules because they contain the scope of judgement and reflexivity (Ambedkar, 2002). As Rinku Lamba has pointed out, the rules absolve the doers from responsibility for the actions and prescribe a format to follow in actions, while no such prescription is involved in the case of principles (Lamba, 2019). 

Furthermore, since Hinduism believed in the social system to be prescribed by “Prophets or Lawgivers” and, therefore, perceived as final and unchanging, that negates the scope for reflexivity and change in accordance with the changing times and conditions (Ambedkar, 2002, p. 299). Furthermore, as eloquently pointed out by Rinku Lamba, since Ambedkar found religion in general to be not very accepting of change, and the caste system features as part of the Hindu religion, the scope for change or reform within the Hindu community appeared negligible, thereby leading Ambedkar to put in efforts to bring in the reforms, primarily to prevent caste-based atrocities, through the state apparatus (Lamba, 2013, p. 190).

The question impending for an answer here is if the state apparatus can be used for reforming the religious community, and if  possible mischief can be done by using the state apparatus for quelling the demands for separation by a community through affecting changes from within their fold. For instance, the co-optation of elites by the government in the secessionist movement of Punjab or in the case of Bodoland Council, where the new chief had less resonance among the Bodos, are instances where identitarian political movements are curbed by the state’s interference with the internal actors of the community (Singh & Kim, 2018; Bezbaruah, 2019). While Ambedkar’s objective for using the state forces (external) to initiate reformation within the community (internal) was to curb the graded inequality adversely impacting the ‘Untouchables,’ denying them equality and freedom, the governments have consistently and excessively used centralisation and state intervention to bring reforms within a religious community. The very recent law on the Waqf bill¹ also indicates excessive state interventions with seemingly ambiguous motivations behind them. Another crucial aspect is Ambedkar’s emphasis on leaving a wide enough scope for the exit for both Muslims (from British India) and the “depressed classes” (from the Hindu religious community) if they feel a lack of belongingness as kith and kin. His commitment to allowing or ensuring this freedom to exist is evident in his words, “I prefer the Freedom of India to the Unity of India,” thereby indicating his conviction against force of any kind, especially on the minority community (Ambedkar, 1946, p. 367).  

However, the hypothetical question worth asking for clarity is whether Ambedkar would have allowed the ‘depressed classes’ to secede and form a separate nation-state since, although sharing the same past with other Hindus, they were oppressed and subjected to inhuman treatment; further, by their renouncing Hindu religion (like Ambedkar and many more in his footsteps), the common religious link would be severed too. Finally, their sense of nationality developed and transformed into nationalism, which fulfilled the grounds for their separation as well. 

Further, while a superficial glance might show Ambedkar in contradiction to Tagore, who was against the state being the centre of all socio-economic activities, the complexities pointed out by Ambedkar in the way of reform, internally within the Hindu community, offer sufficient justifications for state-led reforms. These three-pronged complexities include challenging the authority of the Brahmins, the caste system and the Hindu religious scriptures like Vedas and Shastras (Lamba, 2013). To answer the state-level interventions, it is worthwhile to note that Luis Cabrera in his paper dealing with Ambedkar as a cosmopolitan, has pointed out Ambedkar’s support for the “state-transcendent universal human rights”, which he found to be non-negotiable irrespective of culture, state membership or any other identity marker (Cabrera, 2017, p. 583). His opposition to “uncritical loyalty to the state” was pointed out with his argument that the loyalty to state should be conditional to the state’s protection of the people (Cabrera, 2017, p. 577). For Ambedkar, the state exists for the welfare of the people and has no moral significance apart from this role.  Not only the state but institutions, practices, and even whole religions need to be examined and countered if they violate universal human rights. Third, he advocated appealing to international authorities in case of violation of human rights, which is usually the case with minority communities (Carbera, 2017).

Here, it is also helpful to take up the concept of ‘social endosmosis’ advocated by John Dewey, the scholar and educator who had a great influence on Ambedkar. The scientific meaning of the term is the flowing of fluid through a membrane, and Dewey has only once referred to social endosmosis by arguing in chapter seven of his book Democracy and Education, that “a separation into a privileged and subject-class prevents social endosmosis” (Dewey, 1997, p. 84). However, Ambedkar builds on it by arguing that only “a free social order” ensures social endosmosis whereby without discrimination and restrictions, all classes are able to intermingle and share interests “when there is a free play back and forth,” thereby leading to ease in mobility (Mukherjee, 2009, p. 261).  The “like-mindedness” is what is underlined while drawing attention towards social endosmosis (Cabrera, 2017, p. 586). It can, therefore, be argued that Ambedkar did not oppose the claims of a separate nation for Pakistan and pointed out the flaws in the Hindu social order; his convictions on shared living remained intact. To sum up, Ambedkar’s views uphold the concern for minority rights, whether religious or caste-based, and his commitment to stand by his convictions despite backlash is worthy of recognition. In contemporary times when state surveillance, and friction between linguistic, regional and religious communities have intensified, Ambedkar’s thoughts hold immense relevance. 

Conclusion

The commentary attempts to show Ambedkar’s views on nationalism and the aspect of community. It poses the question of whether Ambedkar’s views conform to the Western nationalist ideals of an ethnic nation, or they are based primarily on allowing the will of the community to be the basis of a separate nation-state. The importance of emotional valence is highlighted to show the then-growing estrangement between Hindus and Muslims, whereby Ambedkar allowed the scope of exit. In the case of intra-community dynamics, Ambedkar’s critique of the Hindu social order is highlighted, along with his justification for state-level interventions for reform and his support for the scope of exit while also arguing in favour of social endosmosis. To sum up, one needs to be cautious in labelling or categorising Ambedkar as a “nationalist” or “crusader”; instead, his political thoughts are premised on reason which needs to be viewed contextually to be able to better grasp him.  

References:

Rodriguez, V. (2002). The Essential Writings of BR Ambedkar. London: Oxford University Press.

Ambedkar, B. (2017). DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR WRITINGS AND SPEECHES VOL. 8.https://www.amazon.com/BABASAHEB-AMBEDKAR-WRITINGS-SPEECHES-VOL-ebook/dp/B074JFP225

Bhargava, R. (2000). History, nation and community: Reflections on nationalist historiography of India and Pakistan. Economic and Political Weekly, 193-200.

Bezbaruah, M. P. (2019). Cultural Sub-Nationalism in India’s North-East: An Overview. Subnational Movements in South Asia, 171-190.

Chatterjee, P. (1993). The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton University Press.

Cabrera, L. (2017). “Gandhiji, I Have no Homeland”: Cosmopolitan Insights from BR Ambedkar, India’s Anti-Caste Campaigner and Constitutional Architect. Political Studies, 65(3), 576-593.

Dewey, J. (1997). Democracy and education. Free Press. 

Guru, G. (2016). Nationalism as the Framework for Dalit Self-realization. Brown J. World Aff., 23, 239.

Kaviraj, S. (2019). Tagore and the conception of critical nationalism. In Religion and Nationalism in Asia (pp. 13-31). Routledge.

Lamba, R. (2013). State Intervention in the Reform of a” Religion of Rules” An Analysis of the Views of BR Ambedkar. Secular States and Religious Diversity, 187.

Mukherjee, A. P. (2009). BR Ambedkar, John Dewey, and the meaning of democracy. New Literary History, 40(2), 345-370.

Singh, G., & Kim, H. (2018). The limits of India’s ethno-linguistic federation: Understanding the demise of Sikh nationalism. Regional & Federal Studies, 28(4), 427-445.

Thorat, S., & Kumar, N. (2008). BR Ambedkar: Perspectives on social exclusion and inclusive policies.

1. For more information on Waqf bill along with its critical analysis, refer to:
   https://scroll.in/article/1080943/with-the-waqf-bill-the-state-brings-a-legal-bulldozer-to-minority-rights ↩︎

---

---